Believing Like A Lawyer by Smith, Steven D
Boston College Law Review
Volume 40
Issue 5 Number 5 Article 1
9-1-1999
Believing Like A Lawyer
Steven D. Smith
Follow this and additional works at: http://lawdigitalcommons.bc.edu/bclr
Part of the Legal History Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at Digital Commons @ Boston College Law School. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Boston College Law Review by an authorized administrator of Digital Commons @ Boston College Law School. For more information,
please contact nick.szydlowski@bc.edu.
Recommended Citation
Steven D. Smith, Believing Like A Lawyer, 40 B.C.L. Rev. 1041 (1999),
http://lawdigitalcommons.bc.edu/bclr/vol40/iss5/1
BELIEVING LIKE A LAWYER
STEVEN D. Smyrn*
TABLE OF CONTENTS
I. LOOKING FOR "THE LAW" 	  1048
A. The Components of Conventional Legal Discourse 	   1049
B. "The Law" Behind the Law 	  1051
1. "The law" 	  1051
2. "The law" behind the precedents 	  1053
3. "The law" behind enactments 	  1055
C. Legal Discourse as Practical Reason ' 	   1058
1. The inefficacy of generic accounts 	  1059
2. The practical inefficacy of the law's distinctive
discourse 	  1061
D. Legal Interpretation. and Scriptural interpretation 	  1065
E. The Paradox of Modern Legal Thought 	  1069
II. AGAINST CONVENTIONAL LEGAL DISCOURSE: THE
HOLMESIAN CENTURY 	  1070
A. The Rejection of Metaphyical Commitments 	  1071
B. The Critique of Conventional Legal Discourse 	  1073
1. Indeterminacy 	  1073
2. Artificiality 	  1076
C. The Special Emphasis on the Form-Substance Distinction . . 	  1080
D. Supplying the Substance	   1083
III. THE - IMPASSABLE PATH OF THE LAW 	  1086
IV. RECONSIDERING THE MODERN CRITIQUE 	  1092
A. The Anticipated Demise of Faith 	  1093
B. Reconsidering the Unimaginable 	  1097
V. THE ORIENTATION OF FAITH 	  1098
A. The Elements of Faith 	  1100
Robert and Marion Short Professor, Notre Dame Law Selma A number of friends mid
ctilleagues commented on earlier drafts. Partly as a result of these COMMelltS, the article has been
so transformed that it may he almost unrecognizable to those who read the earliest versions. In
this respect, I thank Larry Alexander, Curt Bradley, Paul Campus, Step Feldman, Rebecca Deitch,
Bob Nagel, Dale Oest ede, knell:lel Perry, Saikrislum Pmkash, Bob Rodes, Joint Robinson, Emily
Sherwin, and Joseph Vining. I also presented a version of the article in colloquiums for the




	 IJOSTON COLLEGE LAW REVIEW	 [Vol. 40:1041
1. The sense of an overarching reality that is not
directly perceived 
	  1100
2. The normative authority of the unseen
	  1103
3. Recognition that the ultimate truth or reality is
largely inaccessible to human comprehension 	  1104
4. Recognition of signals or directions for guiding
human conduct 	  1106
5. Trustful resignation 	  1107
B. Faith and Reason 	  1109
VI. LAW AS AN EXPRESSION OF FAITH? 	  1112
A. The Legal Faith 	  1113
B. Faith and its Imitations 
	  1117
1. Fictional faith 	  1118
2. Ancillary faith 	  1122
3. Bad faith 	  1126
C. The Hidden Faith of the Law?	  1130
VII. CONCLUSION: CRISIS OF FAITH 	  1135
The perplexing truth, at once startling and yet vaguely reassuring,
is that lawyers and judges today talk and argue and justify in pretty
much the same curious ways that they have used for generations.
Largely impervious to decades of sophisticated legal theory, lawyers
and judges go on much as they did half-a-century or perhaps half-a-
millennium ago—citing and distinguishing precedents, playing off the
plain meaning of statutes against their "purposes" and against the
legislative "intentions" supposedly implicit in them, and purporting to
extract from this conglomeration of materials univocal conclusions
about what "the law" really is. As Norman Cantor observes, "A London
barrister of 1500 would need only a few months of remedial education
to step into an American courtroom today."'
Perhaps Cantor exaggerates. Still, the fact that a distinguished
historian could seriously make the statement points to something in-
triguing, and perhaps troubling, about the law. Could a comparable
statement be made with any semblance of plausibility about, say, a
London scientist of 1500 (if there was one), or a philosopher, or a
commodities trader?
The remarkable tenacity of what we might call conventional legal
discourse is not high on the agenda of current jurisprudential issues,
I NORMAN F. CANTOR, IMAGINING THE LAW: COMMON LAW AND THE FOUNDATIONS OF THE
ANIERICAN LEGAL SYSTEM 373 (1997).
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but it ought to be. In fact, legal thinkers have learned to treat standard
law talk dismissively. Already a generation ago, Grant Gilmore asserted
(with perhaps a touch of overstatement regarding. legal scholars to
match Cantor's overstatement regarding lawyers) that "[1]or two or
three generations past it has been the merest truism, in much Ameri-
can legal writing, that the doctrine which may be found enshrined in
case report and treatise is neither important nor relevant."' Not taken
in by what Holmes called "the fallacy of logical form," legal scholars
quickly penetrate the rhetoric of judicial opinions in order to examine
what they suppose to be the real bases of legal decisions.' So the
jurisprudential debates that engage interest today contend over what
those real bases are, or should be.
In probably the most acrimonious controversy of the moment, for
example, instrumentalist theorists such as Richard Posner square off
against philosophical or "moralist" theorists such as Ronald Dworkin.'
But the contending parties agree, it seems, on the inefficacy of con-
ventional legal reasoning. They agree, in other words, that judges
should not and indeed could not make decisions simply on the basis
of the sorts of conventional or legalistic arguments presented on the
face of the typical lawyer's brief or judicial opinion. Judges who purport
to do this are guilty, Dworkin insists, of "a costly mendacity."'
This dismissive•attitude toward conventional legal discourse might
have been excusable earlier in the century. Thinkers like Holmes and,
a few years later, the Legal Realists were confident that once the
deficiencies in conventional discourse had been exposed, law would
naturally move to adopt—and to adopt for open, public use—a more
adequate form of reasoning about legal disputes, such as an instrumen-
talist "policy science." But a century has passed, and the long awaited
transformation in discourse has not occurred; nor does it seem imini-
2 See GRANT GILMORE, THE AGES OF AMERICAN LAW 13 (1977).
3 Oliver Wendell Holmes, The Path of Law, 10 Rum L. REV. 457, 468 (1897).
4 See, e.g., Rail Llewellyn, A Realistic finisprodence—The Next Step, 30 Cohum. L. REV. 431,
447-48 (1930) [hereinafter Llewellyn, A Realistic Jurisprudence' (distinguishing between "teal
tides" and "paper rules"); if George Fletcher, Fairness and Gaily in Tort Mealy, 85 timtv. L.
REV. 537,546 (1972) (proposing certain important toy( cases can best be understood by "stripping
die . , . cases of their rhetoric").
5 CompareRichat1 A. Posner, The Thohlernatics of Moral and Legal Theory, 1 1 1 HARV. L. REV.
1637 (1998) [hereinafter Posner, Problematiol, with Ronald Dworkin et al., Responses, 111 HARy.
L. REV. 1718-95 (1998). Judge Positer's Holmes Lecture has &IOce been expat tiled into a book of
the same title. &vita:Amitt) A. POSNER, THE PROBLEMNEICS or MORAL AND LEGAL THEORY (1999).
Ike:lose the book was mot published until after this article was completed, citations here are to
the Lecture as published iu the HARVARD LAW REVIEW.
6 RONALD DWORKIN, FREEDOM'S LAW 37 (1996).
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nent. 7 So the persistence of conventional legal discourse deserves
closer study. Why is this peculiar way of talking and thinking so resil-
ient? What if anything does the perseverance of this discourse tell us
about law, legal culture, and the human beings who compose and
inhabit that culture?
In neglecting such questions, jurisprudence betrays its own com-
mitments and threatens to render itself irrelevant. Jurisprudence, after
all, is not a discipline independent and sufficient unto itself, like
Baroque chamber music or modern nonrepresentational art. On the
contrary, jurisprudence is supposed to be a body of thought about law;
most fundamentally, it is supposed to describe and explain how law
works. Indeed, this has been a special point of pride with modern legal
thinkers from Holmes to the Legal Realists to Judge Posner: They have
purportedly been out to explain what law really is, or how law really
root They have been ostentatiously concerned (or so they say) with
the operative reality, not the appearance or representation—with "law
in action," not "law in the books."8 So it is disconcerting to discover,
after decades of such "realist" theorizing, that contemporary legal
theory is not only unilluminating with respect to legal practice but
indeed appears to have drifted away from that practice, thereby becom-
ing an esoteric world unto itself.
This estrangement of legal theory from the world of actual law.
seems particularly unfortunate because it occurs at a time when the
enterprise of law is increasingly beleaguered and unsure of itself. The
dean of the Yale Law School describes "a crisis in the American legal
profession" and worries that "the profession is in danger of losing its
soul. ° Public trust in the legal profession is low.m Lawyers' sense of
satisfaction in their work has declined precipitously.'' Even more fun-
damentally, what critics like Judge Harry Edwards describe as a widen-
I See ittfin notes 105-95 and accompanying text.
8 See, e.g., Sanford Levinson & J. M, Balkin, The "Bad Man," (lie Good, and the Self-Reliant,
78 B.U. L. REV. 885,902 (1998); Roscoe Pound, Law in Books and Law in Action, 44 Mn. L. REV.
12,14 (1910).
"ANTHONY T. KIIONSIAN, TtIE LOST LAWVER 1 (1993).
I° See Marc Galanter, The Faces of Mistrust: The Image of Lawry in Public Opinion, Jokes, and
Political Discourse, 66 U. ON. L. Rm.. 805,808-10 (1998). Galanter reports that "Isclhen, in 1991,
a national sample. was asked to volunteer 'what profession or type of worker do you trust ihe
least,' lawyers were far and away the 111051 frequent response. Almost as wally (23%) spout auc-
onsly volunteered lawyers as the next two categories (car salesman, 13%, politicians, 11%)
combined." M. at 809.
SeeBEHJAMIN SELLS, THE SOUL OrrlIE LAW 17-18,99-100 (1994); see alsoPatrickj.
Ott Being a Happy, Healthy, and Ethical Member of an Unhappy, Unhealthy, and Unethical Profession.
32 Vusto. L. REV. 871 (1999).
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lug chasm separating the professors from the practitioners of law' 2
seems in reality to be something more serious: It is a schism within the
very being of professors and practitioners alike, with conventional legal
discourse marking the division.
This schism is manifest in the confusing, almost schizophrenic
ways in which both academics and practitioners behave. Thus, legal
scholars may dismiss conventional legal discourse in their "Meta"-
reflections, but when addressing a particular issue in a legal brief or
law review article, they will often instinctively and easily revert to just
that sort of discourse. So the law professor in his jurisprudential mode
will disparage or deconstruct conventional legal discourse; but then a
substantive issue arises and this sante professor will eagerly marshal
precedents and legal arguments in the same way that an ordinary
lawyer might to show that "the law" requires result X in case Y or that
sodomy laws really are unconstitutional (whether the Supreme Court
knows it or not)." Conversely, lawyers and judges may employ conven-
tional legal reasoning in arguing about and deciding cases, but they
rarely offer articulate accounts of such reasoning that explain why it is
rational or sensible to resolve iniportant personal, social or political
issues in this way." Why, to use a recent example, should the question
whether an errant but elected and popular President should be re-
moved from office turn on the efforts of innumerable self-certified
experts to extract the true meaning of a phrase—"high Crimes and
Misdemeanors"—used with almost no explanation in a document over
two centuries ago?' 5 Called upon to explain this practice, judges and
12 See generally Harry T. Edads, The Growing Disjunction Between Legal Education and the
Legal Profession, 91 Mica L. REV. 34 (1992). For a recent discussion concurring in Edwanls's
diagnosis and collecting other supporting authorities, see Patrick j. Sailu, Legal Ethics in Decline:
The Elite Law Firm, the Elite Law School, and the Moral Formation of the Novice Attorney, 82 MINN.
L. Rtv. 705, 763-71 (1998).
13 Compare, e.g., Thomas C. Grey, Langdell's Orthodoxy, 45 U. Pm'. L. REV. I (1983) (describ-
ing mid criticizing formalist approach to law), with Thomas C. Grey, Bowen V. Hardwick Dimin-
Sled, 68 U. Cow. L. REV. 373 (1997) (offering standard finntalim at guntellts «t show Bowers v.
HardWidf, though never explicitly ONTITIllen, eRgIllog be reconciled With Romer v. Evams and hence
no longer must be regarded as good law).
14 Sreliiala Ross Meyer, Is Practical Reason Mindless?, 86 GEO. Lt1. 647, 650 (1998) ("Indeed,
both Nail Llesvellyn and Benjamin Cardozo concluded that judges themselves have to idea how
they do what they (lo."); cf. ANTONIN SCALIA, A MATEER Or INTERPRETATION: FEDERAL COURTS
AND '111F. LAW 14 (1997) (observing with respect to pervasive pnictices of statutory cmtsultetion
that "lwle American judges have no intelligible theory of wi at we do most"). Mary Ann (Hendon
observes that 11dd-century "teachers and scholars of the law ... could 'do' law very well, but they
were tongue-tied when it came to explaining and defending their ingrained, habitual doings."
MARL' ANN GLENDON, A SINEION UNDER LAWYERS 231 (1994). I will argue Mat in this respect the
situation has not changed discernibly.
15 See Michael j. Iffarnian, Constitutional Felishi.on and the Clinton Impeachment Debate, 85 VA,
L. REV. 631 (1999).
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lawyers may fall back upon one of the currently fashionable "policy"
or theoretical accounts of law that they learned from their law profes-
sors.t°
Law students, for their part, learn two conflicting things in law
school: They learn to "think like a lawyer"—that is, to address problems
in terms of the age-old techniques of applying rules and citing and
distinguishing precedents—and they also learn from "realist" or Criti-
cal professors that this form of thinking is hopelessly archaic. They may
emerge from this training, paradoxically, with entrenched commit-
ments both to legal reasoning and to the idea that legal reasoning is
a backward and perhaps vaguely oppressive enterprise.t 7
In sum, the split between academic theory and actual practice
does not so much divide scholars from practitioners in the way critics
like Judge Edwards have claimed, as it severs both practitioners and
many scholars from themselves, sundering the lawyer who is con-
sciously thinking about or trying to explain law from the same lawyer
when she is actually doing law. This schizophrenic condition is a sign
of something deeply wrong in modern legal thought.
In this Article, I propose to address the current malaise in an
unlikely fashion—that is, by taking conventional legal discourse seri-
ously. My purpose is not to rehabilitate conventional legal reasoning—
for my part, I find the familiar criticisms of such reasoning largely
persuasive—but rather to reflect on the significance of the persistence
of such reasoning in the face of powerful and relentless assaults from
generation after generation of legal thinkers. Simply stated, my thesis
is this: For over a century, legal theorists have been unable to take the
discourse used by lawyers and judges at face value because they have
suspected, with good reason, 18 that this discourse reflects metaphysical
commitments. as well as a kind of "faith" that scholars have supposed
to be untenable in a modern (or "post-modern") world. Conventional
legal discourse implicitly depicts law as a "brooding omnipresence in
IG Judge Edwards is a conspicuous example: In a celebrated and controversial article, Edwards
criticized the academy for neglecting conventional legal reasoning, but he himself did not attempt
to defend t he rationality of conventional legal argumentation as a distinct discourse. On the
connury, Edwards seemed to share the familiar academic view in which "theory" provides the
standard of rationality by which actual legal doctrine and decisions should be evaluated and
guided. See Edwards, sttpra note 12, at 35,39.
17 Noting that "loin litany days, I had not even eaten breakfast before I watched one of my
professors deconstruct sconething," Patrick Schilt z reports that "It Hire° years of law school left
me—and many of my classmates—imenSely cynical and skeptical." Schiltz, supra note 12, at 767;
cf GLENDON, supra note 14, at 226 ( arguing t he common practice of "deconstruction" in law
school pedagogy often generates cynicism and nihilism in students).
'a See infra notes 26-116,195-217 a nd accompanying text.
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the sky,"' 9 as Holmes scornfully put it, and legal thinkers regard such
a notion as almost self-refuting. Consequéntly, modern scholars have
adopted what they suppose to be "realist" stances toward conventional
discourse. Assuming that this discourse cannot on its own terms
amount to a cogent form of reasoning and hence that it cannot ade-
quately explain how legal issues either are or should be resolved, legal
thinkers have looked past the standard lawyerly ways of talking in order
to discover, or devise, the "real" bases of law. And they have often
assumed or insisted that the archaic ways of lawyerly argument soon
will be or must be replaced by some more "rational"—that is, less
frith-dependent and less metaphysically dubious—form of reasoning.'"
It should be apparent by now, however, that these "realist" expec-
tations were misconceived—history has not unfolded in the way legal
thinkers believed it must or should"—and that in fact conventional
legal discourse, with its metaphysical and faith commitments, is at the
core of what law "really" is. So rather than dismissing the commitments
implicit in law, a genuinely realistic jurisprudence would need to take
those commitments seriously (which is not to say that it must end up
by endorsing them). In short, if there is an escape from the current
jurisprudential malaise, it lies in the development of a "jurisprudence
of faith"—a jurisprudence that would use "faith" at least as a central
diagnostic or explanatory concept, if not as a normative criterion.
Legal thinkers may be expected to treat this proposal with skepti-
cism. "Faith" is today a suspect and little understood concept." Hence,
to say that law is based on faith may seem both to discredit the law and
to render it almost unintelligible. Later in this Article, I try to address
this difficulty by describing•an "orientation of faith" that, upon reflec-
tion, should be familiar to most of us, 23 and by explaining how law can
be best understood as an expression of this kind of orientation."
Nonetheless, recognizing that law is at its core an expression of
faith does provoke daunting questions. What sort of faith does law
reflect? And is that faith a viable one? Is "justification by faith," in other
words, a real possibility for modern law? Or should law be seen more
13 Southern Pac. Co. v. Jensen, 244 U.S. 205,222 (1917) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
2° See infra notes 105-70 and accompanying text.
21 See infra notes 176-217 and accomitallying text.
22 See, e.g., Posner, Noblematies, 3 UPra cote 5 at 1649 (noting arguments based on !elisions
faith are "not a part or academic moralism"); if. JosEPH VINING, FROM NEW-1'08 1s Slier I to
(1995) [hereinafter VINING, NewtoN's SLEEr] (noting "faith" is "a notion in some academic
!midge").
23 See it 	 notes 218-72 and accompanying text.
24 See infra notes 273-360 out accompanying text.
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as the outgrowth of some "quasi-faith"—or perhaps, as critics like
Duncan Kennedy and Pierre Schlag argue, of "bad faith"?” And if so,
what follows? Should law as currently practiced be repudiated? Might
it be maintained as a sort of useful fiction, or "noble lie"? These are
questions that a jurisprudence of faith would need to confront; this
Article can do little more than offer a sort of prolegomenon to such a
jurisprudence.
Part I of this Article describes the basic components of conven-
tional legal discourse and suggests how that discourse, taken at face
Value, reflects a faith and a set of metaphysical commitments that few
if any lawyers today would consciously and publicly endorse. Part II
discusses the structure of twentieth-century jurisprudence—a structure
formed by the efforts of legal thinkers to break free of conventional
legal discourse and its underlying commitments. Part III then describes
how legal practice in the twentieth century has largely disregarded the
prescriptions emanating from legal theory, thus producing the theory-
practice split that so alarms critics like Judge Edwards. Part IV returns
to the origins of modern legal thought; it argues that the intellectual
conditions of the late Victorian period prevented seminal thinkers like
Holmes from taking conventional legal discourse seriously and at face
value, but that these disabling conditions are no longer in full force.
So it may now be possible, for the first time in a long time, to consider
the possibility of a jurisprudence that understands law as an expression
of faith.
Part V attempts to address a preliminary requirement for such a
jurisprudence by discussing an "orientation of faith" that is more
substantial than the caricatures of faith that are often tossed about
casually and dismissively in academic thought. Finally, Part VI considers
various and conflicting ways in which an orientation of faith might
inform the discourse and practice of law, and examines some questions
and problems for jurisprudence that this perspective provokes.
I. LOOKING FOR "THE LAW"
From time immemorial, as the saying goes, lawyers in the common
law tradition have practiced a special form of thinking and argumen-
tation in addressing legal controversies. It is not easy to specify just
what this discourse consists of; indeed, scholars disagree about whether
there is ultimately any distinctive form of reasoning peculiar to lawyers.
23 See infra notes 280-331 and accompanying text.
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Still, it is safe to say that to both lawyers and nonlawyers, lawyerly
discourse at least seems to be a recognizable if somewhat peculiar
mode of talking and thinking. "Thinking like a lawyer" is au elusive
but not wholly empty idea; people may have difficulty defining just
what such thinking consists of, but they "know it when they see it." 26
Indeed, as Cass Sunstein notes, "to nonlawyers or to people from other
cultures" the way lawyers think about problems may appear "weird or
exotic. "27
This Part first describes briefly the basic features that seem central
and distinctive to legal discourse. It then notices the commitments that
this discourse, taken on its own terms, seems to manifest, but that
modern lawyers and legal scholars uniformly disavow.
A. The Components of Conventional Legal Discoune
At least to an outsider, perhaps the most notable feature distin-
guishing the way lawyers think about issues is the special emphasis
on—ancl the intricate practices for using—precedent.'" Although the
doctrine of stare decisis was not explicitly formalized until the nine-
teenth century,'" the law's conspicuous obsession with precedent has
attracted notice, and often derision, for centuries: 3" Lawyers are hardly
26 See SELLS, .sitfron note 11, at 13-16.
27 CASS R. SUNSTEIN, LEGAL REASONING AND POLITICAL CONFLICT 14 (1996). An anecdote
may help support ibis point. I recently participated in an academic conference in which most of
the plesenters and questioners were lawyers; but one participant was an accomplished historian.
Midway through the conRience he intik:11rd 10 me that in all his years in the academy he had
never till now worked much with lawyers or law professors, and he found the lawyerly discourse
extremely curious, "All of the talk about doctrines, all of the invoking and distinguishing of
authorities ," he Snotstied. "Where else except in theology departments do people talk like
this?"
28 See Anthony T. Krunntan, Precedent and Tradition, 99 YALE Li 1029, 1031-32 (1990)
[hereinafter Kroninan, Precedent] (describing special centrality of inecedeni in law); cf. Sent AA,
supra note 14, at 7 (observing "an absolute prerequisite to common-law lawmaking is the doctrine
of state decisis—den is, the principle that a decision made in one case will be Followed in the
next.").
29 For a discussion of how the longstanding practice of following precedents was (brutalized
in nineteenth -eel0m . y England, see Jim Evans, Change in the Doctrine of Precedent in the Nineteenth
Cn in PRECEDENT IN 1..mc 35 (Lamunce Goldstein S., 1987).
"Gerald Posters explains ilmt "Iallready in the seventeenth century, at ihe time of ihe
self-conscious articulationI of classical common law theory by Coke, Hale, and others, the doctrine
lot precedeitt I was under severe attack." Gerald J. Post elm), Some Roots of Our Notimt al Precedent,
in PRECEDENT IN LAW 9 (kauret ice Goldstein ed., 1987), Swaim/Jon:ilium Swill, Gulliver's Dave/s,
in Gm.1.1"EleS TRAVELS AND OTIIER WRITINGS 203 (Ricardo Quintana ed., 1958) (1726):
It is a Maxim among these lawyers, that whatever bath been done before, may
legally be done again: And therefore they take special Care to record all the
Decisions formerly made against common Justice and the general Reason of
1050 	 BOSTON COLLEGE LAW REVIEW	 [Vol. 40:1041
alone in referring to past decisions or events in addressing current
questions, of course, and the "analogical reasoning" that they appear
to employ in the use of precedent may not reflect any distinctive kind
of logic, as some scholars suppose" But lawyers do seem to invest
precedent with special weight—they often talk about precedent as
authoritative, or perhaps as qualifiedly "binding"—and they accordingly
have developed elaborate methods of using precedent. Karl Llewellyn
counted thirty-two "impeccable" techniques for using or deflecting
precedents, another twelve methods that he thought legitimate, an
additional sixteen methods that are "correct but less usual," and four
techniques that he regarded as "illegitimate" but that are nonetheless
used."'
A second standard feature of conventional legal discourse consists
of an array of techniques, maxims, and canons of construction by
which lawyers invoke, interpret, avoid, or extend enacted law—statutes,
regulations, constitutional provisions. Contemporary scholars some-
times classify the leading approaches to statutory interpretation under
three broad headings: textualism, intentionalism, and ptoposivism."
Each of these approaches has a considerable pedigree, and although
different periods or jurists or scholars may incline more to one or
another of these approaches, arguments and techniques appropriate
to each may be found in almost any period or judge. 34
These distinctive forms of lawyerly argumentation about statutes
and connnon law make up a labyrinthine discourse sometimes de-
scribed as the "artificial reason" of the law. The description conies from
Edward Coke's famous exchange with King James I." James asked why,
if "reason" is the essence of the law (as Coke himself insisted), His
Highness should not have the final say in legal controversies—his royal
reason being presumptively at least as acute as anyone else's. Coke
kind. These, under the Name of Precedents, they produce as Authorities to justify
the most iniquitous Opinions; and the Judges never fail to direct accordingly.
	 ,
Id.
31 For all argument Mat legal reasoning is no different front other, sou-legal font's of
reasoning, see Larry Alexander, The Banality of Legal Reasoning, 73 NO'I'RE Dam L. lieu. 517
(1998); if SuNstsaN, .511Pra note 26, at 62-100 (defending idea that "analogical reasoning" is tr
special form of reasoning central to law).
32 See KARI. LLEWELLYN, THE COMMON LAW TRADITION 77-91 (1960) thereinafter LLEWEI:
LYN, THE COMMON LAW I.
See Peter L. Strauss, The Common Law and Statutes, 70 U. Cow. L. REV. 225, 227-29 (1999).
34 For a helpful collection of materials and notes reflecting these approaches and their
ii itermixing in practice, see generally WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR. & PIIILIP P. FRICKEY, CASES AND
MNFERIAES ON LEGISLATION: STATUTES AND TI1E CREATION OF PUBLIC POLICY 514-631 (2t1 ed.
1995).
35 See generally, 5 W.S. Howswourn, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 429-31 (2d ed. 1937).
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famously replied—or perhaps whimpered, because at this point in the
conversation he was evidently prostrate with face pressed to the floor—
that the reason of the law is not the "natural reason" with which His
Highness was so amply endowed, but rather au "artificial reason" to be
acquired only by long training and practice in the special arts and
techniques used by lawyers. Modern scholars still invoke Coke's distinc-
tion in contrasting the way lawyers think with reasoning sintpliciter.a°
B. "The Law" Behind the Law
The distinctive character of lawyerly argumentation provokes a
vital question: Why should this form of thinking and arguing have the
authority that it appears to carry in our political culture? Why is this
curious and self-consciously "artificial" dialectic a helpful way to ad-
dress important questions? Why should the most central issues in our
society—issues of life and death, issues of politics at the highest level—
be resolved by resorting to this peculiar mode of thought?"
On its face, conventional legal discourse offers a straightforward
answer to this challenge. The answer is in one sense perfectly familiar,
but in another sense it has become almost invisible; that is because the
answer has been widely regarded for a century or more as obviously
inadequate, or perhaps as metaphorical, or as a shorthand for some
more sophisticated ancl more rational explanation. So the conven-
tional answer is worth reciting despite its familiarity.
1. "The law"
The conventional answer is that legal reasoning is authoritative
because it helps us ascertain "what the law is." Taken at face value, in
other words, the conventional explanation implies a belief in some
entity—"the law"—that is somehow authoritative for us and the content
of which can be ascertained through conventional legal reasoning.
A visitor to our legal culture who paid close attention and who
innocently took our talk at face value (as most of us do not) would
perceive that this view is constantly expressed in the things lawyers, and
many nonlawyers, say routinely. We describe a situation or problem
and then ask, "What's 'the law' on that?" Or we make assertions about
56 See, e.g., Charles Fried, The Artificial Reason of the Law on What Lanyem Know, 60 TEX. L.
REV. 35 (1981) [herein:diet, Fried, Artificial Reason]; see also GtempoN, supra IIORI 14, at 181.
"The question is sharply posed in l'Atn. F. CAMPOSJURISMANIA: THE MADNESS OF AMERI-
CAN LAW. CallIDOS suggests that our pervasive resort to law and legal reasoning to resolve cultunil
conflicts reflects a sort of collective mental illness. See generally l'Aut. F. CAMPOS, JURISMANIA: THE
MADNF.SS OF AMERICAN LAW (1998) ihereinafier Campos, JURISMANIAI,
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"what 'the law' requires." The visitor might at first suppose that such
phrases allude to some elaborate, multi-volume rule book, and that the
questions call for someone to look up the answers in the same way that
we look up unfamiliar words in a dictionary. Indeed, citizens and
beginning law students do sometimes come to the law with some such
"rule book" notion in mind. Lawyers know better. Alas, if only it were
so simple—if only there were such a rule book stashed away somewhere.
Still, lawyers argue passionately and judges pontificate solemnly about
what "the law" is or requires, even when (or especially when) there is
admittedly no established rule—no statute or regulation or precedent
"on point,"s
Sometimes we refer respectfully to "the rule of law"—or, more
ambitiously and mysteriously, to "the rule of law, not of men." At least
to a naive observer, these familiar phrases might seem to treat "the law"
as if it were some discrete and authoritative entity, or perhaps as a sort
of quasi-person who wields authority. The child's "Mama says you have
to go to bed now" matures into "The law says you have to file your tax
returns by April 15." Indeed, lawyer and psychologist Benjamin Sells
has found that both lawyers and non-lawyers do readily picture "the
law" as a person—typically as something like "an older man, gray-
haired and distinguished looking" who wears a camel coat, carries a
briefcase, and drinks his coffee black without sugar." Or the phrases
might imply that "the law" is some ethereal and impersonal object—
perhaps "an outside and occupying force responsible for imposing and
maintaining order."'" Norman Cantor notices that the common law is
sometimes described as if it were "a kind of fixed heavenly firmament,
its procedures and principles shining down like beautiful and remote
stars, infinitely set apart from the anxieties, confusions, and passions
of particular human lives."'
38 In an earlier period, common lawyers talked as if "custom" constituted the law, but the
same difficulty was apparent—there was in fiwi no established custom for most of the intricate
issues considered by CO111111011 law courts. .S'ee SCALIA, saliva Dole 14, at 5; A.W. Brian Simpson,
The Common Law and Legal Theory, in LEGAL THEORY AND COMMON LAW 8, 18-21 (William
Twining ed.. 1986).
39 SELLS, sn/na Dote I I, at 24. Sells explains that:
rflheLaw can be imagined as if it has a life of its own. The Law that lives in our
imagination is far more influential than we might think. Usually it operates uncon-
sciously, affecting our ideology, our everyday practice, how we think about the Law's
role ill society, how we relate to concepts like order and obedience, and how we
understand larger themes like truth and justice.
M. at 27.
at 29.
4 CANTOR, 51/POI note 1, at 377.
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To be sure, there is probably less of this kind of talk than there
once was. Lawyers and judges today typically do not explicitly declare
that judicial decisions are merely "evidence" of something else—"the
law"—in the way that, say, Swift v. Tyson or the lawyers in the heyday
of the common law did.42 Still, the innocent but attentive visitor might
note that in more indirect ways lawyers and judges still treat judicial
decisions and even statutes as if they were evidence of something else
that is latent but somehow real and authoritative.
2. "The law" behind the precedents
Consider the familiar practices of "common law" argumentation.
Lawyers and judges talk about past judicial decisions as if they were
legally authoritative, and this practice Might at first lead one to suppose
that the decisions themselves are being treated as "the law." But a closer
examination quickly reveals that the matter is more complex. hi the
first place, in discussing a prior case lawyers and judges do not treat
all parts of the case equally. They often purport to be searching for the
"holding" of the case; this is to be distinguished from other, nonobli-
gating features, described as the "dicta," that may in fact make up
nearly all of what is written in the decision. There is no consistent
method or formula for sorting out these elements;" earliest efforts
earlier in the century to articulate the operative distinction have been
largely abandoned." Moreover, even if agreement is reached about a
42 See, e.g., Swift v. Tyson. 41 U.S. 1,37 (1842) (in the ordinary use of language, it will hardly
be contended that the decisions of courts constitute laws. They are, at most, only evidence of
what the laws ate, and are not, of themselves, laws!): I WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES
ON tilE LAWS OF ENGLAND *70 (IISSCoing the "general rule, 'that the decisions of courts of justice
are the evidence of what is commoil law'"); MATIBEW HALE, TUE HISTORY Orli III COMMON LAW
or ENGLAND 67 (2t1 ed. 1716) (asserting judicial decisions "ate less than a Law, yet they are greater
Evidence thereof, Mau the Opinion of any private Persons"). The meaning of these various
statements has been much debated, of course. For an overview of different interpretations of
what Justice Story meant by die statenwin in sop v. mon, see PAUL M. BATOR Er Al.., THE
FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 779-80 (3t1 ed. 1988).
43 See SCALIA, SUp/K note 14, at 8 (asserting 'what constitutes the 'hol(ling' of an earlier case
is not well defined anti can be ;lusted to suit the occasion")".
44 The failure of the project can he discerned by comparing the first and second editions of
Geotge Christie's jurisprudence text, lit the first edition, Christie devoted a substantial block of
text and materials to the problem of figuring out exactly how to extract the holding, or ratio
decidendi, from a precedent. See GEORGE C. CHRISTIEJURISPRUDENCE: TEXT AND READINGS ON
Tim Pitmosolow OF LAw 919-60 (1973). The included readings were already quite dated, and
Christie acknowledged with palpable reluctance that "one may be forced to conclude that there
is no really satisfactory theory of the concept." Id. at 921. Rut Christie was unwilling to abandon
the project because, as he cogently pointed out, without some account, "it is no longer possible
to base one's explanation of the binding nature of precedent upon the concept of the ratio
decidendi of a case." Id. at 958. "We therefore cannot avoid trying to make whatever sense we
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particular case's "holding," the lawyers' search is hardly over. The
holding of any given case must be harmonized with the holdings of
any number of other, often divergent cases to reveal "the law," and
there is no standardized method for achieving such harmony. 45 In
addition, holdings are sometimes explicitly rejected or overruled on
the ground that they are out of line with some higher criterion that
can only be described as "the law."
As Norman Cantor observes, "RI he conventional way of reading
common-law cases is to fincl in each one an example of the exercise of
universal reason."' So it is too simple, or too evasive regarding real
complexities and mysteries, to state flatly that in common law argu-
mentation judicial decisions are the law. Modern jurisprudential wis-
dom notwithstanding, and decades after the ostensible demise of Swift,
lawyers and judges still, in practice, treat prior decisions as if they were
"evidence" of something more subtle and coy and unitary—as evidence
of "the law."
Probably the starkest manifestation of this lawyerly presupposition
of an independently existing "law," at least to an uninitiated but per-
ceptive visitor, would lie ill the common judicial practice of treating
decisions as retroactively applicable even to events occurring before
the decisions were rendered. The judicial assumption has always been
that it is appropriate to subject past actions to a newly-announced
ruling because the ruling merely declares what "the law" is and has
been. This practice is usually followed even in so-called "cases of first
impression," and indeed even when a decision explicitly overrules a
prior decision. 47 The new decision is said merely to declare "the law"
that obligated the parties all along—even though a previous judicial
opinion mistakenly declared otherwise.
To be sure, "realist"-minded scholars and jurists have sometimes
criticized this practice of retroactive application, arguing that the kind
of law presupposed by the practice does not exist and that decisions
call of the concept." Id. at 921. By the time of the second edition, Christie had evidently conceded
defeat; this entire section of the book was simply dropped. See GEORGE C. CHRISTIE AND PATRICK
MARTINJURISPRUDENGE: TEXT AND READING ON THE PHILOSOPHY OF LAW (2d ed. 1995); SD'
also Evans, supra note 29, at 71 (discussing the "Bulginess about the concept of ratio decidendi
in English ittriSprIldence")..
45 As noted, Karl Llewellyn listed over sixty acceptable techniques—as well as several other
techniques that he considered illegitimate Intl that are nonetheless used—for carrptig out this
operation. See Llewellyn, THE COMMON Line, supra note 32.
46 CANTOR, supra note 1, at 377.
47 For discussion and collected materials on this practice, see ESKRIDGE X: ERICKEY,
note 34, at 441-57.
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should at least in some cases be applied prospectively only." For a time
it appeared that a selective practice of prospective rulings might de-
velop.° But more recently both the common law practice and the
traditional rationale for that practice have firmly reasserted themselves.
Thus, in Jim Beam Distilling Co. v. Georgia, Justice Souter observed
approvingly for himself and Justice Stevens that retroactive application
of decisions is "overwhelmingly the norm." Sower went on to explain
that this practice is grounded in the view that "the function of the
courts [is] to decide cases before them based upon their best current
understanding of the law"—a view that in turn reflects "the declaratory
theory of the law, according to which the courts are understood only
to find the law, not to make it.""Justice Scalia, writing for an unusual
coalition including himself and Justices Marshall and Blackmun, went
even further; he maintained that retrospective application of decisions
is constitutionally required because the courts' function is simply "'to
say what the law is.'"51 Two years later, in Harper v. Virginia Department
of Taxation," a majority of the Justices reconfirmed this rule of retroac-
tivity. At least to the untrained but attentive eye, this practice of retroac-
tivity and the reason given for it would clearly indicate the lawyerly
commitment to "the law" that exists independent of the decisions that
merely declare what is already in existence.
3. 'The law" behind enactments
Though this commitment to "the law" is most conspicuous in
"common law" discourse, a reflective examination discloses a similar
presupposition even in the lawyerly interpretation of enacted law.
When lawyers and judges interpret a statute or constitutional provision,
what exactly are they looking for? They might say they are trying to
ascertain the "meaning" of the legal text, of course, but what exactly
is that? As noted, answers to this question typically fall into three
common categories: The meaning of a statute or constitutional provi-
sion is said to be given by the "textual meaning," or by the legislative
"See, e.g., Roger Traynor, Quo l'adh, Thospective Overruling: A Question of judicial Responsi-
bility, 28 liasTINGs 14 533 (1977).
e.g., Chevron Oil Co. v. Nilson, 404 U.S. 97, 106-07 (1971); Linkletter v. walker 381
U.S. 618 (1965).
1°501 U.S. 529. 535-36 (1991) (emphasis added).
See id. at 549 (quoting Marian): st Madison, I Cranch 137, 177 (1803)) (emphasis added).
Scalia added enigmatically: "I an not so naive (lair do 1 Wink our forbears were) as to be unaware
thaTlIttlges in a read sense 'make' law. But they make it as judges HI eke it, which is to say as though
they were 'finding' it—or discerning what dm law is • • . ." Id. (emphasis added).
12 509 U.S. 86, 97. (1993).
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"intention," or by the "purpose" of the statute or provision (or by
some combination of these)." But in the first place there is no agree-
mentin fact, there is rampant dissension—about which of these fac-
tors supplies the meaning of the law. So in an occasional case there
even may be effective agreement about the different factors—about
the textual meaning and legislative intention, for instance—but lawyers
and judges will persist in arguing about which of these factors is really
"the law."" •
In addition, each of these factors turns out to be quite elusive in
its own tight. Both the "textual meaning" approach favored by, for
example, Justice Scalia and the "purpose" approach elaborated in the
famous Hart and Sacks "Legal Process" materials posit that the meaning
of a statute is to some degree independent of the subjective intentions
of the enactors." But this supposition seems odd. Indeed, attributing
to marks on a page "meanings" or "purposes" independent of (and
potentially different than) the meanings and purposes of the human
beings who wrote or approved those marks might appear to be an
exercise in primitive animism. Persons harbor purposes, but except
perhaps in cultures we regard as animistic, stones or rivers or stellar
bodies are not thought to have purposes of their own. Neither, it seems,
do disembodied words or marks on a page; they can only express a
person's put -poses. So how can "the statute" have a "purpose," or "mean-
ing," independent of the purposes and semantic intentions of the
people who made the law?
Textualists typically try to deflect this challenge by making authori-
tative the meaning that a reader would receive, not the meaning that the
authors sought to convey.'" But this response only creates further difficul-
ties and puzzles. In the first place, the response does not eliminate,
but merely defers, the need for authorial intention because, as scholars
like Paul Campos have shown, readers assign meaning to words in a
text only by supposing them to be the expressive product of a real or
supposed author. Without a supposition of some author, a text is quite
simply meaningless; indeed, it is not truly a text at all, but merely a
55 See SUM/ notes 32-33 and accompanying text.
s1 For an unusually clear instance in which the court explessly acknowledged that "textual
meanffig" contradicted "legislative intention, - see In re Sinclair, 870 F.24 1340 (7th Cir. 1989).
For an illuntinatbig analysis of the jurisprudential difficulties and assumptions underlying this
conflict, see generally Paul F. Campos, The Chaotic Psettdotext, 94 Mien. L. REV. 2178 (1996).
55 see, e.g., SCALIA, Stipa note 14, at 16,31,38.
56 See, e.g., id. at 17 ("We look for a sort of 'objectified' intent—the intent that a reasonable
person would gather from the text ....").
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piece of paper bearing mindless marks." Moreover, if the textualist
tries to avoid this problem and salvage "objective meaning" by saying
that what counts is not what the actual legislators intended but rather
what a constructed author such as "the normal speaker of English"
would have intended by the words," further serious questions arise. If
we are not to be bound by the meanings or intentions of the actual
authors—that is, the drafters and the legislators who were elected and
who actually thought about and voted on the law—why should we treat
ourselves as bound by the meanings or purposes of some hypothetical
person who was not elected and who never in fact considered the text
that we are treating as authoritathre?'"
Intentionalists seek to address these difficulties and avoid the
animism that seems to inhere in a textualism divorced from authorial
intentions by saying that what counts is the "intention of the legisla-
ture." Legislators are, after all, actual persons who are commonly
thought capable of having intentions and conveying meanings. But this
position produces its own mysteries; in particular, it presents the famil-
iar difficulty of figuring out how a host of individual intentions (which
are themselves often murky and, realistically, unknowable) can be ag-
gregated to form an overall "intention of the legislature." This difficulty
has led some scholars and jurists to conclude that the perennial quest
for "legislative intention" or "framers' intent" is a search for something
that does not exist.'" But although this problem is often noted, in
practice both courts and lawyers (and most legal scholars) seem to
prefer mostly to pass over it.
57 See, e.g., Paul Campos, That Obscure Object of Desire: Hermeneutics and the Autonomous Legal
Text, 77 MINN. L. REV. 1065 (1993); cf. RONALD Dwoalux, Lbw's EmPiEE 58-59 (1986):
For even if we reject the thesis that creative interpretation aims to discover some
actual historical intention, the concept of intention nevertheless provides the formal
structure for all interpretive claims. I mean that an interpretation is by nature the
report of a purpose; it proposes a way of seeing what is interpreted ... as if this
were the product of it decision to pursue one set of themes or visions or purposes,
one "point" rather than another. This structure is required of an interpretation
even when ... there is no historical author whose historical mind can be plumbed.
Id.
58 See, e.g., Oliver Wendell Holmes, The Theory of Legal Interpretation, 12 Kum L. REV. 417,
417-19 (1899).
59 See generally Steven I). Smith, Law Without Mind, 88 MIMI. L. REV. 104 (1989). See also
Steven D. Stith, Idolatly in Constitutional Inlopretation, in PAta. F. CAMPOS Er Al.., AGAINST 'HIE
LAW 161-67 (1997) [hereinafter Smith, Idolatry!.
co The classic expression of this skepticism is Max Rodin, Shantou Interpretation, 43 HAM'.
L. REV. 863, 870-71 (1930). ht a similar vein, see Edwatds v. Aguillaal, 482 U.S. 578, 637-39
(1987) (Scalia, j., dissenting).
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Moreover, as with the common law, even agreement on a particu-
lar meaning for a statute or constitutional provision will not necessarily
resolve a legal dispute. The meaning may be treated as effectively
nondisposithe—on constitutional grounds, or occasionally on noncon-
stitutional grounds,"' or just because (like the once vibrant but now
practically defunct "contract clause" of the Constitution) it no longer
seems to fit with something that Guido Calabresi describes metaphori-
cally as the "legal topography" or - the "legal landscape."62 The enact-
ment's meaning, it seems, has somehow become ineligible to partici-
pate as an active part of that more mysterious entity—lying always
beyond or beneath the disparate mass of particular decisions and
enactments—that we call "the law."
C. Legal Discourse as Practical Reason?
The preceding discussion has suggested that not only the casual
phraseology but also the common discursive practices of lawyers and
judges disclose a commitment to some entity—"the law"—that lies
beyond or above the observable legal materials. But perhaps this dis-
cussion has been guilty of overearnestness—of taking the linguistic
habits and practices of judges too seriously. A commensensical response
that both practicing lawyers and some theorists might offer would
suggest that law talk is nothing more than a method of "practical
reason"; it is simply a vocabulary 'that lawyers and judges use in fash-
ioning sensible solutions to practical controversies. The various tech-
niques that lawyers use in invoking and distinguishing precedents
might he ways of collecting and analyzing the information needed in
making practical decisions. And the familiar statement that a case has
been decided in a particular way because "the law" so requires might
be nothing more than an elliptical, time-honored way of saying that
the result seems most consistent with common sense, fairness or sound
policy.°
In this spirit, some recent scholarship presents legal discourse as
a method of practical reasoning." And indeed, it is hard to deny that
6I See Steven D. Smith. Illy Should Courts Obn, the Law?, 77 GEO. Li. 113,142-45 (1988).
62 SeeGUIDO CALABRESI, A COMMON LAW GUIDE FOR THE AGE OF STATUTES 121 (1982).
63 It is crucial to distinguish this claim--the claim that conventional legal discourse is aselfo
sensible form of pudica] reasoning about disputes—from the familiar but very different (and, I
think, far more plausible) claim that conventional legal reasoning is a sort of past hoc exercise
used to 'lustily results reached through a different method that might include "practical reason."
The latter claim is considered in Part it.
64 See, e.g., Steven J. Burton, Law as Practical Reason, 62 S. Cu.. L. REV. 747 (1991); Daniel
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law is a form of practical reasoning in smite central senses of the term.
Practical reasoning is typically distinguished from speculative or theoreti-
cal reasoning in two principal ways. First, practical reasoning speaks to
questions about how to live,"" not merely to speculative questions about
the truth or falsity of propositions. Second, practical reasoning lacks
the demonstrative certainty of speculative reason. 66 By these criteria,
legal discourse would surely fall on the "practical" side of the line: It
is primarily concerned with the appropriateness of human actions, not
with the truth of abstract propositions, and it falls far short of the
certainty of mathematical or logical demonstration.
So it seems perfectly plausible to say that legal discourse is a kind -
of practical reason. But this observation fails to "explain away" the
awkward metaphysical commitments discernible in conventional legal
discourse, for two closely-related reasons. First, calling law a form of
"practical reasoning" does nothing to account for the unusual and
distinctive features of legal discourse (as opposed to other, less exotic
forms of practical reasoning). Second, these distinctive legal features
are ill-suited or even dysfunctional for an enterprise that seeks merely
to he a form of practical reasoning; they thus suggest that law aspires
to be more than that.
1. The inefficacy of generic accounts
Accounts of law as practical reason can be so generic that they
provide little insight into the distinctive qualities of legal discourse, as
opposed to other forms of thinking or talking that might also qualify
as "practical reason." Consider Mary Ann Glendon's invocation of
Edgar Bodenheimer's "stunning insight" that legal discourse is a form
of practical reasoning that can be called "dialectical reasoning?" Glen-
don offers this description as an answer to "Holmes, the Realists, and
A. Farber, The Inevitability of Practical Reason: Statutes, Formalism, and the Rule of Law, 45 Wpm.
L. REV. 533 (1992); David E. Van Zandt, An Alternative Theory of Practical Reason in Judicial
Decisions, (i5 nil.. L. REV. 775 (1991). For a skeptical response to these it IVOC1111011S of "practical
reason," see generally Larry Alexander, Practical Reason and Statutory Inlinfortatiort, 12 LAW &
PHIL. 319 (1993).
65 Cf. Gerard V. Bradley, Overcoming Posner, 94 Mien. L. REV. 1898, 1905 n.15 (1996)
(reviewing Klemm) A. POSNER, OVERCOMING LAW (1995)) ('Practical reason* is trasonitw. . .
about what to do.").
66 For au exposition of the origins of these distinctions in Aristotle's philosophy, see Josmn
DUNNE, BACK TO THE ROUGH GROUND: PRACTICAL JuncstENT AND THE LURE Or TECHNIQUE
237-44 (1993).
67 GLENDON, SUp/E/ note 14, at 237. 	 •
IOW 	 BOSTON COLLEGE LAW REVIEW 	 [Vol. 40:1041
the crits" who have attacked law for falling short of the standards of
proof used in the natural sciences:
Dialectical reasoning is not a single form of reasoning, but
au integrated set of related mental operations. It builds on
practical reason, but subjects common sense to a process of
critical examination and evaluation in which logic has its
appropriate but auxiliary role. Similar to scientific method,
dialectic method attends to available data and experience,
forms hypotheses, tests them against concrete particulars,
weighs competing hypotheses, and stands ready to repeat the
process in the light of new data, experience, or insight. But
unlike the method of the natural sciences, dialectical reason-
ing begins with premises that are doubtful or in dispute. It
ends, not with certainty, but with determining which of op-
posing positions is supported by stronger evidence and more
convincing reasons. That is what has made dialectical reason-
ing so unsatisfying to the many professional philosophers who
have chosen to take their bearings from the natural sciences)'"
Glendotes appreciative description may be accurate enough as far
as it goes, and the description may indeed serve to point out differ-
ences between legal reasoning and a familiar (if dubious) depiction of
the scientific method. Still, there is nothing distinctively legal about
dialectiCal reasoning as Glendon presents it. Indeed, there is little that
is distinctive about it at all; it is simply the way most everyone's cogni-
tive processes work in a whole spectrum of activities of life. For exam-
ple, although Glendon indicates that "dialectical reasoning" has been.
rejected by many philosophers, in fact the approach seems very much
like the sorts of dialectical epistemologies promoted by many philoso-
phers and scholars in the prevailing "anti-foundzitionalist" climate of
opinion. In the absence of any certain premise or infallible methodol-
ogy, what else can we do but compare our general hypotheses with our
particular experiences and judgments, constantly examining and ad-
justing and revising in an effort to determine "which of opposing
positions is supported by stronger evidence and more convincing rea-
sons," as Glendon puts it?" More specifically, the back-and-forth meth-
68 Id. at 237-38.
69 See RICHARD . BERNSTEIN, BEYOND OBJECTIVISSI AND RELATIVISM: SCIENCE, HERMENEU-
TICS, AND l'aaicts 16-75 (1985). Bernstein's entire book explores the development of a sort of
dialectical practical reason in a wunber of influential modern thinkers including Kuhn, Gadanter,
Ilabermas and Roily.
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od in which the reasoner tests and adjusts disputed preinises and
hypotheses in light of particular observations and judgments seems
remarkably like the process of achieving "reflective equilibrium" advo-
cated by philosophers like John Rawls and Ronald Dworkin. 7° Histori-
ans , and social scientists—and even literary theorists—seemingly do
much the same thing. Nor is such reasoning limited to the academic
world. Don't business managers engage in much the same process?
Coaches? ("As a general rule it's best to punt on fourth-and-ten, .. .
but then again there isn't nmch time left and we're behind, . . . but
then again the wind is behind us and our defense has played well ...").
Don't all of us address the questions and decisions of life in much this
way?
In short, generic descriptions of law as "practical reason" are not
so much wrong as unhelpful; they do little either to explain or to
justify the particular features that make legal reasoning distinctive—its
attachment to an elaborate set of techniques for using precedent, its
specialized appeals to "legislative intention" and statutory "purpose,"
its intricate and intimidating vocabulary, its insistence that decisions
be applied retroactively because they merely declare "what the law is."
Generic descriptions fail to explain precisely those distinctive and
metaphysically portentous features that often seem "weird or exotic"
to outsiders who may themselves be skilled practitioners of "practical
reason" in less exotic, more plausible forms. 71
2. The practical inefficacy of law's distinctive discourse
So could these distinctive legal features be explained in more '
pragmatic, commonsensical terms, thereby obviating the supposition
that legal discourse is in fact seeking to do what it routinely says it seeks
to do—that is, ascertain the content of some formidable entity called
"the law?" Possible explanations are familiar enough, but they fit awk-
wardly with the actual practices and vocabulary of legal discourse.
For example, it is often observed that precedents—and perhaps
statutes or regulations—convey factual information that would be help-
ful in crafting a sensible pragmatic decision. 72 And precedents may
70 &V JOIIN RAWLS, A TOM MY OF JUSTICE 48 (1971). For a brief description of this dialectical
process by Dworkin, see Ronald Dworkin, Darzoi n's New Bulldog. 111 Wore. L. RE". 1718, 1722-25
(1998). Cf. LARRY ALEXANDER & KEN KRESS, AGAINST LEGAL PRINCIPLES, in LAW AND INTERPRE-
TATION 279, 906 (Andrei hlarmor ed.. 1995) ("10 We moral realm, reflect 8e equilibrium is
championed as the correct epistemological method for discovering (constructing?) correct moral
principles.").
71 See StINSTEIN, Snp/I7 note 29.
See Van Zandt, supra mol e 64, at 795-96 ("Although ',judges] occasionally cite scientific
1062 	 BOSTON COLLEGE LAW REVIEW 	 [Vol. 40:1041
have given rise to expectations on the part of people who have relied
on them; these expectations would themselves be factors that need to
be considered in making a fair and practically sound decision." In
addition, precedents and enactments are sometimes viewed as expres-
sions of wise counsel from which judges receive instruction or guid-
ance. 74 In this vein, Robin West contends that we ought to use the
Constitution simply as a "source of insight" in the same way that we
use "the writings of Aristotle, John Stuart Mill, John Rawls, and Roberto
Unger.""
Probably these claims all contain a measure of truth. But do these
familiar pragmatic explanations fully account for the distinctive fea-
tures of legal discourse, thereby making it unnecessary to suppose that
the discourse is in fact seeking to ascertain the content of any more
mysterious entity—of "the law?" Two criticisms embarrass the attempt
to give a purely pragmatic account of these distinctive features of legal
discourse.
First, case law and enactments are in fact not very good ways of
discovering or measuring these substantively relevant factors. For ex-
ample, legal precedents typically make almost no attempt to convey
the general societal or cultural information that a pragmatic decision-
maker might want;" a standard almanac would usually be a far better
source of this kind of data. Indeed, reported cases are often very
poor sources of information even about the facts of the cases them-
selves. "In the received theory of adjudication," Brian Simpson ex-
plains, "most contextual information about cases is simply irrelevant,"
and so it is filtered out of the reported decision. 77 For instance, John
studies, the most important source [of information) for judges is the pool of past decisions,
precedent .... Precedents are derivative information ... ."); see also Emily Sherwin, A Defense
of Analogical Reasoning in Law, 66 U. On. L. Rua'. 1179, 1186 (1999) (describing precedents as
providing "a wealth of data for decisionmaking").
73 For exanyle, Emily Sherwin's defense of conventional legal reasoning lays great weight
on the iniporlance of following precedent as a inky of protecting justifiable reliance interests. See
Sherwin, supra note 72, at 1186-89.
74 See generally id,
76 See ROBIN WEST, PROGRESSIVE CONSTITUTIONALISM 196 (1994).
• 76 See RICHARD A. POSNER, OVERCONIING LAW 520 (1995) (asserting "prior cases often con-
stitute an impoverished repository of fact and policy for the decision of the present one).
77 A.W. BRIAN SIMPSON, LEADING CASES IN THE COMMON LAW 10 (1995). Simpson adds:
Litigation entails a process of fitting—sometimes pushing and shoving—the messy
and untidy business of life into artificial legal categories. Even if we leave on one
side i he fact that litigants normally tell lies, the picture of reality presented in a law
report is more or less bound to be to some degree distorted. Indeed the incidents ,
. recorded in lass , reports may 'lever, in any sense, have happened at all.
Id at II.
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NOonan's essay on the famous Palsgraf case shows how virtually every
piece of significant or interesting information about the parties, the
accident, the context, the relevant enterprises, the judges and the
attorneys was methodically excluded from the judges' opinions." In
this respect, at least, Palsgraf was entirely typical.
Cases or statutes are also unreliable indicators of the extent or
depth of expectations. In many instances it would be possible to obtain
much more reliable information regarding actual reliance or expecta-
tions (or the lack thereof) by direct investigation; often such investiga-
tion might convincingly show that a party acted wholly without knowl-
edge of a case or statute. But, in fact, such investigation is virtually
never undertaken. Indeed, actual knowledge of the law is, for most
purposes, treated as irrelevant as a matter of law: That "ignorance of
• the law is no excuse" may well be the one piece of law that most
people know.
Nor are case reports or statutes especially likely sources of wisdom.
This is not to deny that these materials contain some insight or good
counsel. But the person who is truly in search of wisdom (as opposed
to something else, like "the law") would be better advised to go to her
favorite columnist, or poet, or,- hilosopher, or prophet—not to the
United States Reports or the West Digest system. Indeed, viewed as
texts in moral philosophy, the Sherman Act, the Robinson-Patman Act
or the Constitution (if we really paid attention to its text, as opposed
to the volumes of philosophizing that have over generations been
engrafted onto it)" would be almost pitifully meager. A judge who
wants guidance from the philosophical wisdom of an Aristotle would
be well advised to read Aristotle—not, as Robin West suggests, the
Equal Protection Clause.
A more general way of making this point is to notice that practical
reason—and, more specifically, concerns about obtaining information,
protecting expectations and learning from the wisdom of others—are
central to many enterprises, and perhaps to all human activities. As
noted, legislators, administrators, business executives, arbitrators,
school teachers and principals, coaches, parents and probably every-
one else engages in practical reason with similar concerns in mind;
78 See generally JOON NOONAN, PERSONS AND MASKS OF 'HIE 1.4w ch. 4 (1976).
7° See Richard S. Mdrphy & Erin A. O'Hara, Mistake of Criminal Law: A Study of coalitions
and Costly Information, 5 StiP. Cr. ECON. REV. 217,218 (1997) ("Ignorance of the law is IIo excuse'
is so Iddespread a maxim That it is one of the (c..w things many people do know about the law.").
s° For elaboration of the point, see STEVEN D. SMITH, TIIE CONSTITUTION AND THE PRIDE
OF REASON 31-32,43-47,73-83 (1998).
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consequently, all of these actors try to pay clue attention to decisions
and pronouncements made in the past. But in no other field do these
concerns generate the specific and extraordinary treatment of prece-
dent so conspicuous in legal discourse. So without denying that legal
discourse does to some extent perform these pragmatic functions, it
still seems that more is needed to account for these peculiarly "legal"
qualities.
The second difficulty with the wholly pragmatic account of con-
ventional legal reasoning is that it takes the explicit reasoning less
seriously than judges . and lawyers themselves typically seem to take it.
Judges and lawyers, that is, certainly seem to regard the formal legal
reasoning as a deadly serious matter; in preparing briefs and arguing
about an issue they may devote untold billable hours and hundreds of
pages to amassing and explicating it. For some purposes, to be sure,
judges and lawyers may also consult more pure and direct sources of
information or wisdom—compilations of data or, on rare occasions,
philosophical works—but these sources are not treated as having actual
legal "authority" in the way that precedents, statutes or other actual
expressions of "the law" do. And judges and lawyers talk as if the
conclusions reached through such explication of the more purely legal
materials—the conclusions about the substantive content of "the
law"—are authoritative and binding, not just a curious, backhanded
way of conveying some more pragmatic decision about what seems
sensible or fair.
Once again, perhaps the clearest manifestation of this commit-
ment to "the law" lies in the traditional approach to the question of
retroactivity. As noted, courts typically treat a common law decision,
even on a previously uncertain or hotly debated question, as governing
even transactions that may have occurred well before the decision was
rendered. In many cases, such retroactivity could hardly be justified on
the assumption that in forming expectations people anticipated, or
perhaps should have anticipated, what a court would ultimately say on
the issue. Indeed, even when a court overrules a prior decision, the new
decision is typically applied retroactively; this conventional approach
plainly serves not to protect expectations but rather to frustrate them.
So the practice necessarily seems based on the premise that the court
is merely articulating what "the law" was and is, as indeed the Suprethe
Court has recently reaffirmed. 81
81 See supra notes 45-53 and accompanying text.
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In sum, the language and practices of conventional legal discourse
seem .to be animated by a commitment to finding and enforcing "the
law." We can try to explain away this apparent commitment by trans-
lating the vocabulary into pragmatic terms or by offering pragmatic
explanations for the peculiar ways lawyers and judges talk. But the
translation and the explanations seem strained. Were it not for the fact
that modern lawyers and scholars insist otherwise," it would be far
more plausible to suppose that legal discourse is out to do just what it
says it is doing—to discover and declare something called "the law."
D. Legal Interpretation and Scriptural Interpretation
The apparent commitment to faith in a metaphysical "law"' is all
the more evident if we notice—as a number of legal scholars have
done83—how similar legal interpretation is to traditional practices of
scriptural exegesis and, conversely, how different legal interpretation
often is from what we might call "ordinary interpretation." Ordinary
interpretation refers to what we might more commonly think of simply
as "communication"; it describes what we do when we make plans with
a friend, hear a lecture, read a newspaper, listen to a radio talk show
or consult a recipe hook. Our objective is to communicate as plainly
and clearly as possible. So the speaker's goal is to communicate his
intentions clearly, and the hearer's intention is to figure out as pre-
cisely as possible what the speaker is trying to say.
Scriptural interpretation, by contrast, includes but often goes be-
yond this familiar practice of communication in at least two ways. First,
scriptural interpretation often presupposes that a text contains multi-
ple levels of meaning. These levels may be considered in different ways:
as "literal" and "figurative" meanings," as "literal" and "spiritual" mean-
ings," or as "literal," "allegorical," "tropological" and "anagogical" lev-
els of meaning." According to Alister McGrath, Martin Luther eventu-
ally distinguished eight different levels of scriptural meaning. 87 This
search for multiple leveliof textual meaning would seem preposterous
in the familiar contexts of ordinary interpretation. One can imagine
the reclusive academician, sent unexpectedly to do the grocery shop-
82 See infra noes 101-09 and accompanying text.
83 See infin noes 98-100 mid accongmnying text.
84 See generally WILLIAM C. ['LACHER, A HISTORY Or CHRISTIAN THEOLOGY 62 (1983).
85 See, e.g., JAROSLAV PELIKAN, CIIRISTIANITY AND CLASSICAL CULTURE 225-26 (1993).
86 See, e.g., AustERMcGRATit, THE INTELLECTUAL. ORIGINS OF THE EUROPEAN REFORMATION
153 (1987).
87 See id. at 158.
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ping, standing paralyzed in Aisle 9 with grocery list in hand: "I know
that at the literal level this word means 'bread' and this word means
`eggs,' but what are the anagogical meanings? What are the tropologi-
cal meanings?" Conversely, someone who did manage to find such
meanings in an ordinary grocery list would be considered delusional.
A second distinguishing feature of much scriptural interpretation
is its assumption of unity among what appear on the surface to be
diverse texts. Christian believers or preachers routinely put together a
passage from Deuteronomy, say, with one from Isaiah, and then add
still other verses from the New Testament, treating these verses as if
they were a unified text proclaiming a unified truth. Consider, to pick
an example almost at random, John Calvin's defense of the necessity
of belonging to the Christian church as against those who advocated
withdrawal because the church harbored impure people and practices.
In attempting to prove his position, Calvin quoted and cited liberally
from a disparate host of poetic and prophetic Old Testament writ-
ings—writings in which au uninitiated or more skeptical reader might
not detect any reference whatsoever to the Christian church—as well
as from New Testament Gospels and Pauline Epistles." All of these
texts, widely disparate in origin, content and style, were treated as if
they speak in a perpetual present with a single voice.
Again, although this assumption of unity is perfectly familiar in
religious contexts, the same assumption would seem outlandish in
contexts of ordinary interpretation. You would not take, say, a postcard
from Aunt Sal on her Hawaiian vacation, a letter written by your
brother Joe during the war, a clipping from the local newspaper and
a journal entry from Grandma Prudence's depression-era diary and
ask, "Taken together, what are they saying?"
The explanation for these otherwise bizarre henneneutical prac-
tices, of course, is that traditional interpreters of scripture do not
suppose that they are merely reading a variety of writings by different
human authors. The authority of scripture, Mister McGrath explains,
"ultimately derives from the fact that it is God himself who is the author
of scripture."" In the same vein, Jacob Neusner emphasizes that the
intricate and (to the uninitiated) fantastic exercises in scriptural inter-
pretation practiced by Jewish rabbis make sense only on the assump-
tion of divine authorship: "For without theological standing as God's
word, the Torah . . . enjoys no privileged position, requires no sus-
'".See JOHN CALVIN, INSTITUTES OP THE CHRISTIAN RELIGION 1V.1.20-29 at 297-303 (Henry
.Beveridge trans., 1989).
89 SCe MGCRATH, supra note 86, at 123.
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tallied study, bears no message of consequence."'" Another commen-
tator explains:
Jewish tradition teaches that the Torah (the Pentateuch)
was revealed by God to Moses at Mount Sinai  Not only
was the revelation word for word, but . . . it was letter for
letter. Consequently, every word, and even every letter, has
the plenitude of meaning that only a divine author can en-
The assumption that -a text is divinely-authored, and that the
different historical authors were, at least to some extent, scribes for a
common, more ultimate and indeed divine author, serves to justify the
interpreters' quest to find in scripture hidden, allegorical or spiritual
meanings that might have been quite beyond the conscious intentions
of the historical, flesh-and-blood scribes." The same assumption ac-
counts for the traditional interpreters' treatment of scripture as a
unified (although perhaps developing) whole, rather than as a mass
of discrete and diverse texts that happen to have been collected be-
tween a single set of covers. Conversely, on the assumption of strongly
disparate and purely human authorship, these hermeneutical practices
do not make sense; hence, modern scholars operating on secular as-
sumptions are unlikely to presuppose unity, and are more likely to em-
phasize contrasts, inconsistencies or developments among and within
different books of scripture."
Although law involves a good deal of ordinary interpretation,
especially in its treatment of private documents such as wills or con-
tracts, in its approach to public manifestations of law—judicial prece-
dents, statutes or the Constitution—legal practice often seems more
akin to scriptural exegesis both in its assumption that legal texts con-
tain layers of often hidden meanings and in its assumption of unity
in the materials to be interpreted. Legal interpreters regularly and
self-consciously search for underlying "principles" or "purposes" that
were not expressed—and perhaps not even imagined—by the human
9(1 JACOB NEUSNER, A MIDRASII READER 28 (1990).
" Eric NI. Cheylen, Discovering the "lidonnd, 85 FiRST '111INGS 40, Aug.—Sept. 1998, at 40.
See WERNER JEANROND, 'IIIEOLOGICAL LIERINIENEUTICS 18-30 (1991).
"For an overview of the development of modern biblical scholarship, see ROBERT MORGAN
terra lone BARTON, BIBLICAL INTERPREXATION 44-92 (1988). The more secular approach views
the Peolateudi as "a patchwork of disparate pieces." Id. at 77. Likewise, "Mlle centuries-long
practice of Gospel harntonization is now intellectually discredited, though far from dead." Id. at
64. Morgan and Barton explain that "It the significant abide is between all attempts to read the
Bible religiously (on the assumption that it speaks of Cod) and non-religious readings." Id. at 36.
1068 	 BOSTON COLLEGE LAW REVIEW	 t\id. 40:1041
authors of a constitutional provision. 94 Nor is it only in the interpreta-
tion of constitutional provisions or enacted law that this sort of layered
interpretation occurs; if anything, the practice is even more apparent
in the most mundane arguments about the meaning of common law -
precedents. As noted, in discussing a prior decision, lawyers and judges
do not treat the literal statements of opinions as final and dispositive
and they do not—and could not—treat all parts of the case equally.
They purport to search for something more elusive—the "holding" of
the case—which must then be blended in sonic not fully specifiable
way with the holdings of any number of other often divergent cases to
reveal "the law."
Lawyers and judges also instinctively assume that the various texts
of the law will speak with an univocal voice.% Thus, Ronald Dworkin
argues that the law is and must be understood as if it were a single
coherent whole produced by a single author.% And in practice, lawyers
and judges reflect this assumption by, for example, regularly appealing,
through analogical argument, to decisions on matters quite inde-
pendent of the one immediately at issue in order to show that a given
decision would be incompatible with these other, distant decisions—
and so could not be consistent with "the law."
To be sure, critics of prevalent interpretive practices may insist that
legal interpretation ought to be more like ordinary interpretation—like
reading a recipe in a cook book, perhaps 97—but it is clear (as the critics
themselves complain) that this "ordinary interpretation" position is
incongruent with large areas of actual practice. Conversely, the simi-
larities between legal and scriptural interpretation are so imposing that
they have been noticed by a number of modern legal scholars. 98
91 For a recent and very methodical defense of the practice, see MICHAEL J. PERRY, rnIE
CONSTITUTION IN THE Comers (1994). The practice is hardly limited to "liberal" judges and
scholars. See, e.g., HADLEY ARKES, BEYOND THE CONSTITUTION 40-57 (1990); ROBERT BORE, Tile
TEMPFING OF AMERICA: THE POLITICAL. SEDUCTION OF THE LAW 81-83,162-63 (1990).
95 See Pierre Schlag, Clerks in the Maze, in AGAINST Tim Law, MOH note 59, at 218 ( -The
judge is thus a monistic figure, one who says what the law is. And this law is always announced
in the singular: there is always, at die end, .. „just one law.").
96 See DWORKIN, LAW'S ENIFIRF, StipM note 57, at 225.
97 In this vein, 0013, Lawson argues that "it1he Cot isti union of the United States is a recipe—a
recipe fir a particular form of government." See Gary Lawson, On Reading Recipes . . . and
Constitutions, 85 Ow. L.J. 1823,1833 (1997). Consequently, "ti Interpreting the Constitution is
no more difficult, and no different in principle, than interpreting a late-eighteenth-century recipe
for fried chicken." Id. And "loither approaches to interpretation ale sinqily wrong." /d. at 1834.
98 SIT, e.g., SANFORD LEVINSON, CONSTITUTIONAL FAITH 9-53 (1988); ThOIIIIIS C. Grey, The
Constitution as Scripture, 37 STAN. L. Rev. 1 (1984) thereinafter Grey, The Constiltdion); Samuel
J. Levine, Unenumerated Constitutional Rights and Unenumerated Biblical Obligations: A Preliminary
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What these scholars do not acknowledge, however, is that legal
interpretation is, in fact, based on any sort of faith analogous to that
inherent in scriptural exegesis."" Unlike the interpreters of scripture,
modern legal thinkers do not justify their practices by supposing any
actual, single author speaks through the disparate materials of the law.
Thus, Bruce Ackerman suggests that "a model of interpretation which
can do justice to the complexity of American judicial practice ... hears
some striking resemblances to other great interpretive enterprises—
most notably those that derive from the major religious traditions." But
Ackerman quickly acids that there is not and cannot be any sort of
actual faith in legal interpretation: "Most obviously, the American tra-
dition is born in the spirit of the Enlightenment." 1 °°
E. The Paradox of Modern Legal Thought
As the preceding discussion suggests, both the casual phraseology
of lawyers (their questionings about "what 'the law' is" or "what 'the
law' requires") and the actual practices and presuppositions of lawyerly
argumentation seem to betray a sort of faith in some metaphysical
abstraction called "the law."'°' But here we encounter a difficulty that
will challenge us again and again; although lawyers often talk and act
as if they believe in "the law," in moments of self-consciousness mod-
ern lawyers will disavow any such belief. Perhaps nineteenth-century
figures like Joseph Story or Christopher Columbus Langdell may have
taken such talk literally—who really knows?—but for twentieth-century
lawyers, "the law," when implicitly described as some unitary entity that
somehow transcends the concrete cases and enactments, can only be
• viewed as a fiction or metaphor. Asserting that the federal common
law of the Swift v. Tyson era presupposed "a transcendental body of law
outside of any particular state but obligatory within it," Holmes per-
emptorily dismissed the notion as a "fallacy and illusion;" in fact, "there
is no such body of law." 1 °2 And in this respect, Hohnes's jurisprudence
had the rare good fortune (for a proposition of jtvisprudence) to be
explicitly adopted by the Supreme Court in a landmark case. 103
Study in Comparative Hermeneutics. 15 CoNst. Comm. 511 (1998); ?daimon Schwarzsch 'Id, Mumb
1st Interpretation: From Religion to the First Amendment, 7J. CogrEmr. LEG. ISSUES 447 (1996).
99 See Grey, The Constitution, supra note 98, at 20.
m'See Muer: ACKERMAN, WE TIIF. PEOPLE: FOUNDATIONS 159-60 (1991).
lot Cf. Felix Collett, Transcendental Nonsense and (he Functional Approach, 35 Cowm. L. REV.
809, 823 (1935) (arguing that "lolor legal system is filled with supernamild concepts").
" See Black & White Taxicab Co. v. Brown & Yellow Taxicab Co., 27(1 U.S. 518, 532-34 (1928)
(flohnes, J., dissenting).
"See Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 79 (1938).
1070 	 BOSTON COLLEGE LAW REVIEW
	 (Vol. 40:1041
Brian Simpson summarizes our current condition:
For lawyers, to quote E.P. Thompson, writing in 1975 of what
he calls the greatest of all legal fictions, "the law itself evolves,
from case to case, by its own impartial logic, true only to its
own integrity, unswayed by expedient considerations." There
is, of course, a sense in which nobody really believes this any
more, but it remains the case that much legal behaviour pro-
ceeds on the assumption that the law is like that. For example,
all legal argument in court makes this assumption.'"
This paradox—the paradox presented by an elaborate, powerful
system of discourse that appears to presuppose a faith in something
that its practitioners almost uniformly disavow—runs through the
heart of twentieth-century jurisprudence.
II. AGAINST CONVENTIONAL LEGAL DISCOURSE:
THE HOLMESIAN CENTURY
Twentieth-century jurisprudence might aptly be viewed as a mas-
sive revolt against conventional legal discourse and its implicit assump-
tions. Although the century has witnessed a variety of legal theories
and movements, most of the influential views exhibit a common struc-
ture—a structure that can be captured in four themes: (1) the rejec-
tion of metaphysical commitments, (2) the critique of conventional
legal discourse, (3) the special emphasis on the form-substance distinc-
tion, and (4) the advocacy of a more discernibly rational, more prac-
tically ambitious but metaphysically modest substance for legal dis-
course.
As it happens, each of these themes was put forward in Oliver
Wendell Holmes's famouS Path of the Law essay, published on the eve
of the new century. Holmes's essay has often been described as pro-
phetic.'" "A century later," Mary Ann Glendon observes, "lawyers all
over the world are marching to the measure of [Holmes's] thought." 101 '
Glendon's assessment is in one sense too generous: As I will discuss
later, Holmes's prevision' was seriously deficient with regard to the
I " SIMPSON, supra note 77, at 10 (emphasis added).
1 °5
 See, e.g., Alberi W. Alschuler, The Descending Trail: Holmes' Path of the Law One Hundred
Years Later, 49 Fla. L. RE\'. 353, 414 (1997) ("The Path of the Law has molded American legal
consciousness for a century ...."); Martha Minoss, The Path as Prologue, 110 Haim L. REY. 1023
(1997); Louise Weinberg, Hohnes 'Failure, 96 Mien. L. Rev. 691, 692 (1997) (Holmes' essay was
"truly the voice of the future").
It See GLENDON. supra note 14, at 190.
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course that legal practice would take. So lawyers are not marching to the
measure of Hohnes's thought. But Holmes was remarkably prescient
with respect to the shape that legal theory would take, which is to say.
that lawyers, and especially law professors, are often thinking in har-
mony with Holmes. This section considers how Hohnes's response to
conventional legal discourse set or anticipated the structure of twenti-
eth-century legal thought.
A. The Rejection of Metaphysical Commitmentsm
As noted above, conventional legal discourse seems to presuppose
that "the law" exists as some sort of authority or entity that speaks with
a unified voice through more mundane materials such as judicial
decisions and statutes. Holmes regarded this idea as preposterous. He
derided the notion of law as some sort of "brooding omnipresence in
the sky." 1°8 And, as noted, he flatly rejected the idea of a "transcenden-
tal body of law outside of any particular State but obligatory within it,"
declaring bluntly that "there is no such body of law.""x' In Path of the
Law, Holmes rejected the metaphysical conception of the law in more
methodical and positive terms by offering a replacement account of
what the law is—all account that self-consciously avoided appealing to
or presupposing anything mysterious or metaphysical (or even moral).
The law is nothing more, Holmes insisted, than a set of predictions
about what judges will do. 111 The basic ingredients of this account—
judges making decisions and lawyers making predictions about judges'
decisions—are firmly a part of the lawyer's familiar, workaday world.
Although many later thinkers have criticized Hohnes's specific
"prediction theory" of what law is, twentieth-century legal thought has
been faithful to Holmes in rejecting any faith-dependent, metaphysi-
cally ambitious account of law. Holmes's view that law does not exist
as anything like a "brooding omnipresence in the sky" has been re-
107 It might be more accurate to say that all thinking is implicitly , committed to some sort of
metaphysics, so that Holmes and his followers could only have rejected some kinds of metaphysical
commitments. For present purposes, 1 ant using "metaphysical" in what I think is a standard or
familiar (albeit imprecise) sense in which the term refers to ostensible orders of reality that are
viewed as exotic or spiritual or beyond what we innilecliately know in our everyday, commonsense
sonic!. CI Pestle]; Thoblemalics, supra note 6, at 1648 ("I at interested in the type of moralizing
that is, or at least pretends to be, lice from controversial metaphysical commitments such as those
of a believing Christian, and so might rolleCirably appeal to the judges of our secular courts."). •
'° See Southern Pac. Co. v. Jensen, 244 U.S. 205, 222 (1917) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
l"t SeeRlack & White Taxicab Co. v. 141 -mel & Yellow Taxicab Co., 276 U.S. 518, 532-34 (1928)
(nobles, j., dissenting).
w See Holmes, The Palk of the Lan'. saliva cote 3, at 457-61.
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garded as so obvious that the view hardly needs to be expressed. As
noted, even the occasional scholar who acknowledges that the ordinary
discourse of law seems to imply such a conception will hastily acid that
"of course, . . . nobody really believes this anymore."'" Indeed, even
the proponents of what is called "natural law" typically go out of their
way to emphasize that they do not advocate the more exotic metaphysi-
cal notions sometimes associated with that term; modern "natural law"
is—or tries to be—very much a hunian and of-this-world affair. 112
Insofar as legal thinkers reject the idea that law is a "brooding
omnipresence in the sky," they need to supply (or at least assume)
some other account of what law is—to "redefine supernatural concepts
in natural terms," as Felix Cohen put it."' Twentieth-century accounts
differ, of course. Some theorists have followed Holmes's lead in devel-
oping what might be called "behavioral" accounts of law: The law
consists of what judges—or perhaps government officials generally—
do.'" Other scholars offer hermeneutical accounts—Dworkin's theory
of law as a practice of interpretation subject to requirements of "integ-
rity" is a leading example"'—or more sociological or institutional ac-
counts, as in the theories of H.L.A. Hart and Neil MacCormick. 116
Although accounts diverge in saying what law is, however, they con-
verge in saying what law is not Law is not, and could not be, the sort
of univocal authoritative entity that, as discussed above, the discourse
of lawyers and judges would suggest that it is (to a naive but perceptive
observer, at least).
III See SIMPS0N, Supra note 77, at 10.
112 For a discussion by a leading natural law scholar asserting that Batumi law does nit depend
on any mysterious or unusual metaphysical commitments, see Michael S. kloore, Aforal Reality
Revisited, 90 Minx. L. REV. 2424,2491-533 (1992). The other leading contemporary natural law
scholar, John Fiuuis, is sometimes criticized precisely on the ground that his position cannot work
without more ambitious ontological cotunffiments that Fill declines to stake; for a discussion
of this criticism and a defense of Minds, see Robert P. George, Natural Law and Human Nature,
in NATURAL LAW 'InEoRY: CONTEMPORARY Essays 31 (Robert P. George ed., 1992).
11.3
	 Cohen, supra note 101, at 830.
114 See Llewellyn, A Realistic Jurisprudence, supra note 4, at 456 (asserting "the center of law,
is not merely what the judge does, ... but what any state official cities, officially").
113 See generalt5, DWORKIN, LAW'S ENIPIRE, supra note 57.
116 Mart described law as a system of primary and secondary rules that exist iu Ike sense that
they are accepted by legal officials. See Fl. L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 77-114 (1961). Hart
Sometinies presented this view' of law as a kind of "descriptive sociology." See id. at v. MacCormick
describes law as II complex "institutimml hid." See, e.g., Neil klacC.ormick, On 'Open Thame s in
Law, in CONTROVERSIF.S Anour Law's 08:rot.onv 72,78-79 (Paul Antselek & Neil MacCorinick
eds. 1991); see also genetallyNut.MAcCommtcic & OIA WEINBERGER, AN INST ITUTI rNAI.'fnMORI'
or LAW (1986).
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B. The Critique of Conventional Legal Discourse
Stripped of its supporting metaphysics, conventional legal (Hs-
' course becomes a suspect enterprise. Not surprisingly, much of Hol-
mes's Path essay was devoted to criticizing the conventional mode of
talking and arguing. His criticisms would be characteristic of legal
thought throughout the ensuing century.
The central objections might he reduced to two; they challenge
conventional legal reasoning on grounds of its indeterminacy and its
artificiality. Although these objections may appear to be controversial,
a close examination suggests that there is less disagreement than meets
the eye. In fact, Holmes's criticisms have largely carried the clay.
1. Indeterminacy
Holmes maintained that although lawyers and judges talk as if
legal conclusions follow from legal premises—as if the precedents,
rules or doctrines require particular results—the apparent logic of ju-
dicial opinions is misleading. Judges present their decisions as if they
were compelled by the relevant legal authorities. But in most cases an
equally plausible argument can he constructed to justify just the oppo-
site conclusion. So the apparently deductive quality of legal reasoning
is largely illusory." 7
This criticism was elaborated at great length, of course, in the
so-called Legal Realist and Critical Legal Studies movements. Advanc-
ing or resisting the critique has been a staple item for twentieth-century
jurisprudence." 8 But perhaps there is less disagreement—and less re-
sistance to the indeterminacy claim—than the ongoing jurisprudential
skirmishes would suggest. The appearance of conflict results in pan
from the fact that the basic claim is deeply ambiguous about just what
is—or isn't—indeterminate.
The problem is this: On the one hand, it scents the critics are
plainly right in maintaining that for many or perhaps most legal issues,
arguments using the standard techniques of legal discourse can be
constructed to justify inconsistent conclusions. One haidly needs any
fancy theory or Derridean perversity to recognize this fact. It should
117 Sty Hohues, The Path of the Law, supra note 3, at 466 (stating "the logical method and
form flatter that longing for certainty and for repose which is in every human mind. But certainty
geneudly is illusion, and repose is not the destiny of omit .... You can give any conclusion a
logical [Orin. You can always imply a cotalition in a column. But why do you imply it?").
IPIFor an overview of the competing arguments, see Lawrence A. Solum, Indeterminacy, in
A COMPANION TO PHILOSOPHY OF LAW AND LEGAL THEORY 488 (Deems Patterson ed., 1996).
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be enough to observe that in virtually all of the cases decided by courts,
the record contains briefs by losing counsel offering legal arguments
for the position the courts rejected. And, in many of those cases, losing
counsel will have convinced themselves that those arguments are in-
deed correct, so that the courts that ruled against them somehow got
"the law" wrong.
On the other hand, the construction of contrary arguments can
also seem academic, and even a hit sophomoric, because it seems clear
that skilled lawyers can make informed and (to differing degrees)
reliable predictions about how legal issues will be resolved. Experi-
enced lawyers understand that although a particular argument can be
made, in practice that argument will be regarded as implausible or
even frivolous.'m
Contestants in the "indeterminacy" debates tend to emphasize one
or the other of these facts; critics underscore the abstract possibility of
contrary arguments,'" while defenders of the law point out the prac-
tical experience of relative certainty in predicting the proper outcome
of most legal controversies.m But are these facts necessarily in tension?
Legal decisions, after all, are likely the product not only of the formal
legal arguments offered in the case but of other factors as well—per-
haps of underlying "legislative" judgments by the courts (as Holmes
thought),I 22 or the socialization and craft training of judges (as Karl
Llewellyn thought), 123 or background "legal principles" (as Ronald
Dworkin has argued) , 124 or race and gender, or something else alto-
gether. These other background factors might bring considerable sta-
bility and predictability to legal decisions even though the formal "legal
reasoning," considered in isolation and on its own merits, might be
radically indeterminate. 125
"9 See, e.g., Schatz, supra note 12, at 767 ("In the substantial un!jorig: of cases in which I was
involved, the parties, the attorneys, :old the judges not only agreed that language had meaning,
but even agreed on what it meant (that is, on the content of the legal principles governing the
ease).").
120 For an extreme instance, see Anthony D'Amato, Aspects ql Deconstruction: The 'Easy Case"
of the Underage(' President, 84 Nw. U.I-. REV. 250 (1989).
121 See, e.g., KENT GREENAWALT, LAW AND Oturcrwrry 38-39 (1992).
122 See infra note 147 and accompanying text.
123 See infra note 126 and accompanying text.
121 See RONALD DWORKIN, TAKING RIGIITs SERIOUSLY 22-45 (1977).
Ile' For a discussion of this possibility, see Sutton, supra note 118, at 495-97; el STEPHEN M.
FELDMAN, AMERICAN LEGAL THOUGHT FROM PRESIODERNISSI TO POSTMODERNISM: AN INTELLEC-
TUAL VOYAGE 164 (2000):
INIlodernists see easy cases only because they im p licitly accept the stability of some
background context or assumptions that seem to groin id objective textual interpre-
tations. Postmodernists, however, stress that such background assumptions always
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Consequently, whether the law is seriously indeterminate might
hinge mainly on whether one classifies these determining background
factors as part of "the law"—as Dworkin claims with respect to "princi-
ples"— or, conversely, as foreign or nonlegal influences. Thus, despite
iconoclastic contributions such as his famous "thrust and parry" lists of
contradictory canons of construction, the mature Karl Llewellyn was
able to conclude that the law is relatively determinate—or, to use
his peculiar parlance, that law has considerable "reckonability" or
"guidesomeness"—because he counted the "steadying factors" of judi-
cial socialization as part of "the law."1 "G The formal arguments might
appear contradictory and indeterminate to the detached observer, but
a properly socialized judge will know which arguments to accept and
which to reject in a given context. Oddly enough, a radical critic who
makes what seem exorbitant claims of indeterminacy might in reality
hold essentially the same view; she simply does not classify accultura-
tion, or the "deep structure" of prevailing ideology in which judges
and others of their class are socialized, as part of "the law."
In sum, apparent adversaries on the indeterminacy question
might simply be using terms in different ways. If recognizing this
ambiguity narrows the range of actual disagreement, however, it does
little to redeem conventional legal discourse as a form of reasoning
against the objections of Holmes and his successors. On the contrary,
it now appears that the experienced stability and predictability of the
law results not so much from legal reasoning per se as from other
sub-surface factors. The formal argumentation itself turns out to be
highly indeterminate after all; it is more of a framework around which
other sorts of considerations can crystallize, or perhaps a vocabulary
in which decisions generated otherwise can'be expressed. 127
. This conclusion is starkly confirmed in the jurisprudence of
Ronald Dworkin. Dworkin is well-known as a forceful opponent of
skeptics who argue that law is indeterminate, or that judges are often
required to exercise "discretion" in cases in which the law provides
no answer. Indeed, Dworkin is probably the leading contemporary
can be brought to the foreground and displaced, ain't)) , doing so, postmodernists
deconstruct texttml meanings that previously havl appeared uncontroversial.
Id.
12a See LLEWELLYN, THE Common; Lmv, supra note 92, at 19-51. For a related discussion
arguing that the essence of the common law in its heyday vius precisely a system of COIISIMCIII
socialization of participants, see Simpson, supra note 38, at 18-21,
127 Cf. LEVINSON, S/I/M/ note 98, at 191-92 (describing ColISIIIIIII011/11 law as "a linguistic
system" and asserting that "It 'here is nothing that is unsayable in the language or the Constitu-
tion").
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advocate of the "one right answer" thesis.' 28 But Dworkin purports to
achieve rationality and determinacy only by importing a version of
moral philosophy into law; he does not defend the rationality or
determinacy , of conventional legal discourse in itself. On the contrary,
Dworkin insists on the indeterminacy of that form of argumentation;
indeed, he suggests that it could not provide answers to legal questions,
so that judges who purport to reach results through such reasoning .
without resort to moral judgments or moral theory perpetuate "a costly
mendacity. "129
It seems, in short, that the criticism of legal reasoning as indeter-
minate has gained general acceptance—though it need not follow that
legal decision -making is vulnerable to the same criticism.
2. Artificiality
Although the question of "indeterminacy" has provoked recurring
debates throughout the century, from a more detached perspective
that question may seem almost like a distraction. That is because even
if—or especially if—conventional legal reasoning were fully determi-
nate, Holmes's second main objection to traditional legal discourse
would be even more telling.
The second objection basically asserts that legal reasoning is an
artificial exercise that, whether determinate or not, has no good claim
to dictate the results in real world controversies. As noted, proponents
of the common law system since Sir Edward Coke have described its
form of thought as a kind of "artificial reason.""" In effect, the second
major objection takes this self-description at face value, and then asks
why artificial reason should govern "real life" controversies. What sense
does it make, after all, that a criminal defendant should be executed—
or a substantial sum of money extracted from one person and con-
ferred on another—just because an exercise in "artificial reason" was
decided in a particular way'? To let actual controversies be decided on
the basis of conventional legal reasoning seems much like letting an
antitrust suit against AT&T turn on the outcome of a "Monopoly"
contest, or like making a game of "hangman" dictate the fate of an
accused citninal.
In The Path of the Law, Holmes made essentially this same point
in a different way by inveighing against the apparently mindless tradi-
P2s See, e.g., RONAI.D DWORKIN, A MATTER OF PRINCIPLE. 119-45 (198rd.
12° See DwoaKm, Fammord's LAW, surn note 6, at 37.
13° See supra note 36 and accompanying text.
September 19991 	 liELIEVING 1.1h7: A LAMER	 1077
tionalism of the law. It makes no sense, he argued, to do something
merely because a similar thing had been clone or commanded in the
distant past."' Conventional legal thought, of course, would suggest
that Holmes misstated the matter; prior decisions or precedents have
authority not by virtue of being in the past, but rather because they
state or reflecrwhat was—and is—"the law." But if, as Holmes thought,
there is no such "law" independent of or brooding above the actual
decisions, then this account of the authority of precedent will lose its
meaning. And so it seems that a court that follows a precedent it may
dislike on the assumption that the precedent is authoritative or "bind-
ing" is deferring to the past simply because it is past. Holmes drew this
conclusion, at any rate, and it provoked one of his most oft-quoted
aphorisms;
It is revolting to have no better reason for a rule of law than
that so it was laid down in the time of Henry IV. It is still more
revolting if the grounds upon which it was laid down have
• vanished long since, and the rule persists from blind imitation
of the past."'
By and large, twentieth-century legal thinkers have shared Hol-
mes's conclusion. Making a decision simply because "the law" so re-
quires—a law identifiable through conventional legal reasoning—by
now sounds to most lawyers and scholars suspiciously reminiscent of
"formalism" and its symbol, Christopher Columbus Langdell—words
which today bring to mind images of an anachronistic and virtually in-
comprehensible way of understanding law from which we have thank-
fully escaped." Occasionally a would-be defender of conventional legal
discourse will make the mistake of taking on the issue in Hohnes's
terms, arguing that we are obligated to follow the past because it is past;
such defenses have been easy prey for rationalist critics. 134 So most
lawyers and scholars will readily agree that in order to be "rational,"
131 See Hulloes, The Path of the Lau supra note 3, at 4118-09,
132 Id. at 469,
133 Duncan Kennedy C011111ICIIIS that "until recently, I had never met an American legal
theorist or practitioner who called him- or herself a formalist, except in jest." DUNCAN KENNEDY,
A CRITIQUE OF ANUDIcAtton, ON DE SIECLE) 106 (1997). Linda Isleyer observes that "Me
'formalist' account of legal reasoning ... has become a straw man, never defended and often
abused." Meyer, supra Ilote 14, at 649. But see infra notes 139-44 and accompanying text. For
commentary on Langdell, see Alscluder, supra note 105, at 361 (noting Lallgdell serves as "the
ubiquitous bogeynem of American law"); Gn.moRE, sups note 2, at 41-42 (describing Langdell
as "an essentially stupid mall" who serves as a "symbol of the new age" of formalism—an age that
Gilmore viewed as "the law's black night").
191 Compare Kronntati, Precedent, supm acne 28 (arguing that law should follow the past
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legal decisions ought to be determined by "policy" considerations—or
political-moral theory, or something more comprehensibly in accord-
ance with "reason" than conventional legal argumentation.
The frailty of conventional legal reasoning as against the charge
of artificiality is apparent even in the efforts of its occasional would-be
defenders. Almost two decades ago, Charles Fried wrote an essay de-
fending the "artificial reason of the law" and trying to distinguish it
from other forms of reasoning, including moral philosophy. "The law's
rationality," Fried intoned, "is a rationality apart." 135 Yet, even at the
time, Fried seemed uncertain about just what he was claiming. At times
he suggested that the law uses a special form of analogical reasoning
that is wholly different than moral philosophy; the main value of
philosophy in law, he asserted, "is a largely negative contribution,
puncturing the bumptious pretensions of upstart social science to have
found, in Austin's words, 'the key to the science of jurisprudence. '”I36
But Fried offered no careful defense of the rationality of any distinctly
legal method, and as the essay proceeded, legal reasoning came to
seem more and more like a sidekick to moral philosophy, functioning
mainly to fill in details that are too local and specific to have truly right
answers anyway. Instead of serving mostly to protect legal reasoning
against the incursions of social science, moral philosophy now supplied
the very foundation and superstructure within which legal reasoning
did its "filling in" work. So law became "a topic within moral philoso-
phy," and "[p]hildsophy, to be sure, has the last word: 137
It was hardly surprising, consequently, when judge Posner recently
used the Oliver Wendell Holmes Lectures , to attack modern moral
philosophy and its impoHation into law, that Fried not only defended
the use of moral philosophy—surely not the "artificial reason" de-
scribed by Coke and embodied in conventional legal discourse— but
seemed incapable of even imagining any other kind of rationality.
Responding to Posner's critique of moral philosophy, Fried declared
that "the choice is between moral philosophy and . . . what?" Fried
went on to depict the alternative to moral philosophy as a stark absence
of rationality and reflection, leaving human beings mere "creatures of
impulse: 138 The law's "rationality apart," it seems, had fled from Fried's
view.
because it is past) with David Litban, Legal Thalitionalism, 43 STAN. L. REV. 1035,1040-60 (1991)
(raising objections to Kromnan's argument).
135 See Fried, Artificial Reason, supra note 36, at 58.
136 See id. 81 49.
137 1d. at 57-58.
138 See Charles Fried, Philosophy Mailers, III HARP. L. REV. 1739,1749 (1998).
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A more earnest but even less persuasive defense of conventional
legal reasoning conies from the rare explicit proponent of straightfor-
ward legal formalism. The formalist may assert that law has its own "im-
manent" rationality,'" or that legal discourse produces its own particu-
lar species of internal or "legal" truth."° Proponents of this view may
draw on philosophers like Wittgenstein—whether accurately or not is
not for me to say—ill maintaining that "truth" is not an "objective"
quality or a relation of correspondence between statements and some
external reality. Rather, truth is defined by or is a product of dis-
course—of particular language games, or of the "modalities of legal
argumentation as practiced by lawyers.""' So the sort of truth that legal
thinking produces will be internal to legal discourse.' 42 Critics of "the
fallacy of logical form," like Holmes, miss the point, the neoformalist
continues, by complaining in effect that legal reasoning cannot yield
a kind of truth that it was never 'designed to yield and by overlooking
the kind of truth that legal reasoning does yield. 'The modalities [of
legal discourse] are not true by virtue of something outside the prac-
tice of argument," Dennis Patterson maintains. "There is only the
practice and nothing more.""s
hl fact, though, it is the occasional proponent, of this "internal
truth" view, not Holmes, who misses the point. To be sure, one can
ascribe to law an immanent rationality all its own; one can label the
results of legal reasoning as a species of "legal" truth, or as a "truth"
that is a product of the "modalities" of legal discourse and thus "true
from a legal point of view."'" But then the essential question returns:
Why does this "immanent" rationality have any claim on us? And what
sense does it make to let this sort of internal truth determine the results
of external controversies? Or, if the predicate of that question still
139 See, e.g., Ernest j. Weittrib, Legal Formalism: On the In»na nen! Rationality of Law, 97 \5 I.E
Lj. 949 (1988).
140 Tlic leading recent statement of this OM is DENNIS PATTERSON, LAW AND TRUTH (1996).
Patterson's thinking overlaps to a large extent with that of Ernest lVeittrib and Philip Bobbin,
both of whom he discusses. It appears that Patterson differs hum \Veinal) mainly in Ins insisten ce
that the forms of legal argument that produce legal truth are the product of COURT and history;
they are mot, as Weittrib seems to suppose, some sou of eternal Platonic reality. See id. at 38-40,
182. Patterson's similarities to Bobbin ate even stronger; the main difference seems to be that
while Bobbin believes that judges must turn to indisidual conscience to resolve disputes when
the discourse of law runs out, Patterson believes the discourse must he public all the way down.
See id. at 143.
141 See id. at 128-29.
" 2 See hl. at 150 (arguing "truth in law is a matter of the forms of legal argument"), 179
{observing that propositions in law can only be "One from a legal point of Niew").
143 M. at 142.
nor See ht. at 179.
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sounds too objectivist, then why should one language game (the "legal"
game) get to subjugate other language games (the "politics" game, the
"corporate" game, the "personal injury" game)?
In short, the "internal truth" position still leaves uswith the prob-
lem of deciding whether to execute a convicted criminal based on the
outcome of a game of "hangman." In effect, the contemporary neo-
Wittgensteinian formalist merely reasserts Coke's claim that the reason
of the law is not "natural" but rather "artificial." But that observation
describes the problem, not the solution.
C. The Special Emphasis on the Farm -Substance Distinction
Pervasive mistrust of conventional legal discourse has led directly
to another feature of twentieth-century jurisprudence that would seem
remarkable if it were not so familiar. Consider au urgent practical
problem that the criticisms of conventional legal discourse might ap-
pear to create for the critics themselves: At least on the face of things,
it seems that denunciations offered by Holmes and his twentieth-cen-
tury followers ought to be quite revolutionary.'" After all, if the way
judges justify their decisions in crucial legal matters is irrational and
"revolting," as Holmes said, doesn't it follow that the law produced by
these decisions—and the legal system founded on such decisions—
would be "revolting" as well? And the appropriate response to a "re-
volting" system, it might seem, is . . . revolt. So shouldn't this sort of
criticism come more appropriately from desperate radicals than from,
say, a staid and sober judge on the state's (and later the nation's) high-
est court? If Holmes made his criticisms in good faith, then shouldn't
he also in good conscience have resigned his office and joined up with
some party of insurgents? Shouldn't his intellectual heirs at Ivy League
law schools should do the same, as critics of the Critics have sometimes
hinted?' 46
In fact, though, Holmes himself drew no such personally incon-
venient conclusions from his indictment, and he perceived no conflict
between his jurisprudential views and his ability to continue as a re-
vered jurist on the highest tribunals in the land. Holmes was able to
avoid genuine radicalism by adopting a tactic by now so familiar to
145 See Sheldon Novick, Hultnefs Path, Holmes's Goal, 110 HAtty. L. ltr.v. 1028,1028 (1997)
("Holmes has the passionate idealism of the revolutionary"), 1032 (Holmes was "a radical spirit"
with the "willingness to sweep history away and mite on a clean slate"); Richard A. Posner, The
Path Away from the Law, 110 HAM'. L. REV. 1039,1039-40 (1997) [hereinafter Posner, Nth/
(lauding Holnies's "radical challenge to accepted thinking about law").
146 See Paul D. Carrington, Of Law and the Rivet; 34 J. LEGAL Enuc. 222 (1984).
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lawyers that it usually goes unnoticed: He drew a strong distinction
between the "logical method and form" of reasoning offered on the
face of judicial decisions and the substantive thinking that ostensibly
worked behind the scenes actually to produce those decisions. In
essence, what really determined the outcomes in cases was not the
logical arguments about rules and doctrines, but rather "a judgment
as to the relative worth and importance of competing legislative
grounds," or "some opinion as to policy." Although often "inarticulate
and unconscious," this sort of policy judgment was in reality "the very
root and nerve of the whole proceeding. "147
Of course, philosophers have often distinguished between "form"
and "substance," but Holmes was employing—or perhaps misusing—
this age-old distinction in a different way and for a different purpose.
In Aristotle's theorizing, for instance, "form" and "substance" are dis-
tinguishable in concept but inseparable in reality. Both are necessary
to make any particular object what it is. For example, the page in front
of you is a piece of paper (rather than, say, a pencil or a stapler)
because it has the form of a piece of paper, and it is this piece of paper
(rather than some other similar one, such as the same page in the same
article in the library's second copy) because of the particular material
that composes it.'" By contrast, in distinguishing "the logical method
and form" from the underlying policy judgments, Holmes was describ-
ing two entirely different modes of reaching and justifying legal con-
clusions: One mode was adopted for purposes of public presentation,
while the other operated behind the scenes as the real determiner of
decisions.
By thus reworking an old distinction, Holmes was able to achieve
remarkable things. He simultaneously could be a ferocious critic and
a placid upholder of the law, thereby earning admiration for his revo-
lutionary vision and fervor'" while continuing to enjoy all the perks of
high office in the existing establishment. And the law itself could be
at once wonderfully inane and yet perversely wise.
Hohnes's followers have almost uniformly embraced the same
distinction—usually (though not always) for the same apparent pur-
poses. Thus, the distinction between form and substance in legal deci-
sion-making—between the reasons presented on the face of a decision
and the "real reasons" that underlie those decisions—is taken for
granted in much legal scholarship. The typical law review article may
147 Sir Holmes, The Path of the taw, supra note 3, at 466-68.
144 Sir ARISTOTLE, PHYSICS 1-2.
149 See sn/na note 145.
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devote a few pages to discussing the reasoning actually offered by
courts for a decision or doctrine; but it will then go on to consider the
deeper reasons that are supposed to have been—or should have
been—dispositive.'s° Scholarship that actually takes the official argu-
ments at face value and is content to analyze those "legalistic" or
"formalistic" arguments is thought pedestrian and naive, worthy per-
haps of a mediocre student note)."
The form-substance distinction serves some scholars in the same
way that it served Holmes; it permits them, that is, to be profoundly
critical of the law on one level and yet be positive, constructive partici-
pants on another. Of course, for scholars inclined to be more genu-
inely radical, the form-substance distinction is still useful. Critical schol-
ars can fill in the forms of the law with more objectionable matter—for
example, with elitist, or racist, or sexist prejudices. Thus, while main-
stream scholars use the form-substance distinction to make the law
more rational and appealing than it appears to be on its face, radically-
minded Marxists, critical race theorists or feminists can use the same
distinction to make the law appear more oppressive. 152
The near universal usefulness and acceptance of the form-sub-
. stance distinction perhaps deters legal thinkers from wondering very
seriously about the plausibility of such a distinction. But from a de-
tached perspective, the distinction might imply a picture of the world
that is at least mildly fantastic. How likely is it that an enterprise could
go on for generation after generation with decisions being made on
the basis of one kind of reasoning while being publicly debated and
justified through a different form of reasoning? The principal actors
in this enterprise, recall, consist of hundreds of thousands of lawyers
and thousands of judges, in a variety of jurisdictions, and of widely
varying backgrounds, who came to their positions in very different
ways. How likely is it that these disparate actors, while speaking a
common legal language in public, would in fact be making decisions
in the privacy of their chambers on the basis of "economic efficiency"
calculations, for example, or neo-Kantian moral philosophy? Or, if the
assumption is that these' actors typically act on the basis of "uncoil-
15° See supra note 5.
151 For a discussion of this phenomenon in the area of constitutional law scholarship, see
STEVEN D. SMITH, 'HE CONSTMITION AND THE PRIDE OF REASON 127-32 (1998).
152 For a collection of essays considering law from a variety of such Critical perspectives, see
THE Politics or LAW: A PROGRESSIVE CitroQuE (David Kairys ed., 1998); see also FELDMAN, stipra
note 125, at 158, 162, 181-82. Feldman, in discussing "outsider, jurisprudence," states that it
"overtly struggle's] to disclose and transform the oppressive cultural assumptions embedded in
Alitericali law." Id. at 182.
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scidus and inarticulate" judgments, as Holmes asserted and as follow-
ers like Posner have often claimed, 15" then what does it even mean to
make policy calculations unconsciously and inarticulately? Nonethe-
less, much of twentieth-century jurisprudence works against a back-
drop of just this sort of picture.
D. Supplying the Substance
As just discussed, if conventional legal reasoning is only the "form"
in which legal decisions are presented, then it remains for the theorist
to discover or provide the substance—that is, the real reasoning that
does or should determine the decisions behind the scenes. Legal
theorists have eagerly accepted this task, and it is at just this point that
the fiercest jurisprudential disagreements rage. Some scholars would
continue along the path indicated by Holmes, and hence would guide
the law by means of a social science-informed instrumental rationality,
or "policy science." Others would fill in the substance of legal decisions
with the use of moral philosophy.
Most scholars have chosen to follow Holmes's path more or less
faithfully. Thus, Robert Summers explains that "pragmatic instrumen-
talism" has dominated American legal thought through most of the
twentieth century.''' Beginning about a decade after Holmes's essay,
Roscoe Pound gained prominence by criticizing what he called "me-
chanical jurisprudence" (essentially the conventional approach at-
tacked by Holmes) and advocating a "sociological jurisprudence" in
which courts would self-consciously balance social interests and pro-
mote social goals.'" Two decades later, Pound engaged in some less
than cordial debates with a younger generation of so-called "Legal
Realists." But from a more detached perspective, the contending posi-
tions appear to be minor adjustments in a communion program. The
Realists exhibited the same deep skepticism toward traditional legal
methods. Many of them also favored a more policy-oriented law
grounded in the learning of the social sciences.' 5" The instrumentalist
1 " See Holmes, The Path of the Lam supra nine 3, at 466-68; see also RICHARD A.Posuot,
Ecomontie ANALYSIS OF LAW 21 Girl ed., 1986) (asserting "legal doctrines rest on inarticulate
gropings tuscu d efficiency" and that "la/Ithough fewjnilicial opinions contain explicit references
to economic concepts, often the true grounds of legal decisions arc concealed rather than
illuminated by the characteristic rhetoric of opinions").
151 See grnerally Rontter SAMUEL SUMMERS, lusf RUNIENTALISM AND AMERICAN LEGAL THEORY
(1982).
155 See, e.g., Roscoe Pound, illeehataral jurisimlence, 8 Comm L. REv. 605 (1908); Roscoe
Pound, The Scope and Purpose of Sociologicalfiisprudence, 24 Ilsftv. L. REv. 591 (1910).
156 See, e.g., Herman Oliphant, A Return to Stare Decisis, 14 A.B.A. 14. 71,159-62 (1928);
Cohen, supra note 101, at 829-49.
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or policy view of law was again plainly manifest in the Law, Science,
and Policy movement in the 1950s, 157 and later, in perhaps the most
influential legal movement of the second half of the century, in the
law-and-economics movement.
Only slightly revised or updated versions of the same law-and-so-
cial science vision appear with steady regularity—in the writings of
Edward Rubin, for instance, or some recent work of Cass Sunstein.'"
Probably the leading contemporary proponent of au instrumentalist
approach has been Richard Posner. Despite his sometimes proclaimed
maturation into literary or "post-modern" thought,'" the emphasis
on making law more scientific and instrumentalist has been Posner's
dominant theme from beginning to present.'"
Indeed, the basic idea of law as social policy is by now pretty much
axiomatic to scholars who have very different ideas both about what
the content of social policies should be and about what means will be
most efficacious for advancing those policies."'' Hence, both the pro-
ponents of free market law-and-economics and the advocates of greater
regulation by the administrative state easily fit within the capacious
category of instrumentalism, or "law and policy"
But not all legal thinkers have been enthralled by the instrumen-
talist vision. A different, noninstrumentalist substance for law is advo-
cated by theorists who take their cues not from economics or the social
sciences, but rather from modern moral and political philosophy. The
leading proponent of this approach in law has undoubtedly been
Ronald Dworkin. In early work, Dworkin distinguished between "poli-
cies," which are the subject of instrumentalist calculations, and "prin-
ciples," which we treat as subjects of moral reflection.'" Dworkin has
developed an influential jurisprudence—he calls it "law as integrity"—
157 For an UVel' 'kW of the movement, see KRONMAN, THE IDST LAWYER, Stipa/ note 9, at
201-09.
158 See, e.g., Cass R. Sunstein, Behavioral Analysis of Law, U. Cm. L. REV. 1175, 1195 (1998);
Edward L. Rubin, Law and the Alethodoloc of Law, WISC. L. REV. 521, 541-55 (1997).
159 See GARY MINDA, POSTMODERN LEGAL MOVEMENTS 234 (1995). Posner has respectfully
distanced hiniself Gorr the "post-modern" label. See POSNER, OVERCOMING LAW, supra Doh! 70,
at 315-17.
16° For recent expressions, See POSNER, OVERCOMING LAW, sn/n note 76, at 4-21, 301, 395
and Richard A. Posner, Against Constitutional Theory, 73 N.V.U. L. Res'. L 12, 22 (1998).
16 ISee Edward Rubin, Legal Scholarship, in A COMPANION To MOM/PM' OF LAW AND LEGAL
THEORY 562, 565 (Dennis Patterson ed., 1996) ("Since the legal realist movement, most scholars
IlaVe been convinced that law is a social instrumentality .... Olt is a system whose component Is]
are derived flout social policy, not from either a universal moral order or the collective wisdom
of the ages.").
its See DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY, supra note 124, at 22-23. 82-84, 247-52.
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attempting to explain both how moral reasoning operates and how
morality enters into legal interpretation and decision makingifis
The instrumentalist and moralist perspectives have not always
been flatly antagonistic. In a colorful little book called Reconstructing
American Law, Bruce Ackerman argued that conventional legal dis-
course is inadequate to modern needs and conditions. Ackerman pro-
posed a more "activist" and "legal constructivist" vision for law. The
new legal discourse would draw upon social science and computer
technology to develop much more sophisticated descriptions of the
world—in this respect Ackerman was very much in the lineage of
Holmes—but it would assess the legitimacy of that world, and of plans
for remaking that world, through the application of moral and political
philosophy. 164
Ackerman did not succeed in reconciling the instrumentalist and
moralist camps, however, and the antagonism between these move-
ments has become increasingly evident. As mentioned earlier, the
clearest manifestation of this hostility is the recent bitter exchange
generated by Posner's Oliver Wendell Holmes Lectures: Explicitly in-
voking Holmes's Path essay, Posner vehemently criticized academic
moral philosophy, as well as the efforts of theorists like Dworkin to use
it in interpreting or shaping law; such moralizing, he claimed, is little
more than "mystification rooted in a desire to feel good about our-
selves." 166 An array of academic moral philosophers working within law
schools, including Dworkin, countered this attack, in essence accusing
Posner of being small-minded and philosophically obtuse;' 66 and Pos-
ner returned the criticism in a spirited rejoinder: 67 The antagonists
disagreed not only about the nature of law and the value of moral
philosophy but about whose position was the more dispiriting. Martha
163 See DW ORKIN, LAW'S EMPIRE., supra 110IC 57.
le" See BRUCE A. ACKERMAN, RECONSTRUCTING AMERICAN LAw 46-104 (1983).
ids
	 Posner, Prroblematics, supra I tote 5, at 1657, 1695.
166 See, e.g., Martha C. Nussbaum, Still Milky of Praise, III MARV. L. REV. 1776, 1782 (1998)
(asserting "the reader who knows something about academic philosophy will be surprised at every
point IT the sheer casualness and inaccuracy of Posner's treatment"). Charles Fried describes
Posner's essay as "diatribe," lull of "the ad hominent ridicule of opponents" and of argument that
is "gross and mum:weed." Fried, Philosophy Matters, supra note 138, at 1739-40. Not all the
respondents were so caustic; though criticizing much of Posner's analysis, John Noonan praised
Posner's own more critical comments as "courageous," "candid," and "coolly judicious." See,Joh a
T. Noonan, Jr., Posner's Problematics, Ill Wm'. L. REV. 1768, 1768 (1998) (stating "Ih low .
unsparingly he unmasks the pretensions to universality of t he classics, how conventional and
self-cot ttradictory he shows the modern oracles to be").
167 See Richard A. Posner, Reply to Critics ofThe Problematics of Moral and Legal Theory, I I 1
MARS'. L. REV. 1796 (1998) [hereinafter Posner, Rep& to Critics].
108(3 	 BOSTON COLLEGE LAW REVIEW	 [Vol. 40:1041
Nussbaum found Posner's lectures "an occasion for sadness," 168 and
Anthony Kronman declared Posner's position "despairing from start
to finish" and his lectures "depressing";' 69 in response, Posner ex-
plained his reasons for thinking that "[t]he pessimist is Kir -omnan.""°
Despite these strident disagreements, the antagonists agree with
each other—and with Hohnes—on one final thing. They agree, that
is, on the need for greater theoretical explicitness in law. To be sure,
they disagree on what form that theorizing should take. But on the
inadequacy of conventional legal reasoning as an autononnius dis-
course and on the necessity of supplementing or replacing that dis-
course with something more understandably "rational," all seem to
concur. In sum, legal thinkers by and large part ways for only one
segment of Hohnes's path.
III. THE IMPASSABLE PATH OF THE LAW
As discussed above, legal thinkers have been following along Hol-
mes's path—or a good portion of it—for the last century. But legal
practice has, for the most part, declined to follow their lead. On the
contrary, the actual discourse in which lawyers argue and judges ex-
plain their decisions reinains remarkably like the one that was the
target of Hohnes's criticisms. The fact that legal thinkers and legal
practitioners are often the same people only serves to deepen the
paradox.
Thus, if we begin with that most honored embodiment of law—the
judicial opinion—we discover, first, that such opinions still constitute
the most commonly used material both for legal argument and for
legal pedagogy and, second, that such opinions still present themselves
largely as exercises in logically deducing conclusions from past legal
decisions and enactments. Judicial opinions still purport to derive the
legally required result from a correct statement of the correct legal
doctrine. They still engage in the same citing and distinguishing of
precedents, the same search for the meanings or intentions or pur-
poses of statutes, and the same effort to extract from this disparate
mass of materials univocal statements of what "the law" is.
To be sure, judicial opinions today are not of exactly the same
character: Courts probably talk more now than they did in Hohnes's
time about social policies and about "balancing" competing "interests."
168 Nussbautn, supra note 164, at 1776.
16° See 1CRONMAN, Sttpra note 9, at 1753, 1767.
' 7° See Posner, Reply to Critics, supra note 167, at 1811.
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But such considerations are typically brought in to reinforce more
conventional arguments about what "the law" requires. Thus, while
emphasizing that Iffrom the formalist period to the present, the
relative proportion of rule orientation has lessened in comparison to
the play of instrumental reasoning," Brian Tamanaha acknowledges
recent studies showing that more formalistic and conventional legal
reasoning "is still more dominant: 171 Moreover, the courts have not
begun to attempt to address the conceptual questions or to formulate
the methodology that might transform loose talk about policies or
social interests into anything approaching a policy "science." 172 Brian
Leiter observes that "in retrospect, policy 'science' looks rather silly, a
`science' in name only"
It would not be unfair to place part of the responsibility for this
state of affairs on Holmes himself. As Louise Weinberg has pointed
out, during Hohnes's decades on the bench he did virtually nothing
to implement the jurisprudential changes he advocated and toward
which he promised "to press ... with all my heart." 174 Measured against
his own prescribed path, Weinberg concludes, Holmes's rhetorically
'memorable but jurisprudentially conventional opinions amounted to
a "colossal waste."'m Holmes's reticence or incapacity to carry out his
own project might prompt doubts about the cogency of his prescrip-
tions.
The persistently conventional character of judicial opinions in
turn both reflects and determines the character of legal pedagogy and
of lawyerly argumentation in general. Consider legal education, the
context in which Hohnes's campaign was launched and where, enjoy-
ing the luxury of fresh, bright minds not already mired in legal con-
ventions, the campaign might be expected to achieve its greatest suc-
cess. In Hohnes's day, we are told, formal legal education following the
"Harvard method" was largely devoted to the study of selected judicial
opinions that were collected in casebooks. 176 Holmes's prescriptions
called for radical transformations in this mode of study: Law schools
should greatly reduce the emphasis on history, as reflected in past
in See BRIAN Z. TAMANAIIA, REALISTIC SOCIO-LEGAL THEORY 241-42 (1997).
172 For a discussion of the fhilitre to address any of the complex questions of "interest
balancing" in constitutional law on either a conceptual or empirical level, see T. Alexander
Aleittikoff, Constitutional Late in an Age of flab wring 90 YALE LI 943 (1987).
173 Brian Leiter, Is There An Anterirati jurisprudence?, 17 OXFORD J. LEG. Stun. 367, 379
(1997).
171 .Ser Hoboes, The Path of the Law„suhra note 3, al 474.
175 See Louise Weinberg, Holmes' Failure, 96 Mien. L. REV. 691, 700, 707 (1997).
1713 See CagnmoN, sup, note 14, al 184.
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judicial decisions, and instead devote themselves to developing and
inculcating policy science."
And so today, a century later, law students continue to spend most
of their time . . . studying selected judicial opinions collected in case-
books. Norman Cantor observes that social sciences have had only a
marginal impact on legal education.'" 'The exclusive paradigm taught
in American law schools remains that of the common law updated and
democratized to a greater or lesser degree." A century after Holmes's
famous essay, Richard Posner acknowledged wistfully that "even today
most law professors are analysts of cases and legal doctrines,"I80 while
the President of the Association of American Law Schools complained
that "classroom discussions are . . . too uninformed by insights from
allied disciplines such as philosophy, sociology and economics?"' So
it is difficult to sympathize with the hand-wringing of those who worry
that theorists in Holmes's lineage have captured legal education and
abandoned traditional "case method" pedagogy. 182
To be sure, many casebooks today include smatterings of "pol-
icy"—excerpts from articles about law-and-economics, or questions
raising considerations of efficient resource allocation. No doubt some
teachers emphasize (and, if they are serious, supplement) these sparse
"policy" materials. But it seems that most teachers touch upon policy
materials lightly, if at all. Even more crucially, it is the rare course that
is systematically organized around a policy perspective—and an even
In See Holmes, The Path of the Law, supra note 3. at 467-77.
178 See CANTOR, supra note I, at 358:
Miro made at Vale and Columbia University Law Schools in the 1930s and 1940s
to integrate legal study with the leading edges of the social and behavioral sciences
had a modest and mostly ephemeral impact. Except for market economics, social
. and behavioral science has remarkably little impact on American law schools today.
Id.
179 Id, at 376.
I " Posner, Against Constitutional Theory, supra note 160, at 10.
181 Deborah Rhode, Professional Education and Professional Values, THE NEsestraut (Assoc.
of Am. Law Schools), April 1998, at I, 3.
182 See, e.g., Edwards, supra note 12: GLENDON, 511P10 note 14, at 225 (criticizing "the legal
academy's turn away from law"), 245 (decrying "the law school without law"). The dubious nature
of this criticism, perhaps grossing out of a conspicuous nostalgia, is apparent in a curious passage
in which, within a single paragraph, Professor Glendon begins by complaining that "It1oday, we
to longer teach law in the old-fashioned way," Inn goes on to quote with approval a study that
appears to indict legal education precisely because it does still teach law in the old-fashioned way
and has not adapted to developments such as "the coming of the regulatory state." See id. at
246-47. A different but related worry see ms prima facie more plausible for traditionalists—that
even though law professors largely continue primarily to teach case analysis, their lack of com-
mitment or conviction 1110,1118 that they will not teach it carefully or respectfully, and the presence
of critics and deeonstrucuonists in the academy may tend to subvert what is still the dominant
pedagogical enterprise.
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rarer course, if it exists at all in the law schools, that actually tries to
immerse students in the social science data and methodologies that
the Hohnesian revolution contemplates. Larry Alexander observes that
law students receive almost no training in the empirical skills that
would be needed to implement the policy science vision.'" In short,
both in its heavy use of case analysis and in its effort to extract the
doctrinal content of the cases, law teaching is still highly reminiscent
of the so-called formalist methods prescribed by Langdell and dispar-
aged by the Hohnesians.
The teaching of tort law can serve as a concrete example. The
Holmes essay commented specifically on what the consequentialist
perspective might mean for torts,'" and indeed, perhaps as much as
any subject area except antitrust, tort law has been a field for the
development of economic analysis in academic writing. Moreover, in
probably every law school in the country, students are required to study
tort law in the first year. Hence, tort law pedagogy seems to be a
promising area for promoting the Holmesian revolution. And in fact,
a few teachers do try to systematically orient the Torts course in a policy
direction.' 85
More often, though, the doctrine-oriented, precedent-based ap-
proach prevails—with a pinch of law-and-economics or moral theory
thrown in from time to time for seasoning. David Rosenberg, who
teaches Torts at Harvard Law School, explains:
Constructed on Holmes's model, the course on tort law would
concentrate on the systematic risks from business activity, and
its general contribution to the curriculum would come from
exploring the theories and policies of market regulation. Yet
as they did when Holmes wrote, students spend most of their
time today parsing the semantic logic of cases to derive, class-
ify, and criticize rules. Few reliable empirical studies exist, and
students are neither given the details of nor trained to evalu-
ate critically the few studies that do. There is much talk about
the deterrence and compensation functions of tort liability,
but the actual costs and net benefits of such a system remain
unknown. . . . Basic policy questions (at best presented in
short, conclusory, casebook excerpts from scholarly litera-
ture) are raised as if they were merely another perspective
183 See Alexander, input note 31, at 519,
184 Seel - 101111es, The Paik of the Lail?, Mira note 3, at 467.
185 I know this to be true from persisted experience; my Torts teacher was Catido Calabresi.
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rather than the shaping force and crucial matter at issue.
Discussion of policy questions tends to be correspondingly
superficial .. . . 186
And if Rosenberg has described how tort law is taught at a leading
national law school (at Holmes's law school), consideration of sys-
tematic policy analysis at regional schools is likely to be even more
cursory. Thus, it seems that Rosenberg is right: "Legal education
today falls far short of the mark Holmes set for the future." 187
But if law students receive little instruction in systematic policy
analysis, and instead learn little more than a thin "policy" vocabulary
useful mostly for rhetorical purposes, it hardly seems likely that they
will have the time or inclination to devote themselves to "policy sci-
ence" after they have graduated and entered the hectic life of a lawyer
or judge. Not surprisingly, it is precisely this rhetorical function that
"policy" typically serves in lawyers' briefs and judges' opinionsiss As
revealed in these materials, few if any areas of law can offer anything
remotely approaching a "science" for promoting public policy objec-
tives through law. On the contrary, legal briefs and arguments are
typically pretty much what they were in Holmes's clay—labored efforts
to cite and distinguish the relevant cases, doctrines and statutes so as
to extract a controlling rule of law that will allow the lawyer's client to
prevail.
Judge Posner, though a leading advocate of a more instrumentalist
jurisprudence, acknowledges the persistence of the very sort of legal
reasoning that Holmes deprecated. Few lawyers or judges today, he
admits, would embrace the label of "formalism."
Yet most lawyers, judges, and law professors still believe that
demonstrably correct rather than merely plausible or reason-
able answers to most legal questions, even very difficult and
contentious ones, can be found—and it is imperative that
they be found—by reasoning from authoritative texts, either
legislative enactments (including constitutions) or judicial
decisions, and therefore without recourse to the theories,
188 David Rosenbetg, The Path Not Taken, 110 UMW. L. REv. 1044, 1045 (1997).
187 See id. at 1044.
188 For example, noting that the Supreme Court has sometimes addressed issues of jury
behavior which have been extensively studied by social sdentists,j. Alexander Milord concludes
that "Min examination of the written opinions in these cases reveals that the justices ignored,
misused, distorted and misinterpreted psychological literal ore about trials to justify decisions at
odds with empirical data." j. Alexander Lanford, The Limits of a Scientific jurisprudence: The
Supreme Court and Psycholog, 60 IND. L.J. 137, 145 (1990).
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data, insights, or empirical methods of the social sciences
189
. . . .
If instrumentalist policy science has only a marginal presence in
current legal discourse and pedagogy, moral philosophy has, if possi-
ble, even less influence. Most law students probably make at least a
passing acquaintance with "law-and-economics" in a torts, contracts or
antitrust course; the same probably cannot be said of the two-IC-intim
moral theory or Rawhian political philosophy advocated by legal theo-
rists like Dworkin. To be sure, most law schools probably offer some
sort of seminar—Constitutional Theory, perhaps, or Social Justice—
dealing with themes in modern moral theory, just as they may offer
seminars in law and economics. But these courses are hardly the bread
and butter of the curriculum; most students probably go through law
school largely or wholly untouched. These students, of course, then go
on to become the nation's lawyers and judges. .
An inspection of legal education and legal practice thus suggests
that Hohnes's prophecies are nowhere near "coming true," as disciples
like Posner sometimes wishfully assert.'!" Instead, we find a thin, mostly
rhetorical "policy" veneer that covers a reality in which legal argumen-
tation and justification work pretty much as they did a century (or
perhaps five centuries, or even eight centuries) agom—that is, by
muddling along on the basis of precedents and rules while presenting
their conclusions as if they were logically compelled by these authori-
tative historical materials. And seventy years after Felix Cohen de-
scribed the "Restatement" project as "the last long-drawn-out gasp of a
dying tradition," 192 the project continues to flourish—now in its third
incarnation. Indeed, in his less sanguine moments (which seem to
come with increasing frequency), Judge Posner admits most of this.
"The traditional conception of law is as orthodox today," he laments,
"as it was a century ago." 19"
189 POSNER, OVERCONIING LAW, OlpOt note 76, at 20.
191 ' See Posner, Path, supm note 145, at 1043 (asserting Boh nnes's "article is a prophecy, and
it is coming true").
191 SO! Capt, supra note I, at 192 ("A London barrister of 1540, quick-frozen and revived
it New York today, would only need a year's brush up course at NM School of Law to begin civil
practice as a partner in a midtown or Wall Street corporate-law Br u t"); id. at 73 ("Glanville
wouldn't be surprised at what . he would find if he were to nil iu on a class on property in a law
school today. It is still his common law."). Cf. M. El. Ogilvie, Reviezo. 29 OrrAwA L. REV. 225, 228
(1997-98) ("Despite the best efforts of the social sciences in the 20th Century to confound the
finulamental principles of the common law they continue to resonate as deeply within the
societies of the late 20th centu ry common law jurisdicticun as they have Mule for the eight
preceding centuries.").
192 See Cohen, supra noie 101, at 833.
tut Posner, Path, supra note 145, at 1040,
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In short, Hohnes's Path seems to have become a jurisprudential
cul-de-sac, in which theorists travel around and around in the same
tedious circles while the main traffic of the law flows along other
avenues. Holmes thought that radical changes in legal discourse were
imminent. For a century, Hohnes's descendants have thought the same
thing; with embarrassing regularity they have solemnly, or sometimes
breathlessly, proclaimed that conventional law is about to give way to
a more rational, or more scientific, or more philosophical discourse.
Scholarly careers have been made—and continue to be made—by, in
essence, producing the second, and the third, and the tenth editions
of the Restatement of Holmes. And in retrospect, the most cogent
observation was Grant Gilmore's, made almost four decades ago: "The
more things change, . . . the more they are the same: 494
IV. RECONSIDERING THE MODERN CRITIQUE
As discussed above, legal theory and legal practice in this century
have taken fundamentally different paths, with the consequence that
in their theorizing legal thinkers often can do little except look down
on the discourse of legal practice with a mixture of incomprehension
and disdain. Setting out to understand law in a "realist" way, twentieth
century legal thinkers have ended up with a distinctive and abstract
discipline of their own that seems largely disconnected from the ways
in which real lawyers and judges act and think. Like a partner in a once
promising relationship that has ended in separation and divorce, mod-
ern legal theory might naturally look back and wonder just how this
breakup came about.
The preceding discussion suggests that what have turned out to
be irreconcilable differences between legal theory and legal practice
began to emerge as soon as theorists like Holmes concluded—or, more
accurately, took for granted—that the faith and the metaphysical com-
mitments manifest on the face of the way lawyers and judges talk and
argue could not be taken at face value, and hence that legal discourse
would need to be reconceived in less metaphysical and more under-
standably rational terms. If we consider the origins of modern juris-
prudence in their context, it is natural that legal thinkers would make
this assumption. The intellectual climate of the time ensured that any
sort of "faith" of the kind seemingly implicit in the law could only be
considered backward and disreputable, and that an enterprise built on
such commitments was destined to wither. Old prejudices, as we know,
19-1 See Cram Gilmore, Legal Realism Its Cause and Cure, 70 YALE L. J. 1037, 1048 (1961).
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die hard. But the intellectual climate has changed, and it may now be
possible to reflect more seriously on a possibility that for thinkers since
the time of Holmes has been beyond the pale of consideration.
A. The Anticipated Demise of Faith
As noted above, the structure of modern jurisprudence founded
in a rejection of conventional legal discourse can be traced back
to—and arguably owes much toHohnes; so it is worth noticing some
aspects of the intellectual milieu in which Holmes and his contempo-
raries and immediate successors worked. The general culture of this
country was in the process of breaking free of its traditional Protestant
underpinnings. The legal disestablishment effected by the federal and
state governments in the late-eighteenth and early-nineteenth centu-
ries had been formal in nature; though losing its official legal status,
Protestant Christianity and what Mark DeWolfe Howe called the "de
facto establishment"' had continued to dominate American culture
through most of the nineteenth century. The influence of religious
revivals on the culture is well known. Nor was it only less educated
citizens who took their guidance from religion; nearly all private col-
leges were sponsored by churches, and the leading periodicals in
circulation among educated citizens were theological quarterlies that
discussed not only religious issues per se but also politics, science, and
culture from generally religious perspectives.'"
As the century neared its end, however, religion began to recede
as the central organizing force in society.I 97 Universities became more
secular.'" In law, the longstanding assumption that Christianity was an
integral part of the common law lost its force.'" Insofar as a Christian
ethos had undergirded the possibility of believing in a unified law
ilr'See MARK DEWOI.FE I !OWE, THE GARDEN AND THE WILDERNESS 11 (1965).
See MARK A. No1.4, A HISTORY OF CHRISTIANITY IN THE UNITED STATES AND CANADA
220-32 (1992).
107 See id. at 286-309.
193 See grnerally GEORGE M. MARSDF.N, DIE SOUL OF 'HIE AMERICAN UNIVERSITY 99-262
(1994). Marsden describes a "yettittutt leap from old-time college to modern university within
one genenuion Billowing the Civil War."Iti. at 99. Otte crucial conseunetice of this transformation
was that even at the 11eUor universities which had been founded as Protestant institutions and
continued to profess a commitment to some sort of "Christian" worldview—Harvard, Mde, Chi-
cago, Princeton—"Isitandards for science that a priori excluded considerations of faith would
become the norm." See id. al 99,131.
19{-P See Stuart Banner, When Christianity Ms Purl of the Common Law, 16 LAw & HIST. REV.
27,58-59 (1998).
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somehow above or beyond mundane legal decisions and enac tmen ts ,2®
that undergirding disappeared.
A related and prominent feature of the Victorian period in which
Hohnes's notions about law were forming was a perceived and some-
times passionate conflict between science and religion. In retrospect,
the controversy may seem to have been characterized by misinforma-
tion, misconceptions and needless and reckless charges and counter-
charges. 20 ' But in its own day the "science versus religion" debate was
perceived by Many as a monumental and fundamental clash that defied
anyone to remain neutral; and the educated might have little doubt
about where their loyalties were owed. Owen Chadwick observes:
Science versus Religion—the antithesis conjures two hyposta-
tized entities of the later nineteenth century I mysterious
undefined ghost called Science against a mysterious indefin-
able ghost called Religion; until by 1900 . schoolboys decided
not to have faith because Science, whatever that was, had
disproved Religion, whatever that was. 202
Universities were of course committed to science; and law, as an
awkward and self-conscious newcomer into the university, was espe-
cially anxious to wrap itself in the mantle of "science." 203 This aspira-
tion might have meant something different to Holmes than to an ac-
ademician like Langdell, but the general commiUnent to "science,"—
and hence to avoiding the taint of association with whatever was con-
trary to "science"—was powerful.
The prestige and expected growth of science were closely associ-
ated with another major theme of the period: the inevitability of "sec-
ularization." As modern scholars often point out, the term "seculariza-
tion" can mean quite different things, but at its core the secularization
thesis trumpeted what Matthew Arnold had thought he heard in 1851:
2°° See id. at 50-53,61.
201 For an insightlid review of the debate, see OWEN CHADWICK, THE SECULARIZATION OF
THE EUROPEAN MINI) IN THE NINETEENTH CENTURY 161-88 (1975).
202 Id. at 161; see also FELDMAN, SIIPM 110IC 125, at 85 (explaining 1).111cm:is during the
antebellum years most Americans had believed that science and religion were in harmorty, during
the early postbellmit period science and religion increasingly seemed separate and irrelewurt to
each other").
203 For a description of this development and its 1110IiratiODS, see KRONMAN, THE LOST
LAWYER, MOM note 9, at 169-200. I do not mean to imply that the aspiration to make law a
"science" began in the 10 neteenth century. The aspiration has a 1111101 II:Rigel . history'. See generally
Iloeflich, Law & Geometry: Legal Science from Leibniz to Langdell, 90 Am. J. LEGAL IIIST. 95
(1986).
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the "melancholy, long, withdrawing roar" of the "Sea of Faith."'" Jose
Casanova explains:
The theory of secularization may be the only theory which
was able to attain a truly paradigmatic status within the mod-
ern social sciences. In one form or another, with the possible
exception of Alexis de Tocqueville, Vilfredo Pareto, and Wil-
liam James, the thesis of secularization was shared by all the
founding fathers: from Karl Marx to John Stuart Mill, front
Auguste Comte to Herbert Spencer, from E.B. Tylor to James
Frazer, front Ferdinand Toennies to Georg. Simnel, from
Emile Durkheim to Max Weber, front Wilhelm Wundt to
Sigmund Freud, from Lester Ward to William G. Sunnier,
from Robert Park to George H. Mead. Indeed, the consensus
was such that not only did the theory remain uncontested but
apparently it was not even necessary to test it, since everybody
took it for granted. 2"
As Patrick Kelley has convincingly shown, Holmes in particular was
powerfully influenced by the nineteenth-century positivism of thinkers
like Comte and Mill. 226 This version of positivism offered a version of
the secularization thesis that depicted human thought as progressing
ineluctably from a "theological" stage to a "metaphysical" stage, and
then culminating in a "positivist" or scientific stage in which both the
supernatural beings of the first stage and the metaphysical entities of
the second stage are repudiated in favor of purely empirical and
scientific understandings. 2" In a similar vein, Holmes suggested that
law and legal theory must evolve according to a preordained progres-
sion, "each generation taking the inevitable next step, mincl, like mat-
ter, simply obeying a law of spontaneous growth." 2"
One natural consequence of this academic turn toward science
and secularization and away from religion and faith was that the pre-
suppositions evident on the face of legal discourse—that is, the appar-
ent commitments to "the law" as an, entity that exists independent of
the statutes and judicial pronouncements that are expressions or "evi-
dence" of it—became untenable. It was unimaginable that such an
2°' See Matthew Arnold, Dover Beath, in Ansot.n: THE COMPLETE Poems 253, 256 (Miriam
Allot ed., 1979).
M ,JOSE CASANOVA, PUBLIC RELIGIONS IN 'rift MODERN WORLD 17 (1994).
206 See generally Patrick J. Kelley, Was Holmes a Pragmatist? Reflections on a /V/Ml Twist to an
Old Argument, 14 S. It.b. U. LJ. 427 (1990).
207 See id. at 429-30, 438-39.
20$ See Holmes, The Path of the Law, supra note 3, at 468.
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ethereal entity could exist; and even if it could, it was surely not
susceptible to understanding through the methods of science. Instead,
"the law" as implicitly conceived in common law discourse would nec-
essarily be an object of faith. But faith was precisely what scientific and
secular learning aimed to replace, or at least to relegate to the private
sphere 201
To be sure, at least according to the standard depiction, Christo-
pher Columbus Langdell and his followers tried for a time to combine
the aspiration to legal science with a commitment to law as an inde-
pendent, almost transcendent object 21° (though this standard depic-
tion of the LangdellianS has recently been challenged). 2 II Their pecu-
liar project (or the common understanding that they were engaged in
such a project) may account for the special revulsion reserved for
Langdell and other devotees of "transcendental nonsense" among later
students of the law. Earlier, "pre-scientific" thinkers like Hale or Black-
stone who had expressed what may sound like faith in an objective law
might be excused in the same way that secular social scientists can
describe the magic or religion of earlier periods as a sort of primitive
science, admirable given the limitations of time and place. 912 But some-
one like Langdell who tries to preserve a commitment to independent,
objective law in a full-blown age of science can only provoke embar-
rassment.
"lames Boyd White describes the emiromnent within which legal scholars work:
In the aculemic world we tend to speak as though all participants iu our conversa-
tions were purely rational actors engaged in rat lot ml debate; perhaps some people
out there in the world are sufficiently benighted that awry turn to religious bdiefs
or other superstitions, but that is not true of us or, if it is true, we hide it, and it
ought not be true of them. Outs is a secular academy ....
James B. White, Response to Roger Crouton's Article, 37 J. LECAI. Enuc. 533, 533 (1987).
210 Giant Gilmore characterizes (or perhaps mischaracterizes) the Langddlian view of law in
this way:
[Haw is a closed, logical system. Judges do not make law: they merely declare the
' 	 law which, in some Platonic sense, already exists. The judicial function . . . is
restricted to the discovery of what the true rules of law 'ate and indeed always have
See GILMORE, supra note 2, at 62.
211 See generally W. Borlette Carter, Reconstructing Langrlell, 32 GA. L. Rzw. I (1997); see also
generally ALBERT W. ALSCIIULER, 'BLOWING OUT TIIE NIORAL LICFITS AROUND Us': THE LIFE,
WORK, AND LEGACY OF OLIVER WENDELL HOLIES (101111C0111illg, University of Chicago Press
2000).
212 See Stephen Sharot, Magic, Religion, Science, and Secularization, in RELIGION, SCIENCE,
AND MAGIC 261, 262-68 (Jacob Nemner et al. eds., 1989) (describing the "intellectualist" position
in anthropology' that views magic and sometimes religion in primitive cultures as incipient forms
of science).
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In short, the prevailing ethos of the time greatly restricted the
range of possibilities that a thinker like Holmes could take seriously.
In particular, Holmes and his descendants could no more suppose that
a respectable enterprise like law could be based on commitments of
the kind that seemed evident on the face of conventional legal dis-
course than they could contemplate a department of astrology or
witchcraft in the modern uiliversity. So they had no choice, in their
new academic offices, but to set about putting law on a more respect-
able footing. Their efforts to do that—and the frustrations that have
attended those efforts—were considered in Parts II and III.
B. Reconsidering the Unimaginable
Today the situation is different—though legal thinkers may he
slower than scholars in sonic other fields to perceive the change. The
features that made up the framework for late nineteenth-century
thought, if they have not disappeared altogether, are at least much
more contestable today. Their diminished force may make it possible
to consider seriously options that for Holmes and his followers were
beyond the pale.
Thus, the developments characteristic of the "second disestablish-
ment" of religion seem to have played themselves out, and it may even
be that a reversal of the movement has occurred. More specifically, the
assumption that religion would withdraw to the private sphere, thereby
relinquishing its role in public culture, no longer seems valid.'" Simi-
larly, the old antagonism between "science" and "religion," if it has not
altogether disappeared, has at least receded. Today it is common to
find accomplished scientists describing science as providing support
for faith,?I" while religious leaders urge their followers not to disparage
and indeed to cultivate learning in philosophy and science." And the
"secularization" thesis, once taken as almost axiomatic, has been largely
abandoned by social scientists in the face of overwhelming contrary
evidence (although legal scholars sometimes seem either not to have
noticed this fact or to be unwilling to acknowledge it). Jose Casanova,
while adhering to some aspects of the thesis and cautioning against its
overhasty dismissal, joins in the consensus concluding that "the old
21:1 The increasingly prominent role of religion in public life has provoked a healed normative
delmie. See, e.g., RELIGION AND CONTENIPORART LIBERALISM (PAULL TB hitmir ed., 1997).
See, e.g., JOHN POLKINCHORNEi BELIEF IN GOD IN AN AGE OE SCIENCE (1998).
215 See FIDES Dr RATIO (Papal Encyclical, 1998).
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theory of secularization can no longer he maintained." 216 Casanova
summarizes the current situation:
[O]ne can draw two lessons from religion in the 1980s. The
first is that religions are here to stay, thus putting to rest one
of the cherished dreams of the Enlightenment. The second
and more important lesson is that religions are likely to con-
tinue playing important public roles in the ongoing construc-
tion of the modern world. This second lesson in particular
compels us to rethink systematically the relationship of relig-
ion and modernity and, more important, the possible roles
religions may play in the public spheres of modern socie-
ties. 217
The jurisprudential focus of this Article is only indirectly related
to the sort of rethinking proposed by Casanova. This article, in other
words, is not immediately concerned with the role of "religion" in
modern society. Insofar as "religion" is linked by close association with
"faith," however, and insofar as conventional legal discourse is appar-
ently all expression of faith, the developments described by Casanova
suggest both the possibility of and the need for reconsidering that
discourse. For the first time in a long time, in short, it may be possible
to take conventional legal discourse seriously—to consider forthrightly
assumptions that underlie legal discourse and to discuss openly
whether those assumptions are viable today.
V. THE ORIENTATION OF "FAITH"
In modern academic discourse, "faith" is sometimes understood
not in terms of what it is, but rather in terms of what it supposedly is
not—that is, "reason." So "faith" becomes almost by definition a form
of irrational, or at best, nonrational belief; its ostensible rejection of
216 See CASANOVA , MOM note 205, at 19. Casanova further stales that
the majority of sociologists of religion ... have abandoned the paradigm with the
same uncritical haste with which they previously embnwed it ... Anued with
"scientific" evidence, sociologists of religion now feel confident to predict bright
fituaes for religion. The reversal is astounding when one thinks that only some
twenty years ago nobody was ready to listen whet, in the first ''seetdarization
debate," the first voices were raised by David Martin and Andrew Greeley question-
ing the concept and the empirical evidence, sw lack thereof, behind the theory of
secularization. But how could anyone listen attellInely then, when even the theo-
logians were proclaiming ihe death of God and celebrating the coining of the
secular city?
Id, at I I.
217 Id. at 6.
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reason becomes the very essence of faith. As Mark Twain quipped:
"Faith is believing what you know ain't so."" 8 In a similar vein, Bertrand
Russell mockingly. described faith as "a firm belief in something for
which there is no evidence."212
Given these unappealing depictions, an essential initial step in
considering the role of faith in law is to attempt Some necessary
clarifications. In the first place, both "reason" and "faith" are some-
times used either as epistemological or ethical terms. They are taken
as describing possible types of responses, that is, to the questions
"What, and on what basis, should I believe?: but also to what Bernard
Williams calls the Socratic question: "How should I live?"22" Hence, we
speak of believing something on the basis of reason or faith; but we also
speak of the "life of reason," or the "life of faith." Since this varied usage
may be a source of confusion, it will be helpful to stipulate some
working semantic boundaries.
• In the remainder of this Article, I will treat "reason" as au episte-
mological term that refers to a way of assessing propositions that
present themselves for belief. The content or methods of "reason" are
themselves subjects of controversy, 221 of course, but "reason" generally
connotes forming and assessing beliefs using the methods of formal
logic and also of scientific, empirical investigation.
If "reason" is an epistemological term for present purposes, "ration-
alism" (not "rationality") will refer to an ethical orientation. In short,
"rationalism" . will denote an approach to the ethical question "How
should I live? "—an approach that : in its own self-understanding broadly
takes the form "I should live in accordance with 'reason." This com-
mitment is itself often vague and variable in its specific content. In
modern life, though, it typically implies dedication to making decisions
in accordance with "instrumental rationality," 222 or, more broadly, in
218 1 MARK 'TWAIN, FOLLOWING THE EQUATOR 114 (Stormlield ed., 1925).
210 See BERTH AND RUSSELL, HUMAN SOCIETY IN ETHICS AND POLITICS 203 (1955) (quoted in
HELMUT RICHARD NIEBUHR, FAITH ON EARTH 14 (Sale UP) (1989)); cf. WOLFHART TANNENBERG,
CIIRISTIANITY IN A SECULARIZED WORLD 44 (1989) (observing in a secular culture "faith appears
as irrational connnitment to a content which is regarded as 'true' only in a private perspective").
220 See BERNARD WILLIAMS, ETHICS AND THE LIMITS OF PHILOSOPHY 4 (1985).
221 For a helpful survey of the various and often inconsistent things that "reason" has been
taken to mean in modern thought, See ERNEST GELLNER, REASON AND CULTURE (1992).
222 Charles Lindblom explains:
In contemporary Western cultures, when people are called upon to give reasons—
even to themselves—for choosing a volition, they often find it difficult to mitintain
sustained thought about it other than by exploring connections between it regarded
as a means and some other volition as end. Often they cannot think, cannot analyze,
cannot debate except about memis to assumed ends. If, at the end of the line, they
consider a possible volition as an end only and cannot cast it as means to a still
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accordance with clearly articulable and measurable criteria keyed to
observable factors."'
"Faith" will then be used primarily as an ethical concept, 2P4— as
the principal ethical alternative to "rationalism." In describing faith as
an alternative to rationalism, I do not presuppose that faith is hostile
to rationality, or that faith is somehow incompatible with reason as a
way of formulating and assessing beliefs. Although such incompatibility
is often assumed, the relationship among these terms is in fact com-
plex, and it cannot be even tentatively assessed until after the ethical
orientation based on faith is first described.
The following discussion will begin by offering a description of
that orientation, followed by a brief discussion of the relationship
between "faith" and "reason." Part VI will then consider the relation-
ship of this orientation toward the issues of jurisprudence.
A. The Elements of Faith
The basic orientation of faith can be described, I think, in terms
of five elements or characteristics.
1. The sense of an overarching reality that is not directly perceived
An essential characteristic of faith is the belief or sense that be-
yond ordinary, observable facts and events—beyond the ebb and flow
of visible day-to-day occurrences—there is a, more ultimate truth or
reality. This more ultimate reality might be understood in terms that
make it seem personal or quasi-personal—the divinity of theistic relig-
further end, their minds stop working on the issue; they fall silent, have nothing to
say or think. Their analysis, even if incomplete, terminates. Even sophisticated
intellects often cannot define rational thought other t han as thought that appro-
priately connects means to ends.
CHARLES LINDBLOM, INQUIRY AND CHANGE 41 (1990).
223 For a classic critical discussion of this orientation, see Mic hael Oakeshott, Rationalism in
Politics, in RATIONALISM IN FOWLES AND OTHER ESSAYS 5 (Timothy Fuller ed., 1991).
221 As an ethical concept, the notion of "faith" has been used in various ways. In the discussion
that follows, my purpose is neither to be comprehensive nor to explore deeper theological
controversies (such as those which have exercised Catholic and Protestant thinkers since the
Reformation) about the meaning or efficacy of faith. Nor do I intend to present any specific
substantive formulation of "faith"Christian faith, for instance, or Jewish Nth. To be Mlle, in its
real world appearances, faith will usually he expressed in some specific formulation; I have tried
to draw on sone quite disparate formulations in order to illustrate the orientation. My purpose,
however, is not to describe any particular faith, but instead to extract the essential or generic
features of a basic orientation toward the ethical question "How should I liver—one that will be
understandable and familiar, and that will depend at its core on something that would widely be
viewed as "faith."
•
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ion—or it might be impersonal, as with the Tao, or "way," of Taoism.
The overarching reality might be depicted as static—Plato's "Forms,"
for instance—or dynamic, as perhaps in a Hegelian commitment to an
intelligent, teleological process of historical development. Or the more
ultimate reality might be depicted as a sort of cosmic or meta-narra-
tive—a grand drama in which individuals are players. 225 The crucial
common element in these various forms of faith is a sense that what is
manifest or readily observable is not all there is: Beyond the manifest
there exists a latent reality that, although not directly perceived, is if
anything even more real than the facts and events that immediately
present themselves. 226
Although this commitment to a reality beyond the visible is famil-
iar enough in religion, in poetry, and in certain kinds of philosophy
(in particular Platonism), some characteristic expressions may be help-
ful. Evelyn Underhill wrote of "[man's sense of] a Wholeness, a Per-
fection already fully present over against him." This reality is under-
stood as a "Transcendent Object," or as "the Absolute and Eternal,
standing beyond the present and the past," or as "the mysterious
'ground' of our being. "227 In a similar vein, Abraham Heschel observed
that "Me see more than we can say. The trees stand like guards of the
Everlasting; the flowers like signposts of his goodness." 2" Heschel de-
scribed this "more than we can say" in poetic terms as "the stillness
that surrounds the world, hovering over all the restlessness and fear of
life—the secret stillness that precedes our birth and succeeds our
death," as "the mystery that animates all beings" or, more succinctly, as
"the Infinite" or "the Eternal." 229
221
	
Louts DUPRE, PASSAGE TO MODERNITY 145 (1993) (observing that in the Middle Ages
life was viewed as a "cosmic play" in srthich "the human person clearly had the lead—but an
unchattging God directed the play").
226 Drawing on comparative religion, Huston Smith summarizes the recurring themes: "On-
tologically, Spirit is more real than everything else. Causally, it occasions everything else. AO
axiologically, it excels everything else by being perfect." Huston Smith, The Ambiguity of Mattel;
HI CROSSCURRENTS 49, 55 (1998).
227 See EVELYN UNDERHILL, WORSHIP 6-7, 15 (rev. ed., 1991).
228 Stir ABRAHAM J. tIESGIIEL, MAN'S QUEST FOR COD 4 (1954).
229 See id. at 3-4, 9. Heschel noted that °rodeo: life tetals to extinguish awareness of this
more ultimate reality:
There is such an alattulance of the here and the now, such plenitude of the given
and the conceived that our mind has lost itself in the world. All we can trust in is
the work of our hands, the product of our minds, and what lies beyond it is
considered an illegitimate fancy. The world to us consists of iusvluueuts, of tools,
and the supreme ideas are symbols only.
M. at xii.
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For a more ancient expression, consider the teaching of Lao Tse
regarding the "Tao," sometimes translated as the "way":
The tao that can be told
is not the eternal Tao.
The name that can be named
is not the eternal Name.
The unnameable is the eternally real.
*****
It is hidden but always present.
I don't know who gave birth to it.
It is older than God.
It is serene. Empty.
Solitary. Unchanging.
Infinite. Eternally present.
It is the mother of the universe.
For lack of a better name,
I call it the Tao.'"
Although a belief in a transcendent or more ultimate reality is
characteristic of religion—or even, arguably, the core of religion 231
-the belief is not limited to "religion" in any conventional sense. The
example of Plato shows that philosophers may be consciously commit-
ted to a realm of more ultimate reality."' And probably the most
frequent if unsystematic expositions of this belief conic from poets,
who characteristically attempt to reveal a layer of meaning beneath and
beyond what is immediately apparent—"To see the world in a grain of
sand,/And a Heaven in a Wild Flower."'" Thus, for a poet who notes
"the clearest freshness deep down things," the world may become
"charged with the grandeur of God. It shakes out like shining from
shook foil." 234 And even thinkers who are scornful of religion, such as
2" LAO '!'ss, TAO TE CHING GI15. 1, 2, 25.
231 William j james suggested that "were one asked to characterize the life of religion in the
broadest and most general terms possible, one might say that it consists of the belief that there
is an tutseen order, and that our supreme good lies in harmoniously adjusting ourselves thereto."
WILLIAM JAMES, THE VARIETIES or REuctous EXPERIENCE 50 (Collier Books 1961) (1901). In a
similar vein, Vaclav Havel observes that at the core of all major religions is the belief that "this
world and our existence here are not a freak accident having little meaning but are part of a
mysterious, yet integral act whose sources, direction and purpose are difficult for us to perceive
in their entirety." See Vaclav Havel, Faith in the World, CIVILIZATION 51, 53 (Apr./Alay 1998).
232 See PLATO, THE REPUBLIC bks.
233 See generally WILLIASI BLARE, AUGURIES OF INNOCENCE.
234 See GERARD MANLEY HOPKINS, CODS GRANDEUR. In a poet like Hopkins, of course, poetry
and religious thith are explicitly joined.
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Marx or the eighteenth century philosophes, may come to treat some-
thing else—a hypostatized "History" or "Posterity," for example—as a
sort of quasi-mindful, super-mundane reality that moves human events
along some preestablished course."'
This perception of au unseen reality might already he regarded
as a manifestation of "faith" in an epistemological sense, since by
definition that overarching reality is not immediately accessible to
"reason" understood as a combination of formal logic and straightfor-
ward empiricism/2 "G However, the sense of an unseen reality does not
by itself constitute faith as an ethical orientation.
2. The normative authority of the unseen
The belief in the unseen becomes an ethical orientation—though
not quite yet an orientation of "faith"—when it is supplemented by a
commitment or belief that life is somehow to be lived in conformity
with a super-mundane reality. The unseen, in other words, provides
the normative criterion that should govern decisions about how to live.
Persons should live in conformity with God's will, 277 or with "the Tao"; 2"
2-' For a discussion of the highly religions (polity of Mar's view of history, see KARL Loom',
WANING IN II ts . rogy 42-51 (1949). For an argument that lilt the eighteenth centtiry philoso-
Idlers, history—or "1'051(1'4"—N8111w a subslillite for God, see CARL BECKER, THE 11EM'ENLV
CITY OF tilE EIGHTEENTH CENTURY PHILOSOPHERS I 19–(38 (1932). Becker maintains that
the thought of posterity was apt to elicit from eighteenthwentury Philosophers and
revolutionary leaders a highly emotional, an essentially religious, response. Poster-
ity, like nature, was often personified, reverently addressed as a divinity, and invoked
in the atecills of prayer.
Id. at 142.
230 Because it is not accessible to ordinary "reason," the person committed to believing
nothing but what cm, he established by reason 'nay of course reject this kind of belief. See LAO
TsF., l'Ao Tr. CHING cll. 41.
When a superior luau heats of tlw 'la°,
he immediately begins to embody it
When an average man hears of the Tao,
he half believes it, half doubts ii.
When a foolish man hears of the Tao,
Ile laughs out loud.
If he didn't laugh,
Ii wouldn't be the Tao.
hi.
R37 "Lei us hear the conclusion of the whole mutter: Fear God, and keep his commandments;
for this is the whole duty of man." Err/es/as/es 12:13.
23S See Lao ME, to TE CUING cll. 37:
The Tao never does a nything:u
yet through it all things ate done.
If powerful men and women
could center themselves in it,
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they should live not simply to achieve the satisfaction of their interests,
but rather should strive to play their part in the cosmic script or
narrative.
Acceptance of-a more ultimate reality as normative or regulative
produces an orientation toward the question "How should I live?" that
differs radically from the more familiar concept of an instrumentally-
rational pursuit of human wants, needs, or interests. Evelyn Underhill
maintained that from the recognition of a transcendent reality "Mt
follows that . . . the envisaged end is not man's comfort, security, or
personal success, but His glOry and purpose, the more perfect doing
of His Will.""" Similarly, Rabbi Heschel observed the modern tendency
to assume that "all our actions are guided by one consideration, how
best to serve our personal interests"; but while conceding that "the self
has its legitimate claims and interests," Heschel explained that these
do not constitute the primary ethical desideratum. Instead, we should
live in accordance with the more ultimate reality, or God."" Lao Tse
remarked that "[a] good traveler has no fixed plans and is not intent
upon arriving ...." Insiead of striving, she simply opens herself to the
workings of the Tao."'
3. Recognition that the ultimate truth or reality is largely
inaccessible to human comprehension
The two characteristics described thus far fail to capture a quality
typically associated with "faith." Indeed, these beliefs or commitments
might readily have been endorsed by earlier "rationalists," such as Plato
or that-quintessential figure of the American Enlightenment, Thomas
Jefferson. As Daniel Boorstin has explained, Jefferson was in some
respects very much like the Calvinists for whom he had little patience;
the existence of God and the ethical imperative of conforming to
God's design were central to Jefferson's political and ethical think-
the whole world would be transformed
by itself, in its natural rhythms.
Id.
239 UNDERHILL, sn/na note 227, at 9 (stath
[Mow strong a pull is needed to neutralize the anthropocentric trend of the human
mind; its intense preoccui ninon with the world of succession, and its own here-aild-
now desires and needs. And only in so liar as it is released front this petty subjectiv-
ism, can it hope to glow up into any laiowledge of the massive realities of that
spiritual universe in which we live and move.).
See also Lso ME, TAO TE CHINO Cll. 14.
2 i° See lIESCtIEL, supra note 228, at xiii.
241 See LAO TSE, TAO TE CItING ch. 27.
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big."' Unlike the inscrutable God of the Calvinists, however, Jefferson's
deity was conveniently accessible to the human mind. In taking the
opposite view, the Calvinists were more representative of an orientation
of "faith," which typically insists that we "see through a glass darkly,'"""
so that the ultimate reality is beyond our comprehension (at least in
our present, mortal condition).
In this vein, Hebrew scriptures such as the book of Job or the later
chapters in Isaiah emphasize the inscrutability of God." 4 In the tradi-
tion of the writings of the pseudo-Dionysus and Maximus the Confes-
sor, Christian theologians have similarly insisted that God is far beyond
our comprehension, so that anything we say affirmatively about God
will misrepresent the divine nature."' Evelyn Underhill, acknowledging
"the refusal of the Spirit to fit into the neat categories of thought,"
concluded that "all our attempts to penetrate its mystery must end in
acknowledgment of defeat: 246 The Tao Te Ching revels in paradoxes as
it presents the Tao, and later observes: "The more you know, the less
you understand."247 Consequently, "[t] hose who know don't talk./
Those who talk .don't know."248
The inscrutability of the ultimate reality presents daunting prob-
lems, of course, both epistemological and ethical. How can we discuss
or teach about something that by hypotheses we cannot understand?
Without pretending to have solved the problem, Christian philoso-
phers and theologians developed a complex interplay of ways both of
saying what God is like in an imperfect, suggestive or analogical form-
"cataphatic" theologyand of saying what God is not—apophatic the-
aagy. 249
But the ethical question is even more pressing: How can we em-
brace the view that the ethical imperative is to live in accordance with
ultimate reality if that reality is beyond our comprehension? How can
an inscrutable, unseen reality provide a viable guide for actual living?"°
212 See DANIEL). BOORSTIN THE LOST WORLD OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 29-30 (1993); see also
Steven D. Smith, Nonsense and Natural Law, 4 S. CAL. INTERDISCIPLINARY Li. 583, 590-93 (1995).
2131 Corinthians 13:12.
211 See, e.g., job 38:1-42:6; Isaiah 55:8-9.
2111 See PLAC/ IER, 51/pia note 84, at 95; JAROSIAV PELIEAN, THE SPIRIT or EASTERN CHRISTEN-
DOM (600-1700) at 110-36 (1974).
216 UNDERHILL Supyi note 227, at 8-9.
217 See LAP 'FSE, TA0 TE cum; cll. 47.
211 Id., Al. 56.
212 See generallyWAnimIlt LOSSES', THE MYSTICAL THEOLOGY OFTI IF, EASTERN CHURCH 23-42
(1091 ed.).
250 The difficulty prompts Charles Larmore to argue that "Cod's transcendence has led to
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This question leads to the fourth characteristic of the orientation of
faith.
4. The recognition of signals or directions for guiding
human conduct
The response of faith to this apparent predicament is to accept
that although human beings cannot comprehend ultimate reality, they
can nonetheless receive direction or guidance from it. Different faiths
differ, of course, in their understandings of how this guidance is given.
But the most common views, I think, fall into two categories, which
adopt what we might call the method of revelation and the method of
intimation.
The first approach holds that ultimate reality issues authoritative
directions at discrete times and places, and that these revelations can
be preserved, interpreted and followed. The most familiar such belief
is the idea that God has given instructions which have been collected
in sacred texts, such as the Bible or the Koran. So humans can study
and live according to divine instructions even though they cannot
comprehend God and cannot grasp God's overall design.
The second approach holds that the ultimate reality presents itself
or offers its guidance on a more ongoing basis—hut in glimpses,
intuitions or "intimations." I have taken the term "intimations" from
the title of a Wordsworth poem which speaks of
those obstinate questionings
Of sense and outward things,
Fallings from us, vanishings;
Blank misgivings of a Creature
Moving about in worlds not realised . . . .251
These "worlds not realised" are presented to us mostly in "shadowy
recollections" which lead us to perceive that "[o]ur noisy years seem
moments in the being of the eternal Silence." Such intimations lead
us to "truths that wake,/To perish never" and to a "faith that looks
through death."
• A different example of this approach is Socrates' account, as
presented by Plato, in which Socrates claims to be "subject to a divine
his withdrawal from the world and thus to the autonomy of the world." See CHARLES LARMO RE,
'1HE MORALS OF MODERNITY 42 (1996). Consequently, "God's transcendence, if thought through
consistently, must lead to secularization." Id. at 43.
251 	Wordsworth, Ode: Intimations of Immortality from Recollections of Early Childhood.
September 19991 	 BELIEVING LIKE A LAWYER 	 1107
or supernatural experience . . . —a sort of voice which comes to me,
and when it conies it always dissuades are from what I am proposing
to do . . . ,"252 The Quaker belief in au "inner light" giving directions
that the recipient might not fully grasp, but should nonetheless follow,
would be another familiar example of the "method of intimation."'"
So would the "Reason" whereby American transcendentalists like
Emerson thought to receive intimations front the "oversold" of the
universe. 2" And of course on a more familiar and mundane level,
ordinary people without any pretensions to special spiritual status
often feel impelled to do or not to do something on the basis of a
"hunch," intuition, feeling or premonition.
The methods of revelation and intimation are not mutually exclu-
sive. On the contrary, in many faiths they are thoroughly interrelated.
It is a common contention of Christians, for instance, that God's will
is revealed in the Bible—and the disciple should therefore study it
often and carefully—but that scripture cannot he fully or properly
interpreted without the ongoing aid of God's spirit. In addition, Chris-
tians frequently claim to receive inspiration independent of the activity
of reading and interpreting scripture.
5. Trustful resignation
The cumulative product of the preceding elements is not so much
a method or technique for making decisions about how to live, but
rather an attitude in which the believer trustingly turns her life over to
the care of a higher reality. The person of faith lives with a full
awareness that she cannot see the "big picture." She cannot predict
the particular consequences of her various actions and decisions, nor
can she know where her life is destined to take hen Nonetheless, she
does not view the enterprise as a simple gamble, or "shot in the dark,"
but rather is confident that by entrusting herself to a higher reality her
actions will somehow work together for good. Her attitude, in Hans
Kong's description, is one of "fundamental trust"—of "saying yes to
reality."2"
252 See Ftsto, TIIE APOLOGY 31d. As this quotatitni indicates, the instructions reported In'
Socrates did not affirmatively direct, but rather prohibited. Whether this report should he taken
at face value is, like virtually everything in Plato's dialogues, subject to debate.
253 See Robert Barclay, now Thy Mind to the Light, from An Apology for . . the Thineiples and
Doctrines of the People Called Quakers, reprinted in '111IE QUAKER READER 228-39 (lessamytt West
ed., 1962).
251 See PAUL F. ROLLER, jR., AMERICAN TRANSCENDENTALISM, 1830-1860: AN INTELLECTUAL
INQUIRY 78-80 (1974).
255 See LIANs RUNG, DOES COD Exiter? 445, 461, 465, 473 (Eduard Quinn trans., Vintage ed.
1981).
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Lao Tse emphasized the "resignation" aspect of this attitudinal
quality with the concept of "wu wei," translated as "non-ado" or "crea-
tive letting-be." The concept counsels resignation rather than striv-
ing:
He who stands on tiptoe
Doesn't stand firm.
He who rushes ahead
Doesn't go fan.
He who tries to shine
Dims his own light.
He who defines himself
Can't know who he really is.
He who has power over others
Can't empower himself.
He who clings to his work
Will create nothing that endures.
If you want to accord with the Tao,
Just do your job, then let go.
*****
True mastery can be gained
By letting things go their own way.
It can't be gained by interfering. 256
One of the clearest expressions of this overall approach, and of
the contrast between faith and a more rationalistic orientation, is
contained in a poem, originally entitled simply "Faith," by John Henry
Newman. When later set to. music, the poem became one of the most
popular Christian hymns (although its lack of specifically Christian
language prompted doubts about its orthodoxy). The poem begins:
Lead, kindly light, amid the encircling gloom;
Lead Thou me on!
The night is dark, and I am far from home—
Lead Thou me on!
Keep Thou my feet; I do not ask to see
The distant scene—one step enough for me. 257
256 TAO TSE, TA() Tx CHING chs. 24, 48.
257 The poem is repri Wed and its history is discussed in OWEN CHADWICK, THE SPIRIT OF
THE OXFORD MOVEMENT 86-98 (1990). Chadwick reports that Ike poem was originally titled
simply "Faith." See id. at 86. Chadwick also reports that early hpnicals often revised the words to
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Taken together, these characteristics compose an orientation to-
ward life and decision-making that differs dramatically front that of
rationalism. This is not to say that faith and instrumental rationality
are mutually exclusive. Typically the counsels of faith will speak to some
dimensions of life but not to others. As Rabbi Heschel acknowledged,
"the self has its legitimate claims and interests." 258 Moreover, even in
the domains where faith and instrumental rationality speak, the reve-
lations or intimations of faith may suggest broad aspirations without
supplying detailed directions for clay-to-day living.
Consequently, the person of faith, like the rationalist, will inevita-
bly be engaged in the formulation of objectives and the assessment of
means for achieving those objectives. Faith, however, will provide the
encompassing framework for these pursuits. So although the person
of faith will know intimately the daily experience of instrumental cal-
culations, those calculations will by no means make up the core of her
ethical commitments or her overall orientation toward life. Moreover,
in pursuing instrumental ends within a framework of faith, the person
of faith will act with a trust and hopefulness not plausibly available to
those who lack such faith. 259
B. Faith and Reason
As noted, "faith" encompasses living in accordance with beliefs
and commitments that cannot be fully justified on the basis of "reason,"
understood as the epistemology including formal logic and empirical
observation. It hardly follows, however, that faith is incompatible with
reason. On the contrary, the relationship between the epistemology of
reason and the ethical orientation of faith is much more complex, and
at least to some degree, mutually supporting.
Far from rejecting reason, faith commonly appeals to reason in at
least two different ways. First, although I have tried to describe the
generic features of an orientation of faith, in its concrete appearances
faith will not be generic—it will typically be maintained in souse at least
loose formulation that tries to convey something about what the more
overarching reality is like and how its guidance can be received—and
this snore substantive formulation will likely be subject, at least in some
make them more specifically Christian—to say, Mr example, "Lead, Saviour, lead amid the
encircling gloom." See hi. at 90. "The Church lipm1 books objected to the poem because it could
be sung by Unitarians." Id. to 92.
258 HESCIIEL, SUM note 228, at xiii.
259 But rf. Annette Baler, Secular Faith, in FArrn 226, 227 (Terence Penellitnn ed., 1989)
(arguing for the possibility of "the secular equivalein of faith in Cud").
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respects, to examination by the methods of reason. Given the long
history of perpetual commerce between faith and reason, the common
modern notion that faith and reason are wholly different realms of
experience, so that reason does not speak either to confirm or dis-
confirm faith," reveals a remarkable innocence.
For example, whether the existence of God can be inferred from
logic (as in the so-called "ontological argument") or from the observed
facts of nature (as in the "argument from design") is a question—or
rather a set of questions—that has been debated for centuries and that
continues to be debated in the light of new scientific and theological
understandings by people educated in religion, philosophy and sci-
ence.26 ' In a more narrowly empirical vein, at one time the truth of
Christianity was often linked to the occurrence of miracles in the New
Testament—John Locke's defense of Christianity, for instance, fea-
tured an argument based on Jesus' miracles 2cso that scholarship
employing sophisticated methods for determining the origins and his-
toricity of biblical texts reporting such miracles is, at least in principle,
relevant to this kind of faith.'" Similarly, faith often produces predic-
tions or "prophecies," some of which are definite enough to be subject
to confirmation or falsification. To be sure, prophecies are notoriously
susceptible to new or multiple interpretations, and at least iri the
short run the apparent disconfirtnation of a prophecy may sometimes
prompt zealous believers to even greater exertions of faith and prose-
lytizing.'" Still, faith may be, in some instances, strengthened or (as
thousands of shattered followers of William Miller learned)" invali-
dated as these prophecies are or are not fulfilled.
How many people have been converted—or unconverted—by
these sorts of considerations is uncertain, to be sure. Those who are
260 See, e.g., Edward B. Foley, Political Liberalism and Establishment Clause finispradence, 43
CASE W. 143. L. REV. 963,969-70 (1993) (describing sharp distinction between beliefs based on
"philosophy" and beliefs based on a "leap of faith"); If STEPHEN J. GOULD, DINOSAUR IN A
HAYSTACK 48 (1995) (asserting science and religion cannot actually conflict because they are
"utterly different" enterprises—"science as an enterprise dedicated to discovering and explaining
the factual basis of the empirical world, and religion as an examination of ethics and slues").
261 For a consideration by an accomplished scientist and theologian of some traditional
mgutnents for theism in light of modern developments in science, see POLKINGlioRNE, supra Hole
214, at 1-24.
262 See .1011N LOCKE, 'IRE REASONABLENESS Or CHRISTIANITY 35-37 (George W. Ewing ed.,
1964) (1695).
263 For an overview and balanced assessment of the implications of modern scholarship for
the historicity of the Christian Gospels, see GILHIAM N. STANTON, "DIE GOSPELS AND JESUS 150-64
(1989).
261 See generally LEON FESTINGER ET AL., WHEN PROPHECY FAILS (1956).
263 See 1 SIDNEY E. Ants:mon, A RELIGIOUS HISTORY OF "IIIE AMERICAN PEOPLE 579-81
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skeptical of religion may suspect that religionists are impervious to rea-
son and empirical evidence; persons skeptical of science, or at least of
particular scientific theories, sometimes turn the suspicion around.'"
But many people have reported conversion (and unconversion) expe-
riences influenced at least in part by such considerations 2" and it
would seem unduly dogmatic simply to deny their sincerity en masse.
It is surely true that individual religious believers sometimes cling to
their faith even in the face of seemingly contrary evidence. Individual
scientists often do the same. 262 Over time, however, the pressure of
contrary experience tends to dislodge both insupportable scientific
theories and insupportable faiths: There are few devOtees today of
either Ptolemaic astronomy or Zeus and Athena. 2"
A second way in which faith interacts with reason is more internal
to a tradition of faith: Reason is employed in the understanding,
continuing assessment, revision and application of the teachings of
faith. Christianity, Judaism, Islam and Buddhism all provide examples
of how a community or tradition of faith may be subject to vast trans-
formations—and internal dWisions—as the core of faith is expounded,
interpreted and reconceived in the light both of logical. examination
and of ongoing human experience.
If faith is to a significant degree dependent on reason, it is also
true that reason is to an extent dependent on faith. This dependency
is evident in what proponents of reason typically regard as the most
central and successful exemplar of reason—that is, science—because
"empiricism," as understood in the realm of science, already entails a
significant exercise of faith. At a time when science was achieving its
(1975). Leon Festinger and Ills colleagues discuss the Nfillerite movement in FrwrtNGER Er Al..,
SI/p/r/ 'tote 264, at 12-23.
26 See, e.g., Pliant , E. JOHNSON, REASON IN THE VALANCE: THE CASE AGAINST NATURALISM
IN SCIENCE, LAW AND EDUCATION (1995).
2 67 For a collection of such conversion accounts by col tiempontry philosophers, see generally
CUD AND 'WE PHILOSOPHERS: TOE RECONCILIATION OF FAITH AND REASON (Thomas V. Morris
ed., 1994). For an engaging account of the unronneision stories of a number or nineteenth
century thinkers, see A.18, WILSON, Con's FUNERAL (1998).
262 Thomas Kohli notes that when confronted with apparently collo:try evidence, scientists
will typically , "devise numerous articulations and ad hoc modifications of their theory in order to
eliminate ally apparent conllict." Timms S. KulIN, THE STRUCTURE OF SCIENTIFIC REVOLUTICINS
78 (3d ed. 1996). huleed, "some scientists, particularly the older and anore experienced ones,
will resist indefinitely . . . ." Id. at 152. Kuhn denies that there is anything disreputable or
embarrassing about this phenomenon; such resistance is simply part of the puzzle-solving and
occasional paradigm4estilig that make science what it is.
26'''A1though arguing that the failure of pffipliecy initially stimulates devout believers to even
greater faith and ellOrt, Leon Festinger and his colleagues acknowledged that "there does seem
to be a point at which the disconfinning evidence has mounted sufficiently to cause the belief to
be rejected? See FESTINGER Er At., sepia note 264, at 12.
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preeminent status in modern culture, David Flume disturbingly dem-
onstrated that neither abstract logic nor what we might call "raw ob-
servation" could support the most essential assumptions of the scien-
tific enterprise; a combination of logic and barebones empiricism is
incapable of establishing the reality even of physical causation, nor
does it support the efficacy of the inductive reasoning that is central
to the scientific enterprise. 270 These necessary features of science, or
of human life generally, are supplied by the scientists or by human
beings; they represent, in an important sense, acts or "leaps" of faith. 271
- This is not to say that scientific assumptions about order and causality
are held blindly; they are to some extent subject to confirmation or
disconfirmation as the enterprise proceeds. Michael Polanyi explains
that science, "while using the experience of our senses as clues, tran-
scends this experience by embracing the vision of a reality beyond the
impressions of our senses, a vision which speaks for itself in guiding us
to an ever deeper understanding of reality . . . .""2 Much the same
could be said of other forms of faith which, like scientific hypotheses,
are constantly growing or waning as their animating vision of reality is
or is not sustained by ongoing human experience.
In sum, if "faith" goes beyond what "reason" can establish, still the
two are not simply antagonists. They clash at times, at least in their
particular manifestationS and conclusions, but in the long run they are
mutually supporting—and to some extent, mutually correcting—allies.
VI. LAW AS AN EXPRESSION OF FAITH?
The preceding discussion has tried to describe an "orientation of
faith" that is a familiar human response to the question ."How should
I live?" But even if this orientation is recognizable as an approach to
life adopted by many individuals, how is faith relevant to law—or to
jurisprudence?
27° See generally` DAVID HUME, AN ENQUIRY CONCERNING HUMAN UNDERSTANDING, (min L.
Beauchamp, ed., Oxford University Press 1999) (1748).
271 ER. Tenant explains:
There is no a priori reason why the world should be amenable to scientific reason-
ing: a world conceivably might be of such a :mune that any kind of event in it
succeeded on any other kind of happening. But schnute has approached the World
with the quasi-religious faith that the world is thus amenable, and has maintained
its hope against the world itself, t h roughout its struggle to reduce brute facts to
order and law. •
F.R. Tenant, Faith, in FAITII 99, 101 (Terence Penelhum etl., 1989).
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Recognizing the orientation of faith is most immediately of juris-
prudential value in helping to account for how law as we know it (and,
even more importantly, as we do it) actually works. Its value in this
respect can be described simply: Central features of legal practice that
seem inexplicable from a rationalist perspective—and hence that ra-
tionalist theorists have criticized throughout the past century—come
to seem entirely natural and appropriate from the standpoint of a
certain kind of faith, or from what we might call "legal faith."
As discussed in Part I, a close examination of the conventional
legal discourse practiced by lawyers and judges in Holmes's time and
still practiced by lawyers and judges today suggests that the discourse
is calculated to do just what it purports to do—that is, find "the law."
Conventional legal discourse, in other words, appears to reflect a faith
in an objective law that is somehow authoritative for us. Rationalists,
like Holmes, have found this project next to incomprehensible on its
own terms; hence they have either proposed that conventional legal
discourse be replaced by something more rational—such as "policy
science"—or else they have offered alternative, more rational accounts
of what (beneath the surface) lawyers and judges are "really" doing
and saying. But these alternative accounts typically do not fit well with
the way lawyers and judges actually talk and behave. Conversely, the
puzzling aspects of legal discourse and practice come to make sense if
one supposes that lawyers and judges are operating within a framework
of "legal faith."
A. The Legal Faith
In order to investigate this suggestion, we need first to engage in
a sort of imaginative experiment. We need to conjure up a cultural or
intellectual climate in which people affirm, consciously and without
embarrassment, that "the law" is something unitary and real—in
which phrases like "brooding omnipresence in the sky" do not provoke
amused Or contemptuous denials, but rather assenting nods. What
would such a faith be like? My argument will be that the assumption
of a legal faith provides at least a plausible "as if' account of our own
legal discourse and practices that seem inexplicable within a rationalist
framework.
Indulge for a moment, then, in a thought experiment. What sort
of faith might make the mysterious enterprise of legal method or legal
argumentation seem natural and sensible?'"
295 Readers familiar with his work will detect the heavy influence of Joseph Vining in the
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We might begin by imagining that behind the clay-to-day, tangible
products associated with legal practice—lawyers' briefs, judicial opin-
ions, statutes, regulations—there is some less visible but overarching
reality. We could call this reality "the law." If we wanted a metaphor for
"the law" (which perhaps can only be understood metaphorically),
"brooding omnipresence" might well be a helpful image. Like the
divinity of theistic religions, no man hath seen "the law" at any dine—
not directly, not with mundane eyes at least 'The law," like the Tao, is
"hidden but always present." But though "the law" itself exceeds our
vision, its visible manifestations are plentiful; countless volumes of
them are collected on the law library shelves.
Moreover, "the law" is not just a dry fact; it is the definitive nor-
mative criterion. Legal officials are to act and make decisions, not
primarily on the basis of their own interests, or even on the basis of
pragmatic calculations about hmnan interests generally. They are to
act in conformity with the law.
As noted, "the law" itself cannot be seen directly, and even a
cursory study of its history and manifold manifestations should be
enough to show that it also cannot be fully reduced to human com-
prehension. Consequently, one generation's fallible understanding of
"the law" may come to seem grossly inadequate, or perhaps iniquitous,
to a later generation—even though the public manifestation of "the
law" is in words that remain unaltered. An expression such as "equal
protection of the laws" may be understood in one way in 1897 and in
a drastically different way in 1954 274—the earlier understanding may
come to seem not merely mistaken but indeed shameful—and several
decades later "the law" may speak through the same seemingly innocu-
ous phrase to address topics (gender distinctions or matters of sexual
orientation or laws regulating assisted suicide) and to issue demands
that no one living at the time the phrase was first adopted would even
have imagined. The legal faith might account for these changes by
supposing that earlier generations failed to understand the instruc-
tions of "the law" fully or correctly. Or the faith might conceive of the
overarching reality as a dynamic or "living" entity whose meaning
changes over time. Either way, the guardians and interpreters of "the
law" would insist that the newly announced requirements of racial and
gender and other kinds of equality are not the imposition their own
following discussion. Vining's work is discussed more explicitly infra at notes 335-67 and accom-
panying text.
274 Compare PlessY v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896) with Brown v. Board of Educ„ 347 U.S.
483 (1954).
September 19991 	 BELIEVING LIKE A LAMER	 1115
preferences or politics, but are an interpretation of what "the law"
demands.
Since "the law" is not in itself visible and is not fully accessible to
human understanding, conformity to law necessarily means fidelity to
partial guidance emanating from "the law." As in other faiths, this
guidance is dispensed mostly in two ways. Sometimes major revelations
are given and recorded in central canonical texts, which later genera-
tions then devote themselves to interpreting. In our own legal culture
the Constitution and its major amenchnents—especially the Four-
teenth—would be the primary examples of this sort of text, but there
might also be lesser but still important instances: the Judiciary Act of
1789, Marini°, v. Madison, Brown v. Board of Education. More routinely,
however, "the law" reveals itself in small, incremental glimpses or inti-
mations. Case law is the principal repository of these intimations. Cases
may record intimations about the meanings of the primary and central
texts. Or cases may contain instructions from "the law" that are more
or less independent of those particular texts.
The legal faith thus supports a form of lawyerly discourse that is
largely devoted to the study of cases—of cases interpreting enactments,
and of cases that express the "common law"—in an effort to discern
the directives of "the law." The essential point of this exercise, it is
important to note, is not to determine what these lesser texts them-
selves would mean in some other context or discipline (which is one
reason why any suggestion that law could be made determinate and
scientific by simply importing the discipline of linguistics25 would re-
- flect a gross misunderstanding of the subject matter), but rather to use
them as aids in receiving the instructions of "the law." There is no set
formula for achieving this kind of understanding—indeed, the inter-
preter must herself be in tune with "the law" in order to read its
previous expressions properly—and so naturally the techniques for
correct interpretation cannot be confined to a fixed list. How these
techniques should he selected and combined in any particular case is
something that can only be decided under the subtle urgings - of "the
law."
So it is hardly surprising that au activity that might seem utterly
discordant—suitable mostly for "trashing" 2T6—to the critic who adopts
275 For a wide-ranging discussion of the possibility, sec Proceedings of the Northwestern Univer-
sily/Ithshington Univemily Linguistics Confewnre. 73 WAsn. U. L.Q. 3 (1995).
272 See Mark C. Kelman, Trashing, 36 STAN. L. licc. 293 (1984). KeIncin asserts that "rndost
of the arguments Mat hoc professors make are not only nonsensical according to some obscure
and unreachable criteria of Universal Validity but they are also patently unstable babble." Id. at
322.
1116 	 BOSTON' COLLEGE LAW REVIEW 	 [Vol. 40:1041
a detached and faithless perspective will in fact resonate with a sort of
beautiful necessity for those devotees who have learned to hear and
harmonize with the "Singing Reason" of "the law."277 Moreover, what
might seem to au outsider—to a pragmatist, for example, or a skeptical
critic—like a reckless or wicked disregard for the real world conse-
quences of decisions is not troubling, because the practice reflects a
deep trust that all will be well so long as we follow the teachings of "the
law."
This imaginative depiction might be qualified in a way that would
add realistic complexity without greatly detracting from the legal faith.
This qualification would acknowledge that legal artifacts, such as judi-
cial opinions and enacted statutes, have a dual character. In part, they
are expressions of "the law," as discussed above. But they might also
have a more positivist dimension insofar as they are expressions of the
"will" of particular human legislators or perhaps of human judges. In
the enterprise of construing these legal artifacts, therefore, interpret-
ers might try to give effect to both aspects, attempting to respect the
will of the mundane makers while at the same time listening for the
deeper teachings of "the law" and seeking to reconcile the enactments
with that more ultimate reality. And with the passage of time, as the
immediate willed purposes of the enactments fade from memory, their
more lofty and legal dimensions naturally come to dominate:278 Hence,
"the law" would over time "work itself pure" of more local, and perhaps -
more willful, impositions upon 4. 27°
This depiction of the "legal faith" suggests ways in which the
supposition of such a faith might help make sense of the ways in which
lawyers and judges actually talk and argue and justify. Just as a physicist
might try to explain particular behaviors of atomic particles by observ-
ing that they act "as if' they were influenced by some new particle that
has not previously been detected, we might explain the behavior of
lawyers and judges by saying that they act "as if' they adhered to
something like the legal faith just described.
271 See LLEWELLYN, TIIE COMMON LAW„OlpIN note 32, at 182-83.
278 g ACKERNIAN, 5UpOl Hole WO, at 98,115,121, 14I , 161 (arguing constitutional principles
only become visible as the "lived experience" surrounding constitutional prosisions fades and
gives way to "book learning").
270 See DWORKIN, Law's EMPIRE, supra note 57, at 400-03 (discussing and endorsing the "old
nope" that the law "works itself pine").
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B. Faith and its Imitations
There is an obvious difficulty with the preceding discussion; it
proceeds on a premise that seems patently false. Perhaps the methods
and forms of argument that lawyers and judges use might be under-
standable on the supposition that lawyers and judges hold a certain
kind of faith in "the law." But the fact is—or at least seems to be—that
lawyers and judges emphatically do not maintain any such faith.
As discussed in Part I, few if any lawyers today would confess to
believing that "the law" exists as a sort of "brooding omnipresence."
This denial of faith is a manifestation of the central predicament of
twentieth century legal thought. In the rare contexts in which explicit
discussion of ethical and metaphysical commitments is called for, law-
yers and judges are likely to express some metaphysically modest and
suitably secular understanding of what law is. There is no legal order
or reality beyond the one that we ourselves construct. Consequently,
the task of law is to construct a social order that best prombtes our
human interests, wants and needs. These views, as Holmes and his
innumerable successors have repeatedly insisted, imply that law ought
to be radically transformed into an instrumentalist engine for the
promotion of social policies—subject, perhaps, to the considerations
of justice emphasized in modern political-moral philosophy as prac-
ticed by thinkers like Dworkin. But lawyers and judges seem unwilling
or unable to carry out this transformation. Instead, they continue to
adhere (sometimes quite aggressively, as in the recent prominent writ-
ings ofJudge Edwards, Professor Glendon and Dean Kronman) largely
to traditional legal methods that upon examination can be seen to
reflect a very different orientation—an orientation of faith, and indeed
of "legal faith"—that scholars and legal practitioners are likely to dis-
avow.
Although this state of affairs may seem peculiar, upon reflection
it appears that participants in the enterprise of law are hardly alone in
carrying on activities that seem premised on beliefs they would not
consciously affirm. In fact, we are quite familiar with a variety of
attitudes that resemble faith in some respects, but that lack the inner
conviction and commitment of genuine faith. Three such attitudes, or
what we might think of as "quasi-faiths," could be called fictional faith,
ancillary faith and bad faith. Each of these attitudes might help to
supply an explanation of why lawyers and judges do what they do in
light of what they believe or, more to the point, do not believe.




One possibility is that law expresses a sort of fictional or "as if"
faith. This attitude would have all of the features of the faith described
above, except that its practitioners at bottom do not believe that the
overarching reality on which the practice depends—in this case, "the
law"—"really" exists. Instead, for benevolent or prudential reasons they
talk and act as if they believe in that reality. They adopt a sort of
quasi-belief, or calculated suspension of disbelief, for purposes of en-
gaging in a valued activity, much in the way that readers of novels or
viewers of films suspend disbelief while engaged in the activity of
reading or viewing. This suspension of disbelief serves a valuable pur-
pose. Readers of novels gain an enjoyment and enrichment that they
would not derive if they constantly kept reminding themselves that
"this didn't really happen." Practitioners of law deliberately suspend
disbelief in order to make the celebrated "rule of law" ideal possible.'"
An understanding of law as a fictional faith seems consistent with
familiar features of legal practice and culture. First, fictional thinking
seems to come easily and naturally to lawyers and judges."' Indeed, the
fictional application of terms and concepts has been a principal vehicle
by which the common law has adapted to changes in the world. 282 And
lawyers today routinely deal in "constructive" trusts, "constructive"
notice, contractual terms "implied in law" and a variety of intellectual
tricks for pretending, for different purposes, that "the state" both is
and is not being sued in a given lawsuit. 2"
These are what we might call "little fictions"; they function to
extend, round off, and fill in the law. But at its core, legal thinking also
contains "big fictions." In the jurisprudence of Hans Kelsen, for exam-
ple, the very existence of law as a system of norms depends on the
assumption that there is one central and basic norm from which the
rest of the system derives its legitimacy. 284 The status of this central
entity is mysterious. The basic norm could hardly be thought to be an
288 For a dismission or the nature and purposes of firOOMO thinking in law, see Steven
Radically Subversive Speech and the Authority of Law, 94 Mimi. L. REv. 348, 362-67 (1995).
281 See generallyI—ON —.. rIDLER, LEGAL FICTIONS (1967). For a critical analysis of the ow of
legal fictions, see Peter Birks, Fictions Ancient and Modern, in THE LEGAL MIND 83 (Neil MacCor-
'nick & Peter Birks eds., 1986).
282 See S.F.C. MILSONI, HISTORICAL FOUNDATIONS OF THE CA)EINION LAW 34-35,61-65 (2d ed.
1981).
283 For an explanation of the fictions involved in suits against a state for constitutional
violations, see ERWIN CDENIERINSKE, FEDERAL JURISDICTION 346-47 (1989).
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empirically observable reality, although its effects (that is, the positive
laws) are observable. It is not legally enacted—and logically could not
be, since all legal enactments already depend upon it for their "legal"
character. Instead, the basic norm is "presupposed" or "postulated";" 5
it "exists in the juristic consciousness"286—or, more accurately, in the .
juristic unconsciousness, thus presenting the curious spectacle of an
entity that exists only in thought but is rarely if ever actually thought
of.287 In short, the basic norm is in the nature of a necessary postulate,
or big fiction—something that we need to treat "as if" it were real in
order to have a legal system at all.
The "rule of recognition" that H.L.A. Hart perceived at the fotin-
dation of law"' has a comparable quality. Hart's rule of recognition is
paradoxically circular: The rule achieves its status and content, .he
explained, from the fact that legal officials accept it as authoritative in
a particular form;289 but those officials enjoy their own status as legal
officials because the rule of recognition or subsidiary rules confer it
upon them. So the rule of recognition seems to he a kind of boot-strap-
ping, self-realizing fiction.
In a similar vein, Ronald Dworkin's jurisprudence literally teems
with fictional entities: a whole array of "legal pinciples,""° a "commu-
nity of principle" that is necessary for law to have authority: 29 ' a "single
author" of the whole law who permits law to be viewed as a unified,
coherent body of principles. 292 Dworkin never suggests that any of these
things have any reality independent of our legal practices and their
implicit assumptions, and it is not easy to imagine how they could have
any such reality. 293 On the contrary, some of them, such as the "com-
munity of principle," sewn flatly contrary to empirically observable
reality, and Dworkin himself describes this community as having its
287 See id. at 115.
288 See id. at 116.
287 See id. ("By formulating the basic norm, we ... merely make explicit what all jurists, mostly
unconsciously, assume 	 (emphasis added).
288 See HART, supra note 116, at 97-114 (1961).
289 See id. at 111-13.
29( ' See generally DWORKIN, A MXrFER OF PRINCIPLE, supra note 128; DWORKIN, TAKING
RIGI ITS SERIOUSLY, 5 RPM note 124, at 22-45.
291 Dworkin explains the "community of principle" in this way: "people are members of a
genuine political community only when they accept that their hues are linked in die [(Mowing
strong way: they accept that they are governed by rnr.ttoII principles, not by rules hammered
out in political compromise." DWORKIN, LAw's EMPIRE, S /IPM note 57, at 211.
292 See id. at 225.
293 Larry Alexander observes that legal "principles" of the kind so often it woked by Dworkin
and others are "ontologically queer." Alexandeh sitpu note 31, at 532. For more detailed discus-
sions, see ALEXANDER & KRESS, 51/Pra DOW 7l) and Smith, Idolatry, supra note 59, at 181-86.
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existence through an act of imagination that he calls "personifica-
tion:24" These entities exist because and in the sense that they are
presupposed—treated "as if" they existed—in our legal practices. They
are, in short, fictions.
This lawyerly proclivity to fictional thinking is consistent with a
view of law as the practice of a fictional faith, a faith built on the fiction
of "the law" itself. That view also helps to explain the ludic or game-like
quality of much of law. 295 We can plausibly speak of "the law" as some-
thing that exists, or as a "fact," in the same way that we say it is a fact—a
provable fact, within an understood game, that is—that Miss Scarlet
killed Colonel Mustard in the library with the candlestick. Someone
who thinks Mr. Green killed Mrs. White in the lounge with the revolver
is simply and demonstrably wrong—within the framework of the game,
of course.
The supposition that law is a fictional faith also may help to
explain the puzzling double-mindedness—the peculiar combination of
skeptical sophistication and apparent naivete—that lawyers and legal
scholars so often exhibit regarding the ontological status of "the law."
As noted, if the issue is raised in a context calling for critical self-con-
sciousness, lawyers and especially legal scholars will scoff at the notion
that "the law"—an entity exhibiting some of the qualities of a "brood-
ing otnnipresence"—somehow exists. But then the conversation
changes ("Did the Fifth Circuit get the law right in Smith v. Jones?" or
"Does section five of the Fourteenth Amendment authorize Congress
to expand constitutional rights?") and these same worldly-wise skeptics
will immediately launch into earliest doctrinal arguments that make
no apparent sense except on the presupposition that "the law" does
exist. Or the lawyers mock "legal formalism" and recite "we are all
realisth now," but go on writing briefs or opinions or articles that sound
for all the world like the work of formalists; and then if a critic raises
anti-formalist objections, they will yawn and say, "We all understand
that. Please don't be patronizing."
A detached critic might well feel constrained to classify these
familiar but seemingly schizophrenic phenomena as a kind of mental
illness?" But this double-mindedness becomes less puzzling if we sup-
pose that lawyers instinctively know they are playing a game. While
294 See DWORKIN, LAW'S EMPIRE, SUM note 58, at 167-75.
295 See Arthur Leff, Law and, 87 YALE Li. 989,998-1005 (1978).
296 See generally CAMPOS, LURISMANIA supra note 37; FL George Wright, Mat 's Gone Wrong
with Legyd Theory?: The Three Faces of our spur Personality, 33 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 410 (1998)
(describing dimensions "the split legal personality").
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engaged in the game, they may act like formalists—believers in "the
law"—because that is what the game calls for. Nor is there anything
cynical or dishonest about this practice so long as everyone under-
stands, at least tacitly, that the practice is part of the game. But realist
or anti-formalist criticisms are a cue to step outside the game, and in
that context lawyers and judges are perfectly well aware that "the
law"—the metaphysical law—does not "really" exist 29 '
If the depiction of law as a fictional faith seems to fit and explain
much of legal practice, there is one quality of practice that the depic-
tion does not adequately account for—that is, the trust that lawyers
place in law as a method for making real world decisions. As discussed
in Part I, legal practice does not make decisions, even decisions of vast
social importance, in the way that political leaders or business execu-
tives or investment advisors or ordinary people usually do—that is, by
a forward-looking assessment of future consequences (with a decent
respect for the past as a source of information relevant to the future
and of expectations to be honored). Instead, legal practice mainly tries
to derive decisions by figuring out what "the law" requires. As discussed
in Part II, it is precisely this nonconsequentialist, "artificial" aspect of
conventional legal reasoning that Holmes and his descendants over
the past century have found so deplorable. The typical lawyer or judge
appears to trust, however, that all will be for the best if decisions are
made in accordance with "the law." But a depiction of law as a sort of
game involving a fictional faith fails to account for this trust.
It may be possible, in other words, to talk and act "as if" the law
were real. Lawyers and judges seem adept at doing just that. But if we
also believe that in fact "the law"—the metaphysical "law"—is not real,
or if it is real only in the sense that a fiction is real, then what sense
does it make to entrust vitally important, sometimes life-or-death deci-
sions to that imaginary entity? Why should we let real world results flow
from a game of pretend? If law is a game, it is, as Arthur Leff observed,
"like a game of chess in which, when the King is mated, a real king
dies: 2gs We can imagine seeing such a game in an eerie episode of, say,
"Allied Hitchcock Presents" or "The X Files." By analogy, there may
be value in allowing children to play at cops and robbers, but we do
not let them play the game with real guns. So why should real conse-
quences be left to turn on a merely fictional faith?
297 1'his depiction of die way ill which law might have reality and yield "troth" is very similar
to the position of modern legal formalists like Dennis Patterson. See .supra notes 199-44 and
accongianyittg text.
298 See Leff, supm note 295, at 1005,
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In short, although the idea of "fictional faith" illuminates sonic
aspects of legal practice, it also seems that the operations of law pre-
suppose a faith in a law that is more than merely fictional. So we should
consider other types of quasi-faith that might provide a plausible ac-
count of the workings of law.
2. Ancillary faith
As a historical matter, law usually has not operated as an inde-
pendent or free-standing faith; instead, it has typically functioned as
a sort of appendage to a more complete and self-conscious faith.
Through much of Western history, law operated under the broad
canopy of Christendom, so that in both its content and its form West-
ern law has reflected the powerful influence of an explicit Christian
faith. This interrelationship is thoughtfully explored in Harold Ber-
man's Law and Revolution. Berman argues that although many cultures
and civilizations have developed legal systems, Western law developed
distinctive features, and these features began to form at the same time
and as a direct result of the Papal Revolution of the Eleventh Cen-
tury—a development that self-consciously sought to solidify the Chris-
tian underpinnings of society. Indeed, some of the central features that
are most indicative of law's grounding in an orientation of faith—in
particular, the idea of "the law" as a unified whole that develops
according to its own internal workings and not merely in response to
outside pressures or the instrumentalist pursuit of social goals—devel-
oped during this period."' So Western law, in this view, is intimately
tied to the Christian faith.
And indeed, through much of its history, the Anglo-American
common law in particular was thought to be closely related to Christi-
anity. Stuart Banner observes that when the great common law judge
and scholar Matthew Hale stated in 1676 that Christianity was part of
the common law, Hale was merely making explicit what would widely
have been regarded as self-evident.'" The association persisted in this
country. Thus, in the nineteenth century, "farom the United States
Supreme Court to scattered local courts, from Kent and Story to
dozens of writers no one remembers today, Christianity was generally
accepted to be part of the common law."°'
233 See I IAROLDI BERMAN, LAW AND REVOLVER/ 'FIrE FORMATION OF THE WESTERN LEGAI
TRADITION 8-10,139-98 (1983).
3 ® See Banner, supra note 190, at 29.
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Attachment to a more self-conscious and developed faith might
support the practice of law as a sort of corollary or quasi-faith in two
quite different ways. First, and most directly, the explicit faith might
supply both an ontology and an epistemology directly supporting the
practice of law. Thotnist philosophy, for example, provides an intricate
framework in which "the law" is viewed as real, not merely fictional.
Simply described, this framework understands God's design for the
world to be the "eternal law." That subset of the eternal law which is
directly accessible to human understanding without the aid of revela-
tion is called the "natural law," and insofar as this law is enacted in
positive form by temporal political authorities it becomes the "human
law" or the "positive law:m 2 In addition, Thomist philosophy offers au
explanation for how custom acquires legal significance."' In this way,
an explicit faith provides possible justifications for many of the core
assumptions and practices of conventional legal reasoning. 3°4
In a similar way, its association with Christianity may have sup-
ported the common law's distinctive methods of reasoning. In his
account of the nature of law, Blackstone offered a framework strikingly
similar to the natural law framework expounded by Aquinas." 05 In a
similar vein, Stuart Banner maintains that the proposition that Chris-
tianity was part of the common law was "not a doctrine so much as a
meta-doctrine"; the meta-doctrine helped support a "non-positivist"
view of the common law "as having an existence independent of the
statements ofjudges." 300 This jurisprudential function was hardly trivial;
the "non-positivist" jurisprudence was precisely what underlay the view
that the law was there to be "discovered""°" and not made. Additionally,
the non-positivist jurisprudence supports the forms of conventional
lawyerly argument that accompanied that view. Quoting Richard
302 See 	 Theologim, Questions 90-91, reprinted hi SAINT THOMAS AQUINAS ON LAW,
MottAkrrv, Am) PoUTICS II-28 (William P. Baiting:at 8: Richard J. Regan, ST, eds. 1988).
303 See id. at 79-81 (noting question 97, article 3).
304 As Harold Berman explains, the Western notion of law as a unity that develops organically
"was rooted ... in the theological conviction that We universe itself was subject to law," BERMAN,
supra note 299, at 536.
3°3 SM BLACKSTONE, 511p/VIIKHe 42, at *38-43. Blacksuule stales
DJ his law of nature, being core al with mankind and dictated by God himself, is of
course superior in obligation to any other. It is binding over all the globe, in all
countries, and at all times: no human laws are of any validity, if contrary to this;
and such of them as are valid derive all their force, and all their authority, mediately
or immediately, Boni this original.
Id, at 41.
306 See Banner, suprainae 199, at 50,61; see also Irckust4N, supra note 125, at 159 (discussing
Joseph Story's view that a natural law closely associated with Christianity undergirds all law).
307 See Banner, supra note 199, at 60.
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Hooker's statement that law sits "in the bosom of God, her voice the
harmony of the world," Robert Gordon contends that pre-Hohnesian
lawyers "had, as they saw it, a direct line to God's mind through their
knowledge of the principles of legal science." 308
Less directly, but perhaps as importantly, a consciously- and sin-
cerely-held faith might help to create the mindset and the kinds of
habits reflected in legal practice, even if the faith does not directly
endorse the assumptions of that practice. In this way, an explicit faith
might support law in the same way that Weber thought Protestantism
had supported capitalism: By instilling in people qualities such as
industriousness, self-denial, and a sense of calling, Protestantism had
laid "the religious foundations of worldly asceticism" that comprised
"the spirit of capitalism.""9 So Benjamin Franklin was a sort of quin-
tessential Protestant—minus the religion.sw In similar fashion, persons
innnersed in an explicit faith might naturally learn to think of an
unseen reality as normatively authoritative. And they would become
accustomed to making decisions—to orienting their lives—by looking
to a variety of supposed revelations or intimations that are taken as
dispensing guidance from that unseen reality. In this way, legal practice
might be parasitic even on an explicit faith that did not directly provide
any justification for the particular content or practices of the law.
Moreover, an ancillary faith nnght well generate the sort of habitual
trust that a merely fictional faith could not support.
In this vein, Pierre Schlag describes modern law as "the continu-
ation of God by other means."sl' Schlag explores parallels between the
classic philosophical arguments for the existence of God and the de-
fenses of the enterprise of law raised by modern legal thinkers, ranging
from formalists such as Joseph Beale to contemporary mainstream,
pragmatist and post-modern scholars like Owen Fiss, Margaret Jane
Raclin, Frank Michelman and Jack Balkin.' 12 These legal thinkers do
not explicitly or consciously embrace the theological framework that
they inadvertently imitate; nonetheless, Schlag argues, their ways of
thinking and arguing show that they are engaged in a "residually
theological discourse."'"
3°8 Robert Gordon, The Path of the Langer, 110 14Anv. L. REV. 1013,1013 (1997).
owl See 51.AX WEBER, THE PROTESTANT Ernie AND THE SPIRIT OF CAPITALISM 95,47 (falcon
Parsons tnois., Scribner 1958) (1904-05).
31° See id at 48-56,151.
311 See Pierre &Nag, tato as the Continuation of God by Other Means, 85 GAL. L. REv. 427
(1997).
312 See id at 428-37.
313 See id. at 439; cf: Cohen, Sit/na note 101, at 833 (describing conventional approach to law
as "legal theology").
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An ancillary faith, however, would naturally encounter serious
difficulties if it were cut off froth the explicit faith to which it was
attached. Trouble would arise, in other words, with the religious dises-
tablishmentnot formal disestablishment so much as de facto disestab-
lishment" 14—that would inhibit law from drawing on the primary faith
that previously sustained it. This observation suggests a possible diag-
nosis of the course of legal thinking in this country. Despite formal
disestablishment in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries,
legal culture in this country continued to enjoy a symbiotic relation-
ship with Protestant Christianity. As discussed in Part IV, however, as
the nineteenth century moved into the twentieth, this relationship was
ruptured. More fully than in the past, law was accordingly left on its
owthml—a condition that was, accentuated by the growing secularism of
the academy.
So it is no coincidence that at, about this time disenchanted proph-
ets like Holmes began to find the traditional operations of law—opera-
tions grounded in. a law that served as an ancillary faith—"revolting"
and unintelligible. And they naturally began to understand law in more
secular and rationalist terms—as the product, for example, of instru-
mentalist calculations that judges make without quite being aware of
what they are doing, and that now should be brought into the open.
Unfortunately, this newly-supplied rationalist framework, however ap-
pealing, had little to do with the enterprise that for centuries had gone
under the name of "law." Consequently, secular rationalists such as
Holmes and his descendants might he compared to uninitiated ob-
servers who look over a golf course and, surmising that the golfers must
be trying to keep the grass short, point out disdainfully that there are
far more efficient methods of achieving this objective. In each case,
the observers have badly misunderstood the enterprise they are trying
to explain and regulate."'
311 For a discussion of the "de l'acto disestahlishment" and some of its consequences, see
generally Steven D. Smith, Legal Disconme a nd , the De Facto Disestablishmen!, 81 MAN. L. Rev. 203
(1998).
See Morton J, litwwitz, The Both Nomination and American Constitution Flistoiy, 39
SYRACUSE L. REV. 1029, 1033 (1988) ("If you look at the relationship between law and religion
in American society, you will see the tremmulons connection between the two and the ways in
which law came in the late nineteenth century to replace religion as one of the dominant forms
of certainty and legitimacy in social life."); see also Christopher Sham ton, The Dance of flintily, 8
VALE 3. L. & HUMAN. 495, 503 (1996) (book review) ("The nineteenth century disestablished
religion, but it did not disestablish, law. Legal discourse retains an air of sanctity largely lacking
in the humanities due to its connection to 'sacred,' pre-scientific interpretive traditions.").
316 Harold Berman asserts in Otis vein that "Western legal science is a secular theology,- which
often makes no sense because its theological presuppositions are no longer accepted," BERMAN,
811pal note 299, at 165; see also HAROLD J. BERMAN, FAITH AND ORDER: THE RECONCILIATION OF
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This depiction of law as a parasitic faith that has been cut off from
its host thus provides a plausible account of how the features of law
developed and of why the law as it actually operates has seemed so
alien to twentieth century theorists. This depiction leaves a question,
however, about the current character of legal practice. If law arose out
of and has depended on attachment to a more explicit faith, then why
does the practice of law persist even though the attachment on which
it depends has long been dissolved? Are the mental habits and prac-
tices produced by a now discarded faith really so entrenched that they
can endure for years, or" even generations, after the tie to the primary,
explicit faith has been severed? And if they can, does it make sense to
continue to describe that practice as "ancillary" when it has long been
disjoined from its former principal?
Moreover, it would seem that, deprived of the conscious faith that
once supported it, the merely habitual continuation of a practice
would be possible only if the practitioners managed to avoid reflecting
critically on what they were doing. Conversely, if they did stop to reflect,
they seemingly would be forced either to admit that the practice makes
no sense on current assumptions—and should therefore be aban-
doned—or else to mairitain the practice by embracing a strategy of
deception or self-deception.'n Schlag suggests that such a practice
might be maintainable only by resorting to "bad faith." 3 's Not surpris-
ingly, this is just what some critics think law does rest on.
3. Bad faith
Pursuing this suggestion, we might wonder whether lawyers and
judges are routinely acting from "bad faith." The concept of "bad faith"
is both a familiar legal term and a notion used more broadly in ethical
discourse, especially by existentialist thinkers like Sartre.s!' For present
purposes, we can say that a person is in bad faith if she purports to act
on the basis of a set of beliefs—or a faith—that in fact she-does not
sincerely hold. Bad faith is a close cousin to the common notion of
LAW AND RELIGION 45 (1993) ('"Pile primary cause of the crisis of the Western legal tradition is,
1 believe, the disintegration of its religious foundations.").
317 In Mark Kelinan's view, "Maw professors are, in fact, a kiss away front panic at every
serious, self-conscious moment in which t hey don't have a bunch of overawed students to kick
around." Kelinan, supra note 276, at 322.
3" See Schlag, supra note 311, at 440. -
srs For a helpful exposition, see MIKE W. MARTIN, SELF-DECEPTION AND MORALITY 53-79
(1986).
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hypocrisy, in which a person pretends in public to hold commitments
and beliefs that in private he does not maintain.
One diagnosis of the contemporary situation in law is that legal
practitioners—lawyers, judges and law professors—act pervasively in
bad faith. In this vein, Roberto Unger famously described the pre-CLS
legal professoriat—and there is no apparent reason to treat the post-
CLS professoriat differently—as "a priesthood that had lost their faith
and kept their jobs."" 2" Recently, Duncan Kennedy has offered an
extensive diagnosis of modern legal culture that pervasively depends
on ascriptions of bad faith. Through the use of the concept, Kennedy
seeks to explain "the simultaneously critical and 'believing' character
of American legal consciousness, its paradoxical combination of skep-
ticism and faith."721
The source of the bad faith, in Kennedy's analysis, is the conflict
between the commitment to "rule of law"—a commitment that re-
quires law to be determinate, deductive and, above all, nonideologi-
cal—and the knowledge that in fact law does•not and cannot work in
the way the ideal contemplates. Judges resolve this conflict by present-
ing decisions as deductive, and by half-believing that law in fact has
this character, even though at another level they know this is not so.
They do not (and could not, at least in a systemic way) engage in
"conscious, deliberate, strategic misrepresentation;""" rather, their de-
nial of the ideological character of legal decisions is "half-conscious,
or conscious and unconscious at the same time." 323 Drawing on the
work of Freud and Sartre, Kennedy suggests that "there is sonic part
of the psyche that registers the possibility of the unpleasant truth and
then mobilizes to keep from knowing it." 324 Consequently,
Nile ideological element [in law] is a kind of secret, like a
family secret—the incestuous relationship between grandfa-
ther and mother—that affects all the generations as some-
thing that is both known and denied. 52"
32° See Roberto M. Unger, The Critical Legal Studies Movement, 96 MARV. L. Rev. 561,674-75
(1983).
321 See KENNEDY, Sifpra note 133, at 106.
321 Id. at 193. Kennedy suggests that legal culture probably could not practice conscious
dishonesty because "it would then have the instability of any conspiracy that involves many
thousands of people and has to constantly renew itself by recruiting new Grand Inquisitors."
at 192. A few, judges, however, may be guilty of conscious Iyhig. See id. at 202.
323 Id. at 200.
321 KENNEDY, supra cote 133, at 199.
325 Id. at 191.
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Kennedy's diagnosis of legal culture is a nuanced one. He acknow-
ledges that denial and bad faith work differently in different judges 4x
And he does not depict law as simply and purely an exercise in bad
faith. Legal texts do effectively and legitimately constrain, in a non-
ideological way, to a limited extent: Hence, critical claims that exag-
gerate the indeterminacy and ideological quality of law are implausible
and may themselves reflect bad faith on the part of the nitics. 317
Moreover, the bad faith representation of law as nonideological is not
simply a device by which one class—judges and lawyers—deceive and
oppress other classes. On the contrary, the bad faith engulfs us all—
perhaps for our benefit:
Judges keep the secret, even from themselves, in part because
participants in legal culture and in the general political cul-
ture want them to. Everyone wants it to be true that it is not
only possible but common for judges to judge nonideologi-
cally. But everyone is aware of the critique, and everyone
knows that the naive theory of the rule of law is a fairy tale
328
. .
In short, we manage to maintain faith, albeit "bad faith," in the
law because we think "the rule of law is . . . a beneficent illusion." To
be sure, the illusion confers a dangerous authority on judges. Still, if
the illusion were shattered, then perhaps "judges would tyrannize us
worse than they do already."32" Consequently, the legal academy and
the legal culture have reason to ignore or censure anyone who threat-
ens the illusion by telling the truth about the law. 3""
Although in some respects this seems a plausible depiction of
contemporary legal culture, it fails to appreciate the full complexities
of the internal dissonance in contemporary legal culture. It may be
true, as Kennedy suggests, that judges routinely present their decisions
as the product of deductive, formalist reasoning. This is the aspect of
legal culture, of course, that underlies Kennedy's charges of bad faith.
320 .See id. at 194-98.
322 See, e.g.. id. at 198 (observing "the insistence that law is always and everywhere ideological"
involves as much denial as the more common and formalist position, reflecting the Met that
"Madicals have commitments to the presence of ideology in adjudication tlmt it would be haul
to give up").
322 1d. at 192; cf. CAMPOS, PRISMANIA, supra note 37, at 176 (suggesting that law is "an
institution that survives, and even thrives. because it hil[s] a (lee') cultural need for Ihe mainte-
nance of sonic atavistic set of rituals that will obscure the inescapably troublesome and often
tragic relationship between nnnal belief, political practice, and social power").
329 See KENNEDY, SUpE8 note 133, at 206.
330 See id. at 209.
September 1999] 	 RELIEVING liKE A L1 1 19F.R 	 1129
But Kennedy seems insufficiently attentive to another important fea-
ture of legal culture—to the fact, that is, that judges and lawyers today
typically do not avow a belief in the sort of law that their practices seem
to presuppose. In this respect, legal culture does not conform to the
familiar pattern of bad faith.
In ordinary bad faith, in other words, a person professes to believe
in something that in fact he does not believe. His hypocrisy or self-de-
ception serves his interests, because without a (false) profession of
belief he would lose something he values. In contemporary legal cul-
ture, on the contrary, practitioners profess not to believe in something—
the metaphysical law—that their actions suggest they actually do believe
in. And since their practice—or, more generally, "the law" itself—is
something that they evidently value, their dissonant professions of dis-
belief in the presuppositions of law are not self-serving in any straight-
forward sense.
To put the point differently, if lawyers were practicing bad faith in
the typical sense, then one would expect them to protect their practice
by avowing the faith presupposed in the practice, not by disavowing it.
Disillusioned ministers or pastors, it is said, sometimes do this; Unger's
comparison of law professors to a "priesthood that had lost their
faith"":" draws on this sort of reference. But on closer examination, it
seems that lawyers and law professors do just the opposite of the had
faith pastor: They persist in the practice while denying the faith. Or
rather, they avow faith in. the practice, but not in the premises that seem
necessary to support the practice.
This perplexing condition invites us to consider a different and
almost opposite possibility: Could it be that at some level legal practi-
tioners do believe in "the law," and that if they are guilty of "bad faith,"
their misrepresentation or self-deception occurs not when they engage
in the faith-presupposing practices of law but rather when they con-
sciously or explicitly disavow that faith? In short, although lawyers and
judges might be in had faith when they engage in the practice of law,
their overall behavior seems more consistent with the hypothesis that
the self-deception occurs when lawyers and theorists engage in explicit
theorizing about law—and when in the course of such theorizing they
affirm rationalist, metaphysically reductionist commitments that are
inconsistent with their practice?"'
"I See Unger„cohen :lute 320, at 674-75.
332 There is still another possibility: Lawyer s might be in bad flail' both in their practice and
in their theorizing. They might in fact adhere to a kind of faith that they hide or disavow in their
explicit theorizing, but that faith might not be one that would support the current operations of
legal practice.
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This possibility brings us full circle—back to the "legal faith." And
so we should consider once again the question whether law is in fact
the expression not of a "quasi" or "bad" faith, but of au actual "legal
faith."
C. The Hidden Faith of the Law?
The most searching investigation of this counterintuitive possibil-
ity occurs in the recent work of Joseph Vining, and in particular in his
book From Newton's Sleep. Vining aims to discover what sort of faith
lawyers (and human beings in general)'" really hold—a task that is
both complicated and perilous because Vining does not assume that
our beliefs are transparent or immediately accessible even to ourselves
through casual inspection or introspection. "We hardly know our-
selves," he confesses."'" Consequently, what I think I believe is evi-
dence—but only evidence—of what I really believe. The ways I use
language (as opposed to what I explicitly assert), and the ways in which
I act and plan and live are also evidence of what I believe. 3" So
discovering what I believe entails a careful reflection upon what I think,
say and do in order to reveal the underlying beliefs that authentically
are part of me. 336 In the same way, the investigation of what lawyers (or
human beings generally) believe involves a close examination not only
of what people say they believe but also of what they tacitly concede in
the way they talk and of the presuppositions that seem to underlie their
actions. 337 These various kinds of evidence may often contradict each
other—for example, Vining frequently identifies statements or actions
in which lawyers, scientists or philosophers tacitly deny what they
explicitly assert, and vice versa"eso that the determination of belief
is no easy task that can be finally and confidently completed.
3" Vining argues that huniall existence is permeated by law and legal thinking, hence
examining legal practice and the kind of belief reflected in it is a way of stitching human belief
generally. SeeViNtur, Nrurrou's SLEEP, supra note 22, at 107.
33'1 1d. at 344.
535 See id. :it 128. 130, 189.
'56 In this respect, Vining's project is very much like dmt described by Michael Polanyi:
1 believe that the function of philosophic reflection consists in bringing to light,
and affirming as my own, the beliefs implied ill such of my thoughts and practices
as 1 believe to be valid; that I must aim al discovering what I truly believe ill and at
formulating the convictions whic h I find myself holding; that I must conquer my
seffidoubts, so as to retain a finn hold on this programme of self-identification.
PoLANvt, supra note 272, at 267.
337 See VINING, NEWTON'S SLEEP, supra note 22, at 5 (asserting it is too often overlooked that
law is evidence of view and belief far stronger than academic statement and introspection can
provide"); see also id at 60, 224, 331.
338 See, e.g., id. at 136. 140, 176, 187.
September 19991
	 BELIEVING LIKE A LAWYER 	 1131
Vining's mode of presentation reflects these difficulties. He offers
no linear analysis leading to any definite and confident conclusion, but
rather a series of reflections ranging from near aphorisms to short
essays. The argument—and despite its self-consciously meandering
method" the book plainly contains 'an overall argument—advances
slowly, haltingly, and with many changes of direction, detours and
returns. In the end, the argument leaves a good deal open or uncer-
tain. No summary could hope to capture the range or quality of the
reflection but some recurring central themes can be identified.
In the first place, Vining repeatedly observes that the activity of a
lawyer involves the careful reading of texts—statutes, cases, contracts,
regulations. Moreover, lawyers read texts with a particular purpose in
mincl; they aim to encounter "authority"—something that deserves our
attention and respect. But it mak$ no sense to react carefully—much
less to read a text seeking authority—unless one supposes that the text
is the expression of some person. Without a person speaking to us there
would be no meaning in the words at all, much less a meaning that we
would respect and struggle to understand. 3" Thus, Vining emphasizes
that if we were to come upon what might appear to be a text only to
discover that, in fact, it is the product of random, mindless processes—
of waves on the beach, or of a manual containing form letters—then
we would not engage in close reading to determine the text's meaning.
Indeed, we would be embarrassed to be caught in such an activity,
feeling "the blush of foolishness that comes with au awareness no one
is speaking."'" Much less would we regard the mindless marks as
worthy of deference or respect.
The activities of law, therefore, betray a constant presupposition
of mind behind, and expressing itself in, the texts lawyers study.:142 Law
is, in effect, a. restless "search for voices."i 43
Insofar as he insists that bare words have no meanings and that
interpretation must look to what an author was trying to say, it might
almost seem that Vining is arguing for the familiar "intentionalist"
versions of constitutional or statutory construction. But Vining suggests
that our practices cannot be accounted for by supposing that we are
33"ThiS mei hod of indirection and repetition is consciously chosen. if you are writing, rat her
than speaking intimately face to face," Vining explains, "you do not rush to bare yourself. Ally
miting is distillation of mcillatioi is, resolution of doubts, linking of intermittent perceptions you
know you have some days and times and have not on others." Id. at 343.
31" Sir id. at 183,239.
311 See VINING, Nett-R*4's SLEEP,	 note 22, at 243; .see also id. at 7-8,182-83.
342 See id. note 22, at ISO.
" 3 See id, at 117.
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merely looking for the intentions of the flesh-and-blood authors of a
statute or constitutional provision. After all, not just any author would
be worthy of deference. In order to merit that respect, and hence to
justify our interpretive practices, the author would need to speak to us,
now—would need in some sense to be actually pwsent.$11 The author
would also need to address us not in a game of manipulation, but in
"good faith."45 And the author would need to display the qualities of
caring, and of mindfulness, that warrant our continued attention and
respect."' Rarely, if ever,. would the enactors of some dated statute or
ancient constitution have these qualities.
Nonetheless, we continue to interpret the materials of law in ways
that presuppose some such mind speaking to us through the assorted
texts that lawyers study and invoke. So we must be seeking an author
beyond the particular enactors:44" "Lawyers are caught by legislation
and their reading of it," Vining argues. "Either they must believe what
they do with legislation is often foolish and deceptive; or they do
believe and confess a belief in an informing spirit in the legislated words
that is beyond individual legislators." 118
We thereby reveal a faith that there is something—or, better,
someone" —who communicates to us through the texts that lawyers
study, but who transcends the flesh-and-blood authors of those texts.
Just who or what that someone is remains obscure, an object of Vining's
continual musings. He describes the ultimate author as "spirit" and as
the "transcendent."3mAt times he hints at a sort of pantheism, in which
through the practices of the law we come to know the universal mind,
while at the same time we come to knOw our own true selves, and these
somehow turn out to be the same thing.sm In this spirit, Vining wonders
whether "our whole life outer and inner exists forever as a memory in
344 See, e.g., id. at 109 (stating "11)Int the authority of law is not the clutch of the past....
The 'dead hand of the past' is just that dead, gone. The past cannot touch to.").
515 SeeVINING, NEWTON'S SLEEP, supra note 22, at 111, 239.
346 See id. at 180.
347 See id. at 74 (siatingwe act on "the premise ... that there is a unity and spirit. Without
spirit there is nothing in law, no teason to read or listen closely, to defer, to be deferred to").
348 Id. at 200 (emphasis added). Vining adds: "As in all large matters, there is a mixture, the
usual combination, of doubt and belief, made easier to live with, as ustlid, by strong doses of
self-deception." hl.
349 See SEINING, blEseroN's SLEEP, SUP/11 note 22, at 201 ("So the first and last thing we know,
the ultimate object of knowledge and belief, is a person, not a principle.... This is what we know,
what is real, what has meaning.").
350 See id. at 157, 222.
3" See id. at 128 ("ITIhe question of what the la is' is not so very different front the question
of what we 'ale.'").
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a greater mind"352 and he asks "[w]hat is that original mind if not a
mind something like our own, and what are it and our own but points
to a larger mind?" 3"
But from these hints, and given Vining's own description of writ-
ing as "distillations of vacillations," one could hardly conclude that
Vining is proselytizing for pantheism. Ultimately, the object of the faith
that Vining finds in the practices of law lends itself more to poetic
-suggestion than to creedal formulation. Fittingly, therefore, the book
ends with a poem, which itself ends not with a period but with a clash.








In the clear silence,
The moving stillness—""
In any case, it is that someone—that "spirit" or that "transcen-
dent," necessarily personal—that we actually seek in the practices of
law. And what that someone speaks to us is what we call "the law." So
the texts we study are not themselves "the law," Vining repeatedly
asserts, but rather "evidence" of the law''"—which is to say that they
are evidence of the mind we seek to understand and respect.
treating statutes and precedents as "evidence" of law, Vining's reflec-
tions seem much like the view expressed in the classic statements of
the common law (like Blackstone, or Swift v. Tyson) —a view that
modern rationalists like Holmes have found so incomprehensible."'"
A skeptic would no doubt say that Vining's law is incomprehensi-
ble. Has Vining in fact lapsed into a sort of "transcendental nonsense?"
Is his version of what lawyers search for—of what "the law" must
be—beyond the pale of plausibility? Anticipating such doubts, Vining's
own response is that our behavior shows that we do harbor some such
belief.
352 Id. at 353.
353 Id, at 220.
351 VINING, NEWTON'S SLEEP, sum note 22, a' 355.
5" Sr(' id. at 116, 128, 240.
356 See supra notes 102-04, 108-16 and accompanying text.
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But if, the way we and the world and the universe are, we
cannot do without authority, without saying you ought, you
must, we will produce suffering and take responsibility for it,
I ought, I must suffer if I do not—and if authority is impos-
sible should this something more not exist—then we have
some evidence that what we must believe, is. What we must
believe, must be, not because it exists if we believe it exists,
but because we exist and have been given the means, by our
work, to continue existing. l'' 7
Although Vining's at times mystical and perhaps romantic depic-
tion of law seems almost antithetical to that of an unrelenting critic
like, say, Pierre Schlag, in many ways their assessments coincide. Both
perceive that law is at its core an enterprise of faith and that legal
discourse is essentially theological; 358 consequently, the rationalist juris-
prudences of the twentieth century have served mostly to misrepresent
or conceal law's real character. Both scholars also perceive the im-
mense gap between what lawyers profess to believe (and profess not to
believe) and the beliefs that seem presupposed in the way lawyers actu-
ally speak and act. Iii the end, the difference seems to be that Schlag
is more willing to credit or accept modernist non-belief, so that insofar
as the operations of law .appear to presuppose some sort of faith, it
follows that law is incoherent and probably in bad faith. Vining, on the
other hand, takes seriously the possibility of genuine belief and seeks
to use law to rescue that possibility from the "cynical acid"350 of modern
rationalism. In a sense, Vining acts on the Augustinian maxim that one
must first believe in order to understand—"Without faith," Vining
observes, "we know nothing beyond ourselves" 360—and thereby dis-
cerns in law (or thinks he discerns) what Schlag has dismissed from
the outset.
Vining acknowledgeS that when it is approached in this way, law
becomes "an object of amazement to the modern and postmodern
mentality. ":16I And he points out that, reflectively , studied, law and its
557 VINING, NEWTON'S SLEEP. PIM note 22, at 264-65.
338 As noted, Schlag describes contemporary law as a "residually theological discourse." See
Schlag, supra !tote 311. Vining has long emphasized the affinity hetweett law and theology. See
NEWTON'S SLEEP, Set//1/ note 22, at 133..217, 263, 312; see also JOSEPH VINING. THE
AUTIIHREENFIVE AND THE AUTHORITARIAN 187-201 (1086); Joseph Vining, Legal Affinities, 23 GA.
L. REV. 1035, 1035-37 (1989).
359 Cf. Holmes, The Path of the Law, supra note 3, at 462 (proposing to understand law better
by "washf Mg] it with cynical acid").
:16° See VINING, NEWTON'S SLEEP, supra mole 22, at 103, 179 (asserting that die mind cannot
he known until It is searched lit; and the search must be driven by faith).
39I See id. at 110.
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presuppositions will be "subversive" of twentieth century thought—of
the materialism evident in so much work in the sciences and social
sciences, but also of "what goes by the name postmodernism in literary
and philosophic studies.""" Nonetheless, Vining insists that his ap- •
proach of faith is not incompatible with, and indeed is thoroughly
grounded in, reason. "Reason in its largest sense, respect for evidence
that includes all experience," he asserts, "is the very ground of faith?"
We may want to banish "transcendence" and the "mysterium tremen-
chin," he says, but in doing so we are "not true to experience."""
Moreover, in starting with faith, he is only doing what lawyers always
do—and must do: "The lawyer . . . approaches the words with a faith
to he tested in her work with them."'"
But even if one joins Vining in perceiving an underlying faith in
human activities, and even if in that respect one departs from the
skeptical modernist assumptions in which Schlag places his trust, still
it does not follow that law, as currently practiced, reflects any viable
formulation of faith. From different starting points and with vastly
different attitudes, both Vining and Schlag point to the need for a
jurisprudence of faith. But whether such a jurisprudence would serve
to vindicate law—or faith, or both—or on the contrary, would serve to
subvert them remains an open question.
VII. CONCLUSION: CRISIS OF FAITH
In departing from the "Path of the Law" laid out by Holmes and
followed by the large majority of twentieth-century legal thinkers, Vin-
ing and Berman, Schlag and Kennedy strike out in very different,
sometimes almost opposite directions. Still, these disparate thinkers
agree on a good deal; they agree that, among other things, law as it is
practiced today is a very dissonant enterprise. This dissonance suggests
that the "crisis" that critics like Professor Glendon and Dean Iiironman
diagnose as a loss of tradition and professional ideals, and that critics
like Judge Edwards perceive as a gap between academics and practitio-
ners, is at bottom a crisis of faith—one that runs through the souls of
academics and practitioners alike. The gap is between our practices
and our beliefs—or between the beliefs that seem to be presupposed
362 See id. at 208.
aria
	 at 103.
361 1d. at 329-30 (stating "lithe world is full of oddnesses and incongruities, and this is not
the least of them, this departure from the empirical taken by so many whose clikf pride is their
empiricism.").
363 See VINING, NEWTON'S SLEEP, SUM note 22, at 160.
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in our practices and the beliefs that we are willing consciously and
publicly to affirm.
Understood in this way, the present crisis is hardly unprecedented.
There have been times when a large body of prevailing practices came
to seem insupportableto some people, at least—by reference to any
viable formulation of faith; and the result has sometimes been a wide-
ranging re-examination both of faith and practice in an effort either
to reestablish and reaffirm those practices on a more secure basis or
else to reform, or even repudiate, those practices. 366 In the Reforma-
don era, for example, controversies over then-current church prac-
tices, such as the sale of indulgences, and over extant forms of spiritu-
ality led both proponents and critics of the Church to debate and
formulate what Christian faith consisted of, and then to apply such
formulations to defend or criticize the existing order. Such debates led
one kind of reformer—Erasmus, for example—to advocate relatively
modest changes within existing ecclesiastical structures and religious
practices. Other reformers, like Luther and Calvin, interpreted the
faith to support a more thorough-going criticism, culminating in a
rupture within the existing structures, while still others, such as the
Anabaptists, were led to adopt a much more radical separation from
Christendom altogether. In the Counter-Reformation response, the
Council of Trent undertook a sort of restatement of the faith that
sought both to preserve and reform traditional Christian under-
standings and practices."''
A similar re-examination seems called for at the present time in
law. It would he helpful, in other words, for lawyers and scholars to
examine and articulate the underlying assumptions and ontological
commitments of legal practice, to try to determine what sort of faith
is presupposed in that practice, to assess the acceptability of that faith
in itself and with respect to other prevailing beliefs, and to deliberate
about whether law, either as it currently operates or in some modified
form, is supportable on the basis of premises that we do or might
actually believe.
In fact, however, there is at present little evidence that such an
examination is occurring. On the contrary, the decade of the 1990s
seems, if anything, to have been a period of exhaustion and defensive
SW Though he does not describe the procesS ill pike these tenors, Harold Berman argues
that Western law is !mini:nily the product of a series of such revolutions. See generally BERMAN,
supra note 299.
367 For all overview and analysis of the various Refornmiion movements and responses, see
STEVEN OzmENT, THE AGE OF REFORM 1250-550 (1980).
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retrenchment in which radical questionings, such as those associated
with the Critical Legal Studies movement, were quieted or marginal-
ized. 3 's One reason for this professional reticence grows out of a crucial
difference between our situation and that of earlier periods such as
the Reformation. All parties to the Reformation controversies under-
stood that they were participating in an enterprise of faith. By contrast,
legal thinkers in this century have not acknowledged that law is a
discipline of faith at all. On the contrary, they have adamantly main-
tained that in understanding and justifying law "no ultimate mysteries
[may] be invoked to legitimate its exercise—no transcendent authority,
no Kierkegaardian leap of faith.""" Consequently; legal thinkers have
persistently tried to present law within a broadly rationalist framework,
even though (as the theorists themselves repeatedly insist) the actual
practices of law are largely incongruent with that framework. So the
deep presuppositions of legal practice have remained largely unac-
knowledged and, hence, immune from discussion, criticism or refor-
mulation.
As a result, modern law presents a peculiar spectacle of an activity
grounded in an orientation of faith but lacking the support or guidance
of miyform illation of faith, much less any conscious commitment of faith.
One might say that in its attempts at self-reflection, modern law pre-
sents a spectacle of arrested development. Consequently, in its prac-
tices, modern law reflects a complex of habits carried on without
conviction or self-understanding. We cannot move forward in either
the understanding or the operation of law because we cannot acknow-
ledge the commitments to which law is responsive.
This is the predicament in which law and •lawyers currently find
themselves. And the most important task, facing jurisprudence is to
address this predicament. Students of the law need to do what a long
line of "legal realists" have aspired to do but (misoriented by reduc-
tionist aspirations and rationalist demands) have not quite managed
to do—to try to understand law as it really operates. And we need to
consider how law, as it really operates, relates to what we really believe.
If, that is, we are any longer capable of thinking about such ques-
tions.
568 See, e.g., GLENDON, SIIPEG note 14, at 250 (noting law schools in the 1990s seemed
characterized by a "puss ideological wood"); Mark Tosimet, Critical Legal Studies:A Political
History, 100 YALE 1515, 1519-20 (1991) ("In law, people continue to go through the motions
of defending ... centeoleft jurisprudence, b u t it has become almost tiresome evelt to the people
doi ng die work ..."). For sake of clarity, I note that Critical Legal Studies to my knowledge never
proposed that law be understood in terms of a serious engagement with the concept of faith.
369 See Grey, The Constitution, supra tame 98, at 6. Grey was discussing judicial review spe-
cifically, but his assumption derives from the legal culture at large.
